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Abstract
This study uses the microdata assembled by the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) to examine the impact of the social security and taxation systems on 
poverty and inequality in ten OECD countries, circa 1980. A model of income 
transfer processes is developed to show the relationship between 
government expenditure, transfer instruments and the outcomes of the 
transfer process. The study adapts and extends existing methodologies in the 
poverty and inequality literature. These measures are then applied to the LIS 
microdata to reveal the efficiency and effectiveness of both the social security 
and taxation systems in the countries chosen for comparison.
The analysis shows that, in general, it is the larger welfare states which are 
the most effective in reducing poverty and inequality. The most efficient 
welfare states are those which apply either income tests to direct transfers 
and/or have highly progressive taxation systems. There appears to be a 
trade-off between the efficiency and effectiveness goals of the transfer 
systems in the LIS countries.
The findings of the empirical analysis are contrasted with several streams of 
the welfare state literature to examine the degree of correspondence between 
theory and 'real-world' outcomes. The study shows that many of the 
conventional wisdoms of the welfare state literature do not hold 
empirically. This is attributed to the lack of attention to the role of taxation, 
expenditure efficiency and the incidence of transfers among the pre-transfer 
poor population.
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Introduction
An overview of the study.
The aim of this study is to compare the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
income transfer systems in ten OECD countries. There are several features of 
the study which distinguish it from previous comparative studies of income 
maintenance policy:
i. Whereas most studies of income maintenance concentrate exclusively 
on direct transfers through the social security system, this study takes 
a comprehensive view of transfer policies by using microdata to 
examine the incidence and impact of both social security transfers and 
income taxes.
It does so for two reasons. First, tax 'expenditures' (in the form of 
deductions, rebates and exemptions) may be used in place of, or in 
addition to, social security transfers to increase the disposable income 
of families or households. Second, in many of the countries to be 
studied, social security policy and policy instruments are specifically 
designed to interact with taxation policy to produce certain desired 
outcomes for example, progressive income taxes may 'clawback' 
universal transfers from high income families or households. Thus to 
neglect the effects of taxation (other than indirect observation of its 
effects through disposable income measures) may result in (a) 
underestimating income transfer expenditures designed to effect 
redistributive aims and (b) presenting an incomplete view of those 
transfer systems which crucially depend on the interaction of social 
security and taxation policy instruments.
The data to be used in the study are part of the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) microdata set. The outstanding feature of the LIS data is 
that a number of income and demographic variables have been drawn 
from reliable, usually government sponsored, survey sources in 
participating countries and re-coded to form a common framework.
ii. To expose the interaction of these alternative instruments, the study 
uses a three stage analysis of the formation of family disposable 
income commencing with the initial distribution of income through 
the market; secondly, the distribution post- social security transfers; 
and thirdly, the distribution post-tax.
3iii. Using the observations from each stage of the redistribution process, 
the study will draw conclusions about the effectiveness of alternative 
policy instruments in achieving certain goals of the welfare state in 
relation to income distribution and poverty alleviation. Alternative 
policy instruments in this context refers not only to the choice of 
different social security instruments (eg: universal versus income- 
tested transfers) but also the choice between direct and indirect 
transfers (eg: child benefits versus tax deductions for children.)
iv. A key innovation of this study is its attempt to quantify the efficiency 
with which the poverty reduction and income redistribution 
outcomes are achieved, for example, the extent to which transfers 
close the poverty gap, the proportion of transfers which accrue to 
lower income earners, the amount of redistribution achieved for each 
social security dollar. This issue has become critical in recent years as 
governments of many of the OECD countries react to new perceptions 
of economic scarcity and seek ways to manage the growth of income 
transfer programs that do not incur disastrous political costs 
(Heidenheimer et al, 1990:255).
v. Drawing these findings together the study analyses whether there is a 
trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness goals of income transfer 
systems.
The first part of this study is essentially empirical in character, using 
microdata to draw a fairly detailed picture of the transfer systems of the 
countries under study as they affect income distribution and poverty rates. 
In addition, the study also looks at how each set of policies affects different 
family types, thereby allowing the different priorities and emphases of each 
welfare state to become apparent. The conclusion of Part I summarises and 
ranks these income transfer systems in terms of their efficiency and 
effectiveness in relation to the population overall and by family type. In 
doing so it draws out the differences and similarities in the redistributive 
strategies of these welfare states.
Part II of the study identifies those streams of the comparative social policy 
literature which are most closely related to microdata based analyses and 
uses the results of Part I to comment on this literature. These comments 
concern both specific problems and debates in the literature as well as more 
general observations about the contribution which microdata based studies 
may make in this field. The specific issues include:
4i. Whether the conventional division of countries into welfare leaders 
and laggards, based on expenditures, corresponds with the outcomes 
of transfer processes. In other words, do higher expenditures on social 
security, for example, necessarily equate with better outcomes?
ii. If not, can the microdata identify and explain the intervening 
processes which might prevent the "straight line" translation of 
expenditures to outcomes?
iii. The study examines several well-known typologies of the welfare 
state which use characteristics of the social security system (eg: 
universal versus selective assistance, replacement rates, methods of 
financing) to identify distinctive models of welfare provision. The 
study compares the assignment of the LIS countries within each 
typology to examine the extent to which the selection of different 
attributes of social security systems may lead to different groupings of 
countries.
iv. Using one of these typologies, the study examines whether the types 
of welfare states identified are consistently associated with particular 
outcomes.
This leads to a more general discussion about the relationship of findings
based on microdata to this area of the comparative literature. The discussion
is advanced on several fronts:
v. Can the use of microdata 'inform' welfare state typologies? For 
example, if the validity of these typologies rests on the characteristics 
of the social security system are there critical characteristics which 
have been overlooked? One area which the results of Part I points to 
is taxation. Here, the implications of taking a more comprehensive 
view of income transfers by presenting a balance between the 
characteristics of direct transfers (social security payments) and 
indirect transfers (taxes) is discussed and used to construct an 
alternative typology of welfare state types.
vi. The study also considers some of the assertions and 'conventional 
wisdom' surrounding particular policy instruments and examines 
these in the light of the evidence of the survey data.
5An overview of the Luxembourg Income Study.
This unique database has been compiled by researchers at the Centre 
D'Etudes de Populations, Pauvrete et de Politiques Socio-Economiques in 
Luxembourg and is referred to in the literature as the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS).1 The LIS database is comprised of microdata which have been 
gathered by government statistical agencies in the participating countries, in 
the course of regular income, expenditure or tax file surveys. At present, 
there are fourteen countries participating in the LIS project and two waves 
of data, collected circa 1980 and 1985, are available. (Appendix A provides a 
list of the participating countries, details of the surveys from which the LIS 
data have been drawn and the sample sizes.)
The LIS database consists of approximately 60 income and demographic 
variables (listed in Appendix A) which have been coded according to a 
common set of criteria. Each of these variables is identified with the same 
variable name across the data sets and across the two waves of data. For 
example, income variable VI "Gross wage and salary income" can be 
specified for each country and in each wave of the data without the user 
being familiar with the original data set.
The importance of this facility in relation to this study is immediately 
apparent: the social security and taxation data relevant to a particular 
question can be readily identified by the user without a detailed knowledge 
of the workings of each system. Moreover, researchers can be reasonably 
confident that they are using comparable demographic variables and 
definitions of income. Commenting on this feature of the LIS data and its 
implications for comparative study, Heidenheimer et al (1990:10) note:
Elementary though it seems, one key problem in comparative policy 
studies is the difficulty of finding truly comparable measurements of 
the same things in different countries. For example, every major 
nation produces statistics on the distribution of income. However, 
income is measured differently in different countries; definitions of 
household versus individual income are often not the same; methods 
for estimating the underreporting of income in government statistical 
surveys vary greatly, and so on. Only in the last few years ... has it 
been possible to go back to each nation's income surveys, create a 
common accounting framework, and recalculate the millions of 
individual household income reports on that common basis. Only 
then can we begin to address sensibly questions about the distribution 
of well-being ... and public policy in different nations.
1 A full introduction to the LIS database, its aims, history, sources and compilation is set out in 
Smeeding et al (1985a).
Because of a lack of data of this type many previous attempts at detailed 
cross-national comparisons of the impact of social security have been 
confined either to analysing aggregate data - thereby losing detail on the 
differential impact of transfer systems on beneficiary groups or family types - 
or to concentrating on a very narrow group of beneficiaries or family types - 
thereby losing perspective on the relationship of the impact of transfers on 
the chosen group to the overall population.
The second advantage of the LIS data to this study is that detailed 
demographic data are also available, allowing the research to be conducted 
either from the perspective of a beneficiary category (eg: those receiving 
unemployment benefits) or by some demographic characteristic (eg: lone 
parent families.)
The ten countries which have been selected from the LIS database for this 
study are: Australia, Canada, France, (West) Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. It is 
important to stress here that the analysis presented in this study draws on 
the first wave of the LIS data (circa 1980). At the time of writing, the coverage 
of countries in the second wave of data (circa 1985) was considerably smaller. 
Therefore, income transfer policies may have undergone considerable 
transformation in the intervening period and the outcomes observed, may 
well be radically different today. Despite the age of the data, the analysis 
presented here maintains its relevance for two reasons. First, the expressed 
aim of the study requires the investigation, and application, of 
methodologies suited to cross-national comparisons using microdata. From 
this perspective, the importance of the analysis lies in the sensitivity of the 
measures to alternative forms of transfer policies and instruments. Second, 
at a more general level, the study presents a framework which can be used to 
trace the relationship between government expenditure, transfer 
instruments and outcomes in a consistent fashion.
There are limitations on the data which are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
The four which most concern this study are: the type of unit for which the 
original data was reported; the treatment of zero and negative disposable 
incomes; the under-reporting of income in the original surveys; and the 
stage of the macro-economic business cycle when the data was collected in 
each country.
Although not entirely perfect, the degree of comparability between the data 
sets has been argued to be extremely high (Smeeding et al,1985a) and
7certainly represents the best available data for cross-national comparison of 
income transfers.
A glossary of terms.
This study draws on the theoretical and methodological work of several 
disciplines, each of which use the core terms and concepts of this work in 
slightly different ways. The purpose of this section is to make clear to readers 
how this study defines and uses these core terms.
Direct transfers refers to payments made through social security and
closely allied programs. For example, it includes 
veterans' pensions but not education or health benefits. 
The measurement of direct transfers across the 
countries in the study are defined by the variable 
"SOCTRANS" on the LIS database, the detailed 
composition of this variable is set out in Appendix A. 
In certain contexts, I will abbreviate "direct transfers" to 
"transfers" and this will be clear from the context.
Indirect transfers refers to income taxes and allied deductions. For
example, it includes mandatory social insurance 
contributions for wage earners and the self-employed. 
The measurement of indirect transfers is given by the 
variables "PAYROLL" plus "Vll", as described in 
Appendix A. Indirect transfers will be abbreviated to 
"taxes" and this usage will also be clear from the 
context.
Income transfer system refers to the set of policies and policy
instruments used to make direct and indirect transfers. 
In the course of the study I may refer to it as "the 
transfer system" or the "tax-transfer system". The 
combined effect of transfers and taxes is referred to as 
"net transfers" for the sake of brevity.
Market income refers to income from private sources: wages, property,
self-em ploym ent, p riva te  pensions and 
superannuation. That is, it is pre-transfer, pre-tax 
income. It is the variable labelled as "MI" on the LIS 
database, see Appendix A.
8Gross income
Disposable income
refers to all income from private and public sources. 
That is, it is post-transfer, pre-tax income. It is labelled 
as "GI" on the LIS database and is equivalent to market 
income plus social security transfers plus private 
transfers such as alimony. It may be referred to as pre­
tax income.
refers to income net of taxes and social insurance 
contributions. That is, it is post-transfer, post-tax 
income. It is labelled as "DPT' on the LIS database and 
is equivalent to gross income less the taxes described 
above. It may be referred to as post-tax income.
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1.1. Focusing on outcomes: the use of efficiency and effectiveness criteria.
I noted in the Introduction to the study that its emphasis is on examining 
the outcomes of the income transfer process in the selected countries. In this 
chapter I set out the implications of adopting an outcomes perspective; what 
this means in the context of income transfers; which outcomes will be 
considered; and how these will be measured.
One way of viewing outcomes is presented in Diagram 1.1 which has been 
adapted from a model of the 'production of welfare' developed by Hill and 
Bramley (1986:181). An advantage of using this model is that it shows the 
relationship of welfare policies to policy instruments, the environment in 
which they operate and the linkages between program inputs and program 
outcomes. Applying this to social security transfers, for example, inputs 
would include the actual payments; production would refer to the policy 
instruments used to distribute these payments; outputs would include the 
size and incidence of the payments; while outcomes might be measured in 
relation to the level of need or policy goals.
In the course of this study I will touch on each of these four stages 
individually, as well as linking inputs to outcomes; production to outcomes; 
and outputs to outcomes.
Diagram 1.1. A model of the production of welfare.
Resource
controls
Social, economic 
and physical 
/  environment
Policy -N.
ServiceOrganisation
management
Need
Opportunity
Financial
(resources)
Outputs
(intermediate)Production
Outcomes 
(welfare 
final outputs)
As a first step in this analysis it is necessary to set out which outcomes 
should be measured. There are, of course, many ways of describing, defining
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and measuring the outcomes of income transfer policies. In large part, the 
range of possible outcomes is a direct reflection of the diversity of the goals 
of these policies. This raises two problems for the study: defining the central 
goals common to each of these systems and establishing a set of criteria to 
assess the achievement of these goals.
1.1.1. The goals of income transfer policies.
The goals of income transfer policies vary considerably among the countries 
in this study. To give an example of this variation consider the following 
sample of statements of goals from respectively, Sweden, Germany and the 
United States:
The aim  of this section... is to evaluate the success of the Swedish 
W elfare State by its ow n standards ... im proved social security 
am ong the total population; greater equality betw een social classes 
and betw een single persons and families, as well as between retired 
persons and the labour force; and an elimination of poverty.2 3
Following the policy statements of various federal governm ents and 
the platform s of the major political parties, the Germ an income 
m aintenance schemes have three basic aims: to prevent poverty, to 
provide social security in the sense of helping people to preserve 
their social sta tus in the case of lost earnings, and  to reduce 
inequalities in living conditions.^
The clearest statem ent of goals, w hich did  not appear until the 
early 1970s, outlined eight:
1. Provision of a nominally adequate income level to those who 
cannot w ork  and , in tandem  w ith  social insurance  and  
employment programs, to those who can work.
2 Targeting benefits on those most in need.
3. Coordination and integration of programs to achieve 
adm inistrative efficiency.
4. Similar treatm ent of sim ilar individuals (horizontal equity) ...
5. Vertically equitable treatm ent ...
6. Encouragement of self-sufficiency by providing work incentives.
7. Reduction or elimination of incentives for family breakup.
8. Attention to making the system understandable, coherent, and 
subject to fiscal control.4
It is possible to detect some common themes in these goals, as well as 
substantial variations for example, different emphases on the balance of 
social and private responsibilities. To start with a basic theme, Ringen 
(1987:7) argues that redistribution policies in general have equality as their 
immediate goal, that the aim is to make the distribution of welfare more
2 Flora (1986a:41).
3 Flora (1986b:53).
4 Haveman (1987:91).
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egalitarian or "fairer" than it would have been in the absence of such 
policies.
That equality is a goal in the welfare state we know from what 
politicians say, from what we can read in policy documents, and from 
the existence of policies that cannot be understood independently of 
some redistributive intention.
Where welfare states diverge, according to Ringen (1987:8), is in the strength 
of their commitment to equality:
The goal of equality can be given a weak or strong interpretation. In 
its weak interpretation, it implies a guaranteed minimum standard 
for all members of society ... In its strong formulation, the 
redistributive goal refers not only to the minimum standard but to 
the entire structure of inequality...
It is on the basis of this division of the goal of equality that the study 
proposes to examine the outcomes of income transfer policies. In the first 
instance, all the countries in this study have income transfer policies which 
are aimed at ensuring that a minimum standard of income is enjoyed by all. 
In this context it is reasonable to assume, as a first approximation, that this 
indicates a desire to ensure that poverty is avoided or alleviated. As Ringen 
(1987:141) argues:
To ask about poverty in the welfare state is to question the 
elementary effectiveness of social policy... While there is 
disagreement about the responsibility of government with regard to 
overall inequality, its responsibility in relation to poverty has been 
accepted for generations and is not seriously contested today.
In addition to this goal there are some countries, as the examples from 
Sweden and Germany illustrate, whose policies are aimed at decreasing the 
level of inequality in society. In this context, progress toward this goal would 
be reflected in the level of income redistribution achieved by transfer 
policies.
Thus the two goals of income transfer policies on which this study will focus 
are: the alleviation or reduction of poverty and the reduction of income 
inequality.
In comparing each country's progress towards both these goals, we could 
simply construct measures to indicate the level of poverty and income 
inequality and conclude which countries do best or worst in each regard. 
However a more challenging task, and one which may be of interest to both 
the wider welfare state literature and to social policy analysis, is to consider
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the various stages in the production of these outcomes and the relationship 
between each stage and the outcomes.
In particular, the contribution of various policy instruments to these 
outcomes is of interest to writers in both these areas. It enables us, for 
example, to make more informed judgements about whether universal or 
selective programs are better at achieving one or both of these goals or how 
taxation contributes to these goals.
In addition to the assessment of the effectiveness of these policy 
instruments, the study also examines their efficiency in producing the 
observed outcomes. I indicated in the Introduction that efficiency issues are 
gaining momentum in the discussion of welfare states, even in those 
countries where such concerns are of secondary importance in transfer 
policy (Heidenheimer et al, 1990:255). There are other countries where 
efficiency questions have always dominated transfer policy and this is 
demonstrated by the goals of transfer policy in the United States cited earlier. 
No less than five of the eight goals directly address the efficiency issue in its 
various guises: targeting, administrative efficiency, disincentive effects, fiscal 
control. Many of these goals are shared by other countries in this study such 
as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.
As with the effectiveness issue, efficiency questions are of interest to writers 
in both the general welfare state literature and social policy literature. For 
example, Ringen (1987:13) raises this issue in debating the pros and cons of 
different welfare state 'types':
The large and/or universal welfare state may be seen as wasteful 
and as giving benefits to people who do not need them, at the cost of 
unnecessarily high taxes, and the small welfare state as more 
effective because selective and targeted policies give more bang for 
the buck.
Policy analysts may also be interested in this issue when making 
comparisons of different transfer policies for example, whether some 
policies are more efficient in reducing poverty or inequality and in what 
respect. Where transfer instruments result in fairly similar outcomes we 
may wish to know which instrument produces this outcome most 
efficiently. On the other hand, where different outcomes result we may wish 
to know the costs or benefits involved in adopting the instrument which 
produces a superior outcome. A third reason is that all transfer systems, no 
matter which policy instruments they use, aim to minimise the costs of 
transferring income. This may be a primary or secondary goal of transfers
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although, as noted above, it is increasingly becoming a primary goal even in 
those countries where formerly such concerns were not explicit.
1.1.2. Defining efficiency and effectiveness.
The terms efficiency and effectiveness in this study are defined by the 
relationship between the various stages of production identified in the Hill 
and Bramley model. Hill and Bramley (1986:182) offer the following 
definitions of efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in the general 
context of welfare programs:
Efficiency is the relationship between outputs and inputs ... greater 
efficiency is achieved by increasing the output from given inputs or 
by reducing the inputs required to produce a given output.
Effectiveness is the extent to which a service increases welfare ...
Cost-effectiveness is the relationship between the cost of inputs and 
the increase in welfare achieved ... greater cost-effectiveness is 
achieved by redudng inputs for a given level of welfare increase or 
by increasing welfare for a given level of inputs.
Hill and Bramley's definitions are those adopted in this study, with the 
exception that cost-effectiveness measures are grouped with the efficiency 
measures for ease of exposition. In the following sections I set out how 
efficiency and effectiveness are to be measured in relation to each of the two 
goals and also identify the salient characteristics of each part of the transfer 
process which influences the outcomes.
1.2. The effectiveness criteria.
The effectiveness of transfer policies in alleviating poverty will be measured 
in this study by the extent to which they reduce the number of families in 
poverty and, the extent to which they decrease the poverty gap, measured in 
aggregate, and for particular family types.
Diagram 1.2 adapts the Hill and Bramley model in relation to the poverty 
alleviation goal. The inputs are defined as income transfer payments and 
income taxes. Production in this study refers to the transfer instrument (and 
its characteristics) which distributes the payments to, or deducts taxes from, 
the recipients. The outputs are the size and incidence of transfers and are 
determined by government policy on the level of payments, eligibility 
criteria (ie who should receive income support) and the operation of means- 
tests (ie how much income support). The assessment of outcomes is 
dependent on the relationship of the size and incidence of the payments to a 
defined poverty line. The specification of a poverty line allows us to assess 
welfare outcomes in terms of both a head-count, ie the number of
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individuals or families who are lifted out of poverty, and the size of the 
poverty gap before and after transfers.5
A critical issue in the assessment of outcomes in terms of poverty 
alleviation is the specification of the poverty line. There is a considerable 
literature on how poverty lines can be specified and this is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3.
Diagram 1.2. The production of welfare: a view of poverty alleviation.
Policy= — .
- targeting
- level of payments
- eligibility criteria
Need=
- no's in poverty
- size of the 
poverty gap
Targeting efficiency Poverty reduction
payments
transfer
Inputs= Outcomes=
poverty
reduction
Outputs= 
size and 
inddence of 
transfers
Production=
transfer
systems
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The effectiveness of transfer policies in reducing income inequality will be 
measured by the amount of redistribution achieved by transfers, ie a 
decrease (or increase) in income inequality and by the progressivity of the 
transfers.6 The effectiveness of transfer policies in reducing income 
inequality may be measured by the extent to which indices of inequality such 
as the Gini coefficient fall during the income transfer process and therefore 
reflect the amount of redistribution achieved.
Diagram 1.3 adapts the model in relation to the goal of reducing income 
inequality. The inputs are the average level of transfers received, or taxes 
paid, by the individual, family or household. Production again refers to the 
transfer instruments. The outputs are the size and incidence of transfers 
across the income distribution and are determined by the progressivity of
5 The poverty gap refers to the difference between household or family income and the poverty line. 
This difference may be expressed in actual monetary terms eg $X required to bring the family up to the 
poverty line income; or expressed as a percentage of the poverty line rather than in monetary units. The 
latter approach is frequently adopted in cross-national comparisons to standardise comparisons.
6 The precise definition and measurement of progressivity will be set out in Chapter 5. Briefly, 
progressivity refers to the extent to which higher income earners pay taxes at a higher rate than low 
income earners; conversely, the extent to which lower income earners receive more generous social 
security payments than higher income earners.
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taxes and social security payments. The assessment of welfare outcomes in 
this instance relies on measuring the level of beneficiaries' incomes relative 
to the incomes of non-beneficiaries, or post-transfer inequality to pre- 
transfer inequality. In other words, the assessment captures how much 
redistribution is achieved by the transfer process and identifies to whom this 
redistribution accrues. Again the measurement of redistribution is 
associated with an extensive literature and this is considered in Chapter 6.
Diagram 1.3. The production of welfare: a view of reducing income inequality.
Policy= ^
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1.3. The efficiency criteria.
The efficiency of transfer policies in alleviating poverty may be measured by 
the extent to which the inputs (transfers) accrue to the pre-transfer poor, ie 
target efficiency and the amount by which each unit of input reduces the 
poverty gap, ie poverty reduction efficiency.
Referring to Diagram 1.2, we see that the link between inputs and outputs is 
the transfer instrument, so that the characteristics of this instrument (eg: 
whether it is a universal or selective transfer) will determine target 
efficiency. In turn, the level of output - the size and incidence of the 
transfers - in relation to the existing level of need, will determine the 
amount of poverty reduction achieved per unit of transfer.
The efficiency of transfer policies in reducing income inequality may be 
measured by how progressive the transfer instruments are in distributing 
the transfer payments or taxes and by the amount of redistribution achieved 
for each unit of transfer payment or tax receipt.
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Referring to Diagram 1.3, we see that it is the progressivity of the transfer 
instrument which determines how efficiently the inputs are distributed; so 
that an instrument with low progressivity will require a higher level of 
inputs to achieve the same output as a more progressive instrument. The 
final outcome is measured by the difference between the pre- and post­
transfer levels of inequality and the inputs used to achieve this reduction.
1.4. Discerning the effects of the transfer instruments.
The LIS data file identifies many of the components of the transfer system in 
a fairly detailed fashion. For each family or household 'case' on the file it is 
possible to identify its sources of income from either the private sector (eg: 
wages, property, self-employment) or the public sector (eg: unemployment 
benefits, aged pensions, housing benefits, family allowances); as well as 
deductions in the form of income taxes, property taxes, social insurance 
contributions.
In order to measure and analyse the transfer process a theoretical division of 
the formation of income into three stages - market income (MI), gross 
income (GI) and disposable income (DPI) - is used in the study. In moving 
from market income to gross income it is the direct transfers (social security 
payments) which form the first set of inputs to the transfer system. This 
produces an output in the form of gross income. The movement from gross 
to disposable income is via indirect transfers (taxes) which form the second 
set of inputs to the transfer system, with disposable income the resultant 
output. It is through this division of the transfer process that the separate, as 
well as net, effects of each instrument can be identified and measured. 
Diagram 1.4 (overleaf) illustrates this separation and relates each stage to the 
Hill and Bramley model.
In following the stages of redistribution illustrated in Diagram 4.1, the 
analysis presented in Part I will report the efficiency and effectiveness 
measures at each stage of income formation. The interpretation and 
discussion, however, will vary in the degree of space devoted to the changes 
between each stage. The primary concern will be with the change between 
the pre- and post- transfer measures, with the intermediate stages being 
analysed in greater or lesser detail as warranted. For example, in analysing 
the changes to the poverty head-count the analysis may be more concerned 
with social security transfers than with taxation. On the other hand, changes 
in income inequality may require equally detailed analysis of both types of 
transfers.
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Diagram 1.4. The 'three stage' approach to analysing income transfers.
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1.5. Summary.
In this chapter I have identified poverty alleviation and the reduction of 
income inequality as two goals central to income transfers. In examining the 
progress of the various welfare states towards these goals, this study will use 
several measures of efficiency and effectiveness to compare the various 
policy instruments employed in each country to achieve these goals. Thus, 
the focus is not just on the outcomes of transfer processes, but also on how 
the various instruments of policy contribute to these outcomes.
Chapter 2 discusses some of the general problems which arise in microdata 
analyses, how these have been handled in the LIS database, and the 
operational solutions which this study has adopted to overcome these 
problems.
In the remaining chapters of Part I, the goals of poverty alleviation and 
reduction in income inequality are considered separately and the discussion 
is further sub-divided into efficiency and effectiveness issues. Chapter 3 
discusses issues related to poverty measurement, outlines the methodology 
to be used to specify the poverty line and describes the assumptions made to
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accommodate the LIS data. Chapter 4 reports the empirical results of the 
poverty alleviation effectiveness measures and Chapter 5 the empirical 
results of the efficiency measures.
Chapter 6 reviews the alternative methods employed in the income 
inequality field, outlines the methodology adopted by the study and 
describes the assumptions made to accommodate the LIS data. Chapter 7 
reports the empirical results of the effectiveness measures, while Chapter 8 
looks at how efficiently the outcomes have been produced.
Chapter 9 reviews the empirical results from these chapters, drawing 
conclusions about the overall impact of the transfer systems and 
commenting on findings of interest in relation to the individual transfer 
instruments in these countries.
C h a p t e r  Two 
D a t a  c o n s t r a in t s  a n d
OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS.
2.1. Using the LIS data: some general measurement problems.
While Chapters 3 and 6 discuss measurement issues specific to the poverty 
and income inequality methodologies, there are several methodological and 
operational issues common to both which are discussed in this chapter. 
These issues arise from: the unit of analysis; the use of equivalence scales; 
the choice between recipient characteristics and family types to analyse the 
incidence of transfers; and the treatment of zero and negative incomes. In 
each instance, there is no consensus in the literature as to a "best approach" 
to solving these problems. This requires the study to make quite critical 
choices about how these problems will be handled in the empirical analysis.
2.1.1. The unit of analysis.
The LIS data sets are derived from three main sources, either surveys of tax 
files or specifically designed income or consumption surveys. The surveys 
cover three main types of units, the tax (administrative) unit; the household 
unit; and the family unit. For a number of countries in this study it is 
possible to analyse the data from more than one perspective, in others there 
may be no choice at all. This poses a first difficulty for the study - that of the 
choice of the unit of analysis.7
In the LIS database units have been coded in such a way as to allow 
researchers to identify what type of unit the survey data originally covered. 
For a majority of countries researchers can select units for analysis on either 
a family or household basis. Appendix A sets out the availability of data for 
each type of unit. On balance, the 'family' based definition can be applied 
more uniformly across the data sets than the 'household.' For this reason the 
family has been chosen as the unit of analysis for this study. This selection is 
reinforced by the view that in most of the countries, social security and tax 
policy is directed toward the family rather than the household unit.* 5
The comparability of the unit of observation in the LIS data has been 
discussed by Smeeding et al (1985a), Hagenaars (1989) and Coder (1990). The 
comparability of the unit poses two problems for this study. First, calculating 
the total amount of income, transfers and taxes which accrues to the unit and
7 A general discussion of the unit of analysis problem can be found in Danziger and Taussig (1979).
5 Researchers using the LIS database also appear to favour the family unit, reporting results for either 
families, or individuals in family units. See for example, Buhmann et al (1988), O'Higgins et al (1985), 
Smeeding et al (1985b).
second, in estimating the number of people among whom the unit's income 
is shared.9
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The problem may be demonstrated by the example of a family comprising a 
married couple together with a student aged 18 years residing at home. In the 
Swedish data set, this 'family' would be considered as two tax units, ie a 
married couple and a single taxpayer. In Canada, if the student received some 
economic support from her/his parents, all three would form a single 
'economic family'; if not, then two 'economic families' would be reported. In 
the UK, the student would form part of a single family household regardless 
of whether the student was financially dependent or independent.
To illustrate the difference which the unit makes to the analysis consider the 
situations shown in Table 2.1. The table shows a family of identical 
composition with identical income in Sweden and in the UK. In Sweden, 
this family would comprise two tax units with income of $9,000 (married 
couple) and $5,000 (single person); in the UK, the joint family income is 
$14,000. Using the poverty lines shown in the table, both tax units in Sweden 
would be considered as poor, adding three persons (or two families) to the 
poverty head count, while in the UK the joint income puts the unit above 
the relevant poverty line with no addition to the poverty head count.
Sweden UK
$ $
Married couple income: 9000 14000 }
Student income 5000 combined}
Poverty line in com e: MC = 10,000 
S = 6,000
MC + 1  = 13,000
Total poverty gap: 2000 0
Poverty head count: 3 persons or 
2 families 0
While the incidence of units such as the one described above are generally a 
small part of the survey populations, they do affect the results of a number of 
the measures and these will be noted where relevant.10
9 As the discussion in the following section makes clear, this estimate is critical for the application of 
equivalence scales. The study leaves aside the related issue raised by the work of Pahl (1980;1984) and 
Edwards (1981) which challenges the assumption that income is in fact shared equally among the 
members of a family/household.
10 Smeeding et al (1985a:10) estimate, for example, that the overall poverty rate for Sweden would fall 
from 5.0% to 4.2% if students are exduded from the poor population. This may also affect the results for 
the Netherlands as discussed in Section 2.2.1 below.
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An additional consideration in the choice of unit of analysis is the weight 
given to each unit in the various surveys. Essentially, each survey attempts 
to weight each observation according to the make up of the unit in the total 
population. Thus if a family comprising a married couple with two children 
represents 10% of a country’s family units, then the weight given to each 
unit in the survey will ensure these units will be counted as 10% of the 
sample. This weight is reported in the LIS database as the variable HWEIGHT. 
A second weighting variable is constructed to reflect the weighted number of 
persons by unit type reported as PWEIGHT=HWEIGHT X NUMBER OF PERSONS. In 
most of the measures used in the study, the sample has been weighted by 
HWEIGHT. For several of the inequality measures results will be reported for 
both PWEIGHT and HWEIGHT weighted samples.
2.1.2. The analysis of family types.
The results of the analysis undertaken in the following chapters will be 
reported and analysed on a 'family type' basis. Although there is enough 
detail in the LIS data to allow analysis from the perspective of beneficiary 
type - for example, those in receipt of age pensions - this level of analysis is 
difficult in comparative studies. The reasons for this are: beneficiaries may 
have several sources of income and could therefore be identified with 
several groups and/or beneficiary categories may not match, may overlap, or 
may not exist in some countries. Therefore, the approach adopted by the 
study is to analyse the incidence of transfers for the family types described in 
Table 2.2. The table also shows the abbreviated reference for each type which 
will be used in reporting the results throughout the study.
Table 
reference 
Aged (S) 
Aged (C) 
Single (NC)
Couple (NC) 
Lone parent
Couple (Ch)
Other
Table 2.2. Description of family
Family type 
Aged single 
Aged couple 
Single person, 
no children 
Couple, no children 
Lone parent
Couple with children
Other
Description of family 
Single person of official retirement age 
Couple, head has reached official retirement age 
Single person household, no children, head less than 
official retirement age
Couple, no children, head less than retirement age
Single person less than official retirement age, with
one or more children under 18 years
Couple, head less than official retirement age, with
one or more children under 18 years
All other units
The category of "other" family types includes units such as shared 
households with two or more unrelated adults. In Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland there are no units coded as "other"; in the example just cited
these persons would be coded as single person units in a multi-family 
household. In some countries, depending on resource-sharing or declared 
relationships, such a group would be coded as "other" in a single-family 
household. Table 2.3 below sets out the incidence of each family type in the 
LIS countries as represented on the LIS files.
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Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 7.7 8.1 20.6 20.2 5.3 34.4 3.7 100
Canada 7.8 8.0 20.2 20.1 5.6 34.0 4.2 100
France 12.2 11.3 10.9 21.4 2.9 36.7 4.5 100
Germany 15.6 11.3 18.3 19.0 2.9 29.6 3.3 100
Netherlands 9.9 9.7 12.4 25.0 3.4 36.0 3.7 100
Norway 16.8 10.5 18.0 10.8 8.4 35.5 * 100
Sweden 16.3 9.4 34.2 15.4 4.4 20.2 * 100
Switzerland 14.2 8.1 35.5 15.2 4.0 23.0 * 100
UK 12.5 11.2 11.7 20.6 4.3 34.3 5.5 100
USA 9.3 8.7 21.1 18.8 8.3 29.5 4.4 100
2.1.3. Equivalence scales.
Equivalence scales are used to adjust family incomes to reflect the needs of 
families of different sizes and composition. Table 2.4 illustrates how 
equivalence adjustments are made. In this example, a family income of 
$5,000 is deflated by 0.7 for each additional adult and by 0.5 for each child, 
this produces an adult equivalent unit (AEU) income for each family. 
Alternatively, the incomes could be expressed in terms of the amount of 
income required by different families to reach the same level of well-being 
for a fixed standard. In the example, a couple without children would 
require $8,500 to have an equivalent income to a single person with $5000 
and a couple with two children would require $11,000.
Table 2.4. The calculation of equivalent incomes.
Familv tvpe Equivalence Familv income AEU income Single equivalence
Single person 1 5000 5000 5000
Couple 1.7 5000 2940 8500
Couple + 2 ch 2.2 5000 2270 11000
There is a considerable range of methods which can be used to derive 
equivalence scales and a large number of scales are used in OECD countries 
(Whiteford,1985). The issue of equivalence adjustment has been widely 
discussed in the literature and there is no general agreement on a best 
approach or approaches (Whiteford,1985; Buhmann et al,1988). Additionally, 
as the work of both Whiteford and Buhmann demonstrates, the equivalence
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factors used in OECD countries vary considerably with no obvious central 
tendencies. Therefore, in a comparative context, there is no scale which has 
any clear advantage over others. The choice is essentially arbitrary, as 
Atkinson (1989b:2) makes clear in this discussion on the measurement of 
inequality in a comparative context
It is a field in which there are large differences in social judgments, 
which translate themselves into differences in the tools which are 
applied, such as the measure of inequality or the choice of 
equivalence scale.
The extensive study of equivalence scales carried out on the LIS data by 
Buhmann et al (1988) shows that poverty estimates, and particularly head- 
counts, are sensitive to the choice of scale. One way around this problem has 
been discussed by Atkinson (1989b:3), who suggests that comparative 
researchers use a range of analytical tools - for example, more than one 
equivalence scale or poverty line - to produce a range of estimates which give 
partial rather than absolute answers to questions about levels of poverty or 
inequality. Atkinson's arguments draw on the earlier work of Sen (1979:286) 
who noted that:
... one may be forced to use more than one criterion because of non­
uniformity of accepted standards, and look at the partial ordering 
generated by the criteria taken together ..
In this study two equivalence scales are used to generate a partial ordering of 
the countries, reporting the results for both, and noting where significant 
differences emerge. The study also attempts to improve the partial ordering 
of the poverty measures by developing a notion of the "poverty 
intersection." That is, to define as poor those families who are so defined on 
both equivalence scales. The poverty intersection is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.
The first scale used in the study (designated as EQ1) is a conventional scale 
adopted by the OECD (1982:36) in its list of social indicators. The second 
(designated EQ2) is based on statistical work carried out by Whiteford (1985) 
which calculated the geometric mean of 59 scales based on consumption 
surveys, adopted in government transfer programs or official poverty lines. 
The two scales are shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5. OECD and Whiteford geometric mean equivalence scales.________________
Equivalence scale 1st adult 2nd & subseq. adults Each child
OECD (EQ1) 1 0.7
Whiteford (EQ2)_____________ 1__________________056_________________
1 0.5
0.32
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2.2. Income measurement issues.
In the Introduction I set out the basis on which income is to be measured in 
this study ie in terms of market, gross and disposable incomes. These 
measures reflect the sum of all incomes of the family unit at each stage of 
income formation. In the analysis in the following chapters, the family 
income is expressed in equivalent terms, unless otherwise indicated.
An issue of general concern in income surveys is the apparent under­
reporting of income by survey respondents. Cross-checks between national 
income data and income reported in surveys of this kind, reveal that 
frequently, the expected level of income does not match that which is 
actually reported. This is less true of data based on tax file surveys than on 
income or consumption surveys. Some preliminary work on this problem 
has been done by several LIS researchers, who find that in three of the 
countries so far analysed that reported income is about 90% of expected 
income (Smeeding et al, 1985a). It is difficult to make any correction for this 
under-reporting, except to note that it exists for a number of the LIS files.
22.1. Treatment of zero and negative incomes.
Table 2.6 shows the percentage of families with zero and negative incomes 
for each data set on various definitions of income.
Table 2.6. Zero and negative incomes reported for families.
Families with negative incomes (%)  Families with zero incomes (%)
Country MI a DPI MI a DPI
Australia - - - 10.2 0.5 0.5
Canada 0.2 0.1 0.1 7.4 0.5 0.5
France 0.3 0.1 0.2 14.9 0.2 0.1
Germany - - 0.1 23.4 0.2 0.2
Netherlands - - 1.4 21.2 3.4 2.1
Norway 0.1 0.1 0.1 11.9 0.2 0.2
Sweden 1.0 - 0.1 6.5 0.3 0.3
Switzerland - - 0.1 3.4 1.0 0.9
UK - - 0.1 8.3 - -
US 0.3 0.2 0.2 7.4 0.8 0.8
The percentage of zero and negative incomes reported for these countries at 
the disposable income stage, is generally small for each country with the 
exception of the Netherlands which has a level of both zero and negative 
incomes far in excess of the other LIS countries. There would appear to be 
two sources of explanation for this; first, a large percentage of the zero 
incomes are concentrated in the non-aged single (no children) group. This
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suggests that some of this group may be students or young unemployed who 
are residing with parents without an independent income. Second, as will be 
discussed in the following section, the data for the Netherlands was collected 
in 1983 and thus it is the country furthest on in the downturn in the 
business cycle that occurred in the early and mid- 1980s.
The treatment of zero and negative incomes varies with the operational 
constraints of each measure and the operational management of these 
observations is set out in Table 2.7. Overall, the approach has been to include 
as many observations as possible in the analysis. Thus zero and negative 
incomes are included, at face value, in all measures except where the 
measures cannot be computed on a negative basis, in which case they are 
recoded to zero.12
Measure Zero incomes Negative incomes
Median income included included
Poverty measures included recoded as zero
________ Inequality measures__________ included________________ recoded as zero_______
2.3. Different years of observations.
The period which the first wave of LIS data spans runs from 1979-80 to 1983. 
Two countries, Switzerland (1982) and the Netherlands (1983) are at the later 
end of this wave and therefore the data are more likely to be influenced by 
the downturn in the business cycle experienced in the OECD area in the 
early 1980s. For example, unemployment doubled in the Netherlands 
between 1980 and 1983 from 7% to 14% (OECD,1989). The effect of the 
downturn is also likely to increase the number of small business failures 
and bankruptcies. Negative incomes may arise through tax liabilities on 
previous earnings when current income is low.
Blank (1989) finds that poverty and income inequality move anti-cyclically. 
This implies that if the data for the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent 
Switzerland) had been collected in 1980, we might expect to have observed a 
lower level of poverty and inequality in these countries. The fact that data 
was collected at different stages of the business cycle for different countries 
implies that cross-national comparisons of levels of poverty and inequality 
may be biased. On the other hand, proportional reduction in these measures 
may give a less biased comparison of the effectiveness of transfer systems.
u As suggested by Smeeding et al (1985b:4).
Chapter Three
Poverty measurement issues.
3.1. Defining and measuring poverty in a comparative context.
The investigation of poverty in a comparative context adds a new 
dimension to the debate on the definition and measurement of poverty. 
Cross-national comparisons of poverty raise questions about which sorts of 
measures are appropriate and how these should be applied across national 
and cultural boundaries.
Previously, the analysis of poverty was largely confined to national settings 
where any single approach to defining and setting a poverty line could not 
be demonstrated to be superior to others. Alternative approaches are suited 
to some tasks and not others. In a comparative context, however, are some 
approaches more appropriate than others? In the following section I 
examine this question in terms of the basic debates on approach and 
methodology, noting the importance of the type of comparative data which 
is available and how this might influence the approach to be adopted.
This chapter also considers a number of the perennial questions associated 
with empirical work on poverty: how sensitive are poverty estimates to 
where the poverty line is drawn? What are the effects of using different 
equivalence scales? In presenting a picture of poverty in a cross-national 
context, are head-counts or poverty gaps the better measure? How confident 
can we be in the empirical results and how should the results be presented 
and interpreted?
3.2. The poverty debate.
Broadly speaking there are two conceptual approaches to the definition of 
poverty. The absolute approach aims to set a poverty standard based on the 
minimum requirements of an individual or family, irrespective of the 
standard of living enjoyed by a society as a whole. Conversely, relative 
approaches aim to set a standard which is commensurate with societal 
living standards or expectations.
The debate between Amartya Sen and Peter Townsend in the UK in the 
early eighties on the relative merits of each of these approaches 
demonstrated that neither approach is intrinsically superior in theory, but in
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practice, each has advantages in differing circumstances.12 As Atkinson 
(1989b: 13) concludes:
The problems which arise in the determination of the poverty line 
have been extensively discussed in the literature and it is now 
generally recognized that there is scope for a wide variety of 
opinion.
In the following section I give a brief account of some approaches to defining 
and measuring poverty which exemplify the absolute and relative 
approaches as well as several intermediate approaches.
In addition to the choice of definitional perspective, Atkinson (1989b:13-17) 
has also pointed out that the indicator of poverty may take a variety of 
forms. He distinguishes three types of indicators - the consumption of 
specific commodities, total expenditure and total income. In the discussion 
below I note which indicators are used by the various approaches as this is a 
critical issue in the choice of approach for this study.
3.2.1. Five approaches to poverty measurement
The following discussion of approaches to measuring poverty is selective, 
aiming to describe some of the main methodologies used by government 
agencies to determine poverty lines and to illustrate the contexts in which 
the different indicators distinguished by Atkinson are used. The approaches 
are referred to as:
(1) budgetary or basket-of-goods;
(2) consumer expenditure patterns;
(3) budget standards;
(4) attitudinal surveys;
(5) relative standards.
3.2.2. Budgetary approach.
The first studies to determine poverty lines were conducted in the UK and 
US around the end of the nineteenth century and were based on a fairly 
simplistic basket-of-goods approach. The best examples of this approach are 
the various studies conducted by Rowntree (1902;1941;1951) who established 
his poverty line by drawing up a list of necessities under the headings of
2^ See Sen (1981;1982;1983); Townsend (1985); and Piachaud (1981). In particular, the paper by Sen and 
rejoinder by Townsend in the Oxford Economic Papers vols 35 and 37.
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food, clothing, fuel and household sundries to form a basket-of-goods and 
then estimating the cost of purchasing these items.
In Rowntree's studies, the food allowance was based on the cost of standard 
diets required by low income families specified by nutritional experts. 
Estimates for clothing, fuel, rent and miscellaneous household goods were 
based on actual expenditures by low income earners.
While the determination of the poverty line under this approach was based 
on the expenditure required to consume certain levels of commodities, the 
actual indicator of poverty used was income.
A related approach which is used in the context of developing countries, sets 
specific consumption targets for what are termed 'basic needs' 
(Chichilnisky,1982). In this instance, the consumption of target levels of 
specified commodities is the indicator of poverty, rather than income or 
expenditure equivalents.
3.23. Consumer expenditure theory.
A number of methods for determining poverty lines have been developed 
by economists within the broad area of consumer behaviour. Principally 
these are based on proportional expenditure, Engel curve and utility theory 
approaches. For the purposes of this paper only the first two of these 
approaches will be considered since the methodology derived from utility 
theory has not been used by government agencies for the purposes of 
calculating poverty lines.
Engel’s Law and the proportional approach.
A number of methods for estimating poverty lines derives from the work of 
Ernst Engel who, in a study of the economic development of a province in 
Germany in 1857, observed that:
... the proportion of outgo (total expenditure) used for food, other 
things being equal, is the best measure of the material standard of 
living of a population.13
It is now a well established economic law that expenditure on food as a 
proportion of total expenditure decreases as income increases.14 Expenditure 
on other goods and services such as fuel, clothing and housing has also been
13 Cited in Nicholson (1976:80-83).
14 Ibid.
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found to decrease as household income increases. Thus there appears to be a 
systematic relationship between a household's expenditures on what can be 
termed "necessities" and its standard of living, as determined by income. 
This relationship is illustrated in Diagram 3.1. Conversely, expenditure on 
other items termed "luxuries" shows an opposite relationship in Diagram 
3.2. Expenditure on necessities, singly or in combination, has consequently 
been used in a variety of ways as a measure of living standards and for the 
derivation of equivalence scales.
Diagram 3.1. Engel curve for "necessities".
100%
Expenditure
"necessities" 
as a %of 
total expend.
Income
Diagram 3.2. Engel curve for "luxuries".
100%
Expenditure
"luxuries" 
as a % of 
total expend.
Income
There are several well known poverty lines based on the proportional 
approach. In the US, the Orshansky poverty line assumes that a family 
which spends more than 30 per cent of its income on food is in poverty.15 
Alternative studies in the US which use expenditure on food as a 
proportion of total expenditure (as opposed to income) found that low 
income families on average spent 25 to 35 per cent of their total expenditure 
on food (Nicholson,1976:1-12).
5^ Orshansky (1965; 1969). A formalisation of Orshansky's method can be found in Hagenaars (1985:56).
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In Canada, the proportional approach has been applied by the government 
bureau, Statistics Canada, to derive its poverty line. Statistics Canada chose 
food, clothing and shelter as necessities and, using expenditure data for 
Canadian households, calculated the amount spent on these goods as a 
proportion of income. This proportion was around 42 per cent in 1969. An 
arbitrary figure of 20 per cent was then added to give a 'reference level' of 
expenditure. Households which spent more than this proportion of income 
on necessities were deemed to be in poverty.16
The proportional expenditure approach uses expenditure data to set poverty 
standards; however the poverty indicator can be either income or 
expenditure.
3.2.4. Budget standards.
The development of budget standards, particularly in the US, can be viewed 
as a combination of the basket-of-goods and consumer expenditure 
approaches described above. The US Bureau of Labour Statistics (USBLS) 
opted for an approach to setting reference incomes which involves the 
selective estimation of consumption budgets based on a combination of 
survey data analysis together with normative minimum standards for 
commodities such as food and housing.17
The USBLS has devised techniques for estimating a 'minimum required 
expenditure' for various commodities known as S-curve analysis. This 
technique is based on the observation that consumption patterns for 
necessary commodities typically follows a progression whereby as income 
increases, expenditure is directed firstly, towards increased quantities of the 
commodity, then increased variety, and finally improved quality.
On this basis, it was anticipated that the analysis of expenditure data would 
show a relationship between amounts bought with changes in income. It 
was expected that if expenditures in relation to income followed the trend 
described above, and if, initially, quantity not quality increased, then a 
quantity- income curve would result that was roughly S-shaped.
Using expenditure as a proxy for quantity, the budget level for a particular 
commodity was determined by the point where the increase in expenditure
16 Ibid.
^7 For a detailed discussion of this approach see Mitchell (1985) and Bradshaw et al (1987).
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showed a tendency to decline relative to income. This point (x') is shown in 
Diagram 3.3. The reference income is set by combining the minimum 
expenditure levels for food and housing with the S-curve estimates for 
other commodity groups. The USBLS argued that a standard based on this 
approach represents the cost of maintaining a family or individual at a 
'modest but adequate' level.
Budget standards are set by expenditure based data, although the poverty 
indicator itself is income.
Diagram 33. Quantity-income elasticity function, the 'S-curve7.
Quantity
3.25. Attitudinal surveys: the social consensus approach.
This approach represents a radical departure from those described above. It 
relies on direct questioning of the population about their views on welfare 
levels. This usually takes one of two forms. In the first, the respondent is 
asked to estimate the minimum income needed to maintain a 'reference' 
family (eg: a couple with two children). This produces a poverty line via the 
averaging of all responses (Rainwater,1974).
Alternatively, the respondent is asked for details of their household 
composition, current income and the minimum income they would require 
for necessary costs. The respondents' minimum income estimates are then 
plotted against their actual income to produce a poverty line as follows: if 
the amount individuals consider to be their minimum income is an 
increasing function of income, with an elasticity between 0 and 1, a 
minimum income function can be derived. The intersection of the actual
and minimum income function curves is the poverty line. This point is 
shown in Diagram 3.4, where y* represents the poverty level income.
Diagram 3.4. The determination of the Leyden' poverty line.
Minimum/
Actual
income
Actual income
This approach was introduced by Goedhart et al (1977) and has been 
developed and applied in the Netherlands to produce the 'Leyden' poverty 
line.
Using either of these approaches requires data from specifically designed 
surveys (or specific questions appended to other surveys) to set the poverty 
line. Thereafter, the poverty indicator is income.
3.2.6. Relative deprivation.
The concept of relative deprivation is associated with the work of Runciman 
(1966) and Townsend (1970,1979). The empirical application of this approach 
is best exemplified by the extensive survey undertaken by Townsend in the 
UK in the late 1970s (Townsend,1979). His approach consisted of selecting 
around 60 indicators of the 'standard of living' commonly enjoyed by British 
society at the time. These indicators covered such things as diet, clothing, 
household consumer durables, housing and health characteristics, 
recreation.
Townsend then conducted a survey to uncover the characteristics of those 
who lacked, or did not participate in, the amenities or activities represented 
by each of these indicators. By correlating this lack or non-participation with 
income and demographic characteristics, Townsend was able to construct a 
deprivation threshold or poverty line and to identify significant groups 
within this threshold.
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Like the attitudinal approach, Townsend's approach requires a specifically 
designed survey to set the deprivation index. Although Townsend 
converted his index to an income level, his approach essentially relies on 
the consumption of specific commodities as the indicator of poverty.
3.2.7. Relative income approaches.
The best known example of the relative income approach was developed by 
Victor Fuchs in the US in 1965. Fuchs' approach is based on a concept of 
economic distance. He argued that a definition of poverty was required 
which sets a standard that changes with the growth of real income:
Absolute standards of poverty constantly change. It is more 
reasonable, therefore, to think of poverty in terms of relative 
incomes... In any given society at any given point in time the "poor" 
are those in the bottom tail of the income distribution. While there 
will always be a bottom tail, how far those in it are from those in 
the middle is ... of critical importance.^
Fuchs proposed a standard of 50% of median income. At the time he 
recognised that there was no special claim to be made for choosing 50%, 
however in time this interval has become a widely adopted standard. 
Researchers using the LIS database have favoured this approach in their 
analyses and the following section examines the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach.
The median income approach is set and measured using income data which 
may be collected in a number of ways - usually through surveys of tax files 
or by large-scale social surveys.
3.2.8. Observing poverty: appropriate measures for the comparative context.
In this study the potential range of approaches to measuring poverty will be 
limited by: the conceptual appropriateness of different measures in the 
comparative context; the availability of suitable comparative data to set a 
poverty line; and related to this, the availability and comparability of the 
indicative data. In this section I discuss these issues, using the approaches 
outlined above to illustrate the arguments. While the discussion focuses on 
the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches, the data 
required to support each approach is also important. Table 3.1 summarises
18 Fuchs (1965:89).
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the relationship between the concepts and the type of data used to set and/or 
measure the incidence of poverty.
TaW e^l^^^^relationshi^^etween^overW concTO ^^ri^ndicators^___
Conceptual approach
Indicator ABSOLUTE RELATIVE
SPECIFIC COMMODITIES Chichilnisky Townsend
INCOME  Rowntree Fuchs
EXPENDITURE Orshansky USBLS Budget standards
The advantages and disadvantages of each approach vary with the purpose 
for which the measure is to be used. For example, if we wanted to know 
whether a particular transfer payment provided an 'adequate' standard of 
living for recipients it might be appropriate to examine the expenditure 
patterns of recipients and compare these with a poverty line which has been 
set using dietary, housing and clothing requirements. In answering this 
question such an absolute approach might be more appropriate than, 
perhaps, a relative income approach, which would tell us how far below the 
average or median income the recipients are, but not whether this seriously 
impairs their ability to consume certain necessary commodities. There are of 
course the usual objections regarding the subjectivity of such an absolute 
approach, for example, variations in consumption due to age, sex, cultural 
background. However, the interval chosen to set the relative standard is 
equally arbitrary.
Shifting the focus of the question, and asking whether a transfer payment is 
set at a level which might be regarded as 'fair', would require a shift in 
approach. In this instance, the judgement of fairness may be best conducted 
on a basis which relates the income of recipients to the average or median 
incomes of the society as a whole. Absolute approaches may be inappropriate 
in this context because they do not capture the change in inter-group 
differences, particularly over time. The objections which might be raised 
against the relative measure in this case include the definition of income, 
for example, measuring income but not assets.
The debate on absolute versus relative measures in the UK and US in the 
1970s paid considerable attention to the question of the subjectivity of each 
approach. In this, and indeed many other respects, there is room for doubt 
about the validity of criticisms made by adherents of each particular 
approach of the other approaches. Quite often the charges being levelled at 
other approaches are equally applicable to the approach being advocated. For 
example, a frequently cited criticism of absolute approaches to defining
poverty is that it involves an unacceptably high level of subjective 
judgement with respect to defining what constitutes a minimum standard. 
This is a valid criticism but it is one which is equally applicable to relative 
approaches. For example, the Townsend and median income approaches 
also suffer from considerable subjectivity: Townsend because his indicators 
of style of living were based on his judgements; the median income 
approach because of its arbitrary specification of the interval of comparison. 
Essentially, there seems little point in making abstract criticisms of each 
approach, all measures are problematic and the problems specific to each 
approach are probably best dealt with in the context of application.
Many of the problems associated with the application of an absolute 
approach in national contexts become even more apparent cross-nationally. 
For example, consumption patterns will vary substantially between different 
groups of commodities - fuel consumption will vary with climate; similarly 
clothing budgets and customary diets will differ; housing costs will vary 
with patterns of public and private provision, and so on. It would be difficult 
to construct a budget standard or basket-of-goods which could be confidently 
applied cross-nationally. This is also true of a relative approach such as 
Townsend's. In addition, the data required to generate such standards does 
not exist on a comparable basis.
For these reasons approaches which rely on the consumption of specific 
goods and expenditure based measures are difficult to use with any 
confidence in a comparative context.
The social consensus approach in the comparative context could easily be 
adopted if the appropriate survey data were available for each country. 
However we would not be contrasting the countries on the basis of a single 
standard, but on a series of standards which might prove difficult to 
compare to each other. For example, they would reflect national differences 
in standards of living, customary consumption patterns and so on.
The relative income approach to setting a poverty line has a number of 
advantages and disadvantages in the comparative context. In terms of 
advantages, consider the example of adopting Fuch's approach to setting the 
poverty line (eg: 50% of median income). Using this approach we would be 
able to compare, in a consistent fashion, the relative economic distances 
between higher and lower income earners across countries. A second 
advantage is that, unlike expenditure data, income data pose fewer problems 
in terms of building comparable variables for analysis. Third, an approach
such as Fuchs' allows the specification and measurement of poverty to 
proceed from the same type of data.
There are a number of problems with the relative income approach, some of 
which are shared with other approaches and others which are specific to 
income approaches. In the first instance, the period of observation of the 
income is limited, usually to an annual or even weekly basis. It is possible 
that units defined as poor one week or year may not be defined so in the 
following survey - the duration of 'poverty' may vary considerably for some 
families or households and is frequently related to the stage of the 'life-cycle' 
which the unit being observed has reached. This is a problem common to all 
approaches, even those which do not use income to set the poverty line, but 
as the indicator of poverty.
Second, income as an indicator has specific weaknesses in distinguishing the 
poor in that, assets or capital in the form of home ownership or savings, are 
not included in the measure. Some families which we might not regard as 
poor - relative to community standards - because of their asset holdings, 
may be defined as such on an income basis.
A third problem specific to the income approach in a comparative setting is 
that those defined as poor in relatively wealthy countries, may be well above 
the poverty line in others. This issue is particularly important when 
comparing developed and developing economies. However, in the group of 
OECD countries under consideration here, this poses less concern. The 
problem is one of degree in these countries and requires consideration about 
the relative standard that is chosen: for example, whether one uses median 
income rather than average income as a standard.
To conclude, the relative income approach generally appears to have the 
strongest claims in the comparative context. Its immediate attractions are 
strongly linked to data constraints, but it should also be recognised that there 
are sound theoretical reasons for using relative income approaches rather 
than consumption or expenditure approaches to make meaningful 
comparisons. In terms of the specific focus of this study, the ability of the 
income transfer systems to decrease the economic distance between higher 
and lower income earners is a central element of the effectiveness of these 
systems. For these reasons the Fuchs' approach is adopted by this study. In 
the following sections I set out how the Fuchs' approach is applied in this 
study and discuss a number of related empirical issues which concern how 
the poverty measures are to be presented (head-counts versus poverty gaps)
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and how the countries are to be compared (ranking versus absolute 
measures).
3.3. Setting a relative poverty line.
The basis of the poverty line measures to be used in the study is 50% of 
adjusted median family income. The line has been calculated using the 
following steps:
1. Family disposable income (DPI) is d ivided by the equivalence 
scale (EQ1 or EQ2) to give adjusted fam ily income.
2. Observations are sorted in ascending order and the median  
adjusted income observed.
3. A poverty line for all AEU is set at 50% of this median. This 
is, in effect, the poverty line for a single person since the 
equivalence scale equals 1 for a single person.
4. Poverty lin es for other fam ily s ize s  are calculated  by  
m ultiplying the AEU line by the appropriate equivalence  
factors as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 illustrates how the adjusted median income poverty line is 
calculated for several family types.
Table 3.2. Calculation o f the adjusted m edian income poverty line.
Familv tvpe AEU Povertv line EQ1 Familv tvpe poverty line
Single person 1000 1 1000
Lone parent + 1 child 1000 1.5 1500
Couple 1000 1.7 1700
Couple + 2 children 1000 2.7 2700
3.4. Head-counts and poverty gaps.
Poverty estimates are frequently presented in the form of a head-count 
measure, that is, the proportion of the population below a given poverty 
line. The count itself may be based on persons, families or households. 
While the head-count is a useful presentational measure, by virtue of its 
simplicity, it does have a number of drawbacks which have been widely 
discussed in the poverty measurement literature.19 Of these, there are three 
which most concern this study: first, the head-count is sensitive to where 
the poverty line is drawn; second, head-counts may be misleading in
19 See for example, Sen (1979) and Foster's survey (1984).
comparing the degree of poverty cross-nationally; and third, head-counts are 
insensitive to transfers from the poor to the non-poor.
To illustrate these problems consider the examples shown in Tables 3.3 and 
3.4. Table 3.3 shows the poverty head-counts for two countries based on two 
poverty line incomes. When the poverty line is drawn at $100 per week, 
both countries have identical head-counts of 20%, however, when the 
poverty line is decreased by 10% there is a significant drop in the level of 
poverty in Country A with very little change in Country B. This illustrates 
that head-counts may vary quite dramatically with a small variation in the 
poverty line. It also shows that if we were to compare these two countries 
solely on the basis of Poverty line 2, the head-count would suggest that the 
two countries have similar levels of poverty; however we know from 
Poverty line 2 that the degree of poverty is substantially different. The most 
common reason for such changes is the 'clustering7 of income units around 
the poverty line.
Poverty line 1 Poverty line 2 Poverty head-count (%)
$ $ PLI PL2
Country A 100 90 20 5
Country B 100 90 20 18
Poverty line 1 Poverty line 2 Average poverty gap (S'!
$ $ PLI PL2
Country A 100 90 5 2
Country B 100 90 9 8
This problem is handled in two ways in the study. First, to avoid clustering 
effects, three poverty lines are used in the study. In addition to setting the 
poverty line at 50% of median income, one line is set slightly lower (at 40% 
of median income) and another slightly higher (60% of median income). 
Poverty measures are reported at each of these levels.
Second, the concept of the poverty gap is used in the study. The poverty gap 
is the difference between the income of the unit in question and the income 
that would be required to bring that unit up to its defined poverty line. 
Returning to the example in Table 3.3, we see that in Country A the poor are 
clustered just below PL1 and on average, have incomes which are $5 below 
the poverty line. In Country B the poor are, on average, $9 below the poverty 
line. This accounts for the dramatic shift in the head-count for Country A 
when the poverty line is set at a slightly lower level, while the head-count
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for Country B falls to a much lesser extent. In Chapter 4 the analysis of 
poverty is presented using both the head-count and poverty gap measures.
Table 3.4 illustrates the transfer sensitivity problem identified earlier. We 
see that a transfer occurs between Person A, who is below the poverty line 
pre-transfer and Person B, who is above the poverty line pre-transfer. If the 
head-count measure is used there appears to be no change in poverty levels; 
however using the poverty gap measure we see that poverty has increased.
Poverty Pre-transfer Post-transfer 
line ($1 income ($) income ($)
Person A 100 90 70
Person B 100 100 120
Head-count Poverty gap($) 
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
1 1 -10 -30
0 0 0 +20
This property of the poverty gap allows us to judge the effectiveness of 
different transfer instruments in reducing poverty in a much more sensitive 
fashion than is permitted by the head-count. The change in the size of the 
poverty gap during the transfer process is also an important factor in the 
assessment of the efficiency of transfer systems. For example, transfers such 
as that described above clearly do not contribute to a reduction in poverty. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 considers the extent to which transfers close the 
poverty gap, allowing for the spillover of transfers above the poverty line.
3.5. A discussion of partial ordering.
In the course of the discussion in this and the preceding chapter I have 
identified two key problems which affect the estimation of poverty in the 
comparative context: where the poverty line itself is drawn; and the 
equivalence scale(s) used. As several LIS researchers have shown (Smeeding 
et al, 1985b; Buhmann et al,1988) poverty estimates are quite sensitive to the 
way in which these problems are handled. The extensive work of Buhmann 
et al (1988:140) which produced poverty and inequality estimates for a range 
of equivalence scales concluded that
Choice of equivalence scale can systematically affect comparative 
absolute and relative levels and rankings of countries (or groups 
within countries) with respect to measured inequality and poverty.
Because of these sensitivities, one must carefully consider summary 
statements and policy implications derived from cross-national 
comparisons of poverty and/or inequality.
Indeed, the variation in their results could lead one, as Atkinson (1989a:2) 
suggests, to 'conclude that nothing definite can be said/ Atkinson has given
46
this issue - specifically in the context of the LIS data - a great deal of attention 
and has suggested that partial ordering may be the best approach to 
presenting, analysing and interpreting results from the LIS and similar 
datasets.20
Partial ordering has two aspects as described by Atkinson: the use of rankings 
rather than numerical values and, over a range of poverty lines or 
equivalence scales, these rankings may be partial rather than complete. To 
illustrate Atkinson's approach, consider the example shown in Table 3.5. 
The first point Atkinson makes is that, given the sensitivity of poverty 
estimates, we should avoid statements such as "there is twice as much 
poverty in Country C than in Country A". Even if we could agree that 
Poverty line 1 (PL1) is a measure acceptable to those interested in such 
comparisons, we know that a slight shift in the poverty line, to positions PL2 
and PL3 renders this observation dubious if not inaccurate.
Where there is no agreement on the poverty line(s), Atkinson suggests that 
rather than using numerical values, it may be that the interested parties 
might agree on rankings rather than precise estimates. That is, they may 
agree that there is less poverty in Country A than Country C, but avoid 
specifying how much less. The figures in Table 3.5 for PL1 and PL2 would 
suggest that a com plete ordering is possible for countries A,B and C 
(A<B<C). However, if we extend the range of observations to include PL3, 
then only a partial ordering becomes possible ie A and B<C but A ^B.
Table 3.5. Rankings, partial and complete ordering
Poverty line 1 (PLII Poverty line 2 (PL2) Poverty line 3 (PL3)
% poor rank % poor rank %poor rank
Country A 8 1 5 1 3 2
Country B 10 2 6 2 2 1
Country C 16 3 8 3 5 3
In the presentation and analysis of the empirical results in the following 
chapters, it is the ordering of the countries on each measure which is given 
greatest emphasis. Atkinson (1989b) has proposed that we consider a range of 
poverty lines Z’ < Z < Z+ collectively denoted by Z*. Using the range of 
results from these alternative lines:
20 A full discussion of partial ordering in this context is found in Atkinson (1989b:13-15).
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... we can make unambiguous comparisons if the number in poverty is 
lower for all Z in the range ... but we cannot rank two situations if the 
number in poverty is higher for some Z and lower for other Z in the 
range Z*. In other words, for there to be definitely less poverty with 
one distribution than with another, we require that the cumulative 
distribution of Y be everywhere below that of the other in the range 
of possible poverty lines.23
In this study the range of poverty lines (Z*) can be denoted as Z‘ (40%); Z 
(50%); and Z+ (60%) of median income. Readers familiar with inequality 
measures will recognise that this ordering approach is analogous to the 
concept of Lorenz dominance.22 An ordering of countries in terms of their 
poverty head-counts (and gaps) can be obtained when the head-count of one 
country lies entirely below another for all Z in the range Z*. This situation is 
shown in Diagram 3.5. We see that Germany and Sweden have poverty rates 
lower than Australia and that Sweden has a lower poverty rate than 
Germany for all Z in the range Z*. Thus a complete ordering is possible for 
these three countries.
Diagram 3.5. Complete ordering of three LIS countries.
Cumulative 
percentage 
of poor 
families
Australia
Germany
Sweden
Percentage of 
median income 
(Z* range)
21 Atkinson (1989b:13-14).
22 Lorenz dominance is discussed in Chapter 6.
However, if we add the UK to these observations, this ordering becomes 
partial. In Diagram 3.6 we see that the UK has a lower percentage of persons 
in poverty at the 40% poverty line than all these countries, but much higher 
levels than Sweden and Germany at the 50% and 60% levels.
Diagram 3.6. Partial ordering of four LIS countries.
Cumulative 
percentage 
of poor 
families
Australia
UK
Germany
Sweden
Percentage of 
median income 
(Z* range)
The ordering approach can also apply to comparisons of the poverty rates of 
families of different composition between countries and of poverty rates 
over time within individual countries.
3.5.1. Alternative equivalence scales.
The second problem, the use of alternative equivalence scales, has been 
approached by using two different scales. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
OECD scale and the Whiteford geometric mean scale are used in this study. 
This produces a second range of poverty lines which can similarly be 
ordered using the Atkinson approach. This second range also presents the 
possibility of comparing the two ranges to examine the ordering evident 
from both equivalence scales.
The introduction of the second equivalence scale may assist in confirming 
or denying the ordering evident from the first scale. Consider the ordering
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shown in Diagram 3.7, using the OECD equivalence scale (EQ1) Australia's 
poverty rates are below those of Canada for Z*; however the Whiteford scale 
(EQ2), does not allow a complete ordering.
Diagram 3.7. Partial ordering using two equivalence scales.
Cumulative 
percentage 
of poor 
families
Australia EQ2 
Canada EQ2 
Canada EQ1 
Australia EQ1
Percentage of 
median income 
(Z* range)
While the use of a second equivalence scale may be desirable in terms of 
accounting for the sensitivity of poverty head-counts or gaps to the selected 
equivalence scales, both scales produce fairly similar rankings except in 
countries where there are significant differences in demographic structures, 
in particular, the number of single persons.23 Thus the end result of using 
both scales is that the analysis is unnecessarily cluttered and in my view 
diminishes the trends which are obvious from the results.
For this reason I have developed a technique which examines poverty head- 
counts and gaps based on the intersection of those defined as poor under the 
two equivalence scales. That is, to define as poor those families who are so 
defined on both equivalence scales. I refer to this technique as the poverty 
intersection. This approach can be visualised from Diagram 3.8. Using this 
approach, the following chapter examines whether the poverty intersection
23 This is because of the different weights attached to second adults and children in larger households. 
In the Whiteford scale these weights are much lower than in the OECD scale, thus the comparative 
weight of the individual is greater for Whiteford than for the OECD. Therefore we expect the Whiteford 
scale to measure more individuals in poverty than the OECD scale and conversely, for the Whiteford 
scale to measure less families in poverty than the OECD scale.
v
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produces a more complete ordering of the LIS countries in terms of the 
Atkinson approach.
Diagram 3.8. The poverty intersection.
Families 
defined as 
pooron 
OECD 
scale
Families 
defined 
as poor 
on both
Families 
defined as 
poor on 
Whiteford 
scale
3.6. Summary.
Assessing the effectiveness of social security transfers in alleviating income 
poverty requires the establishment of a poverty line as a yardstick against 
which the transfer systems of various countries can be judged in terms of 
their ability to reduce poverty rates and poverty gaps.
There is no agreed "best approach" to setting a poverty line in the 
comparative context, although the discussion in this chapter suggests that 
approaches which rely on consumption and expenditure to set and/or 
measure poverty present greater difficulties in application than do income 
approaches. For this reason the median income approach suggested by Fuchs 
has been adopted in this study.
Having selected the poverty standard to be used, there remain a number of 
measurement problems. Several have been raised here - the sensitivity of 
estimates to where the poverty line is drawn, the use of alternative 
equivalence scales, and the presentation and analysis of the results in such 
an uncertain environment.
The sensitivity problems are tackled in several ways: by using poverty gaps 
in addition to head-count measures; producing estimates for a range of 
poverty lines combined with the use of two equivalence scales; and the 
presentation and interpretation of the results will use the partial ordering 
approach and the poverty intersection.
>
C h a p t e r  F o u r
P o v e r t y  r e d u c t io n  in  t h e  LIS c o u n t r ie s :
EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES.
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4.1. Cross-national measures of poverty: some presentational issues.
The simplest measures of effectiveness are derived from comparison of the 
number of units in poverty before and after transfers. In order to make 
comparisons meaningful across countries it is convenient to express these 
head-counts as a percentage of the total population. So, for example, we 
might observe in country A a pre-transfer head-count of 20% and a post­
transfer head-count of 10%. The degree of poverty reduction can then be 
expressed as either a 10 percentage point absolute reduction (ie 20%-10%) or 
as a 50% proportional reduction (100% x 10/20).
The absolute measure is probably less useful for comparative purposes 
because it takes no account of the size of the pre-transfer poverty population 
(Smeeding et al,1985b).24 In country B, for example, the pre-transfer head- 
count might be 6% and the post-transfer head-count 3%. The absolute 
measure of poverty reduction would record a 3 percentage point poverty 
reduction which would appear much smaller than that occurring in country 
A, even though the proportion of people lifted out of poverty is the same in 
each country, ie 50%. Even if country B were able to completely eliminate 
poverty, its absolute poverty reduction would be only 6%, still less than the 
absolute reduction in country A. This hypothetical example demonstrates 
the advantage of the proportional reduction measure which will be used 
throughout this chapter.
An alternative measure of poverty which can be used in assessing poverty 
reduction is the poverty gap, measuring the amount by which each unit falls 
below the poverty line. The extent of poverty is an important concern for 
social welfare analysis, for example, a transfer program which lifts a family 
from dire poverty to an income just below the poverty line would be 
measured as having no effect on the crude head-count measure but would 
register a considerable effect using the poverty gap measure (Sen,1979; 
Beckerman,1979a; Foster,1984; Atkinson,1989b). Furthermore, if we were to 
use a slightly lower poverty line, the poverty gap measure of poverty 
reduction would be virtually unchanged, but the head-count measure of 
poverty reduction would change from zero to one. So the poverty gap 
should be expected to be both more informative of the extent of poverty 
reduction and also less sensitive to the choice of poverty line.
24 Smeeding et al (1985b:54) note that the proportionate reduction in the head-count is 'an important 
dimension of inter-country comparisons of poverty.'
One of the aims of this chapter is to use the LIS data to compare the 
measures of poverty reduction using head-counts with the measures using 
poverty gaps. Do the two measures rank countries in the same order? Are 
they equally robust to the choice of poverty line (and also to the choice of 
equivalence scale)? If both questions are answered in the affirmative, we 
may conclude that although the poverty gap approach is superior in 
principle, little information is lost for practical purposes of inter-country 
comparison by using the simpler head-count approach. If, however, the 
answers are negative we may conclude that the extra information contained 
in the poverty gap measures is of operational significance.
The relevance of poverty reduction as an indicator of the effectiveness of a 
transfer system depends on an implicit assumption that pre-transfer 
incomes are independent of transfers. In discussing this assumption, 
O'Higgins et al (1985:6) argue:
Plainly, this is not the case, particularly when some of the 
government programs (eg: pensions) have existed for so long that 
individuals have taken them into account when planning and 
anticipating their future income needs.
This point can be illustrated in a hypothetical example of countries A and B 
which start off with identical transfer systems and identical pre- and post­
transfer poverty rates of 20% and 10%. Suppose country B expands its state 
welfare payments to a hitherto neglected group, the aged. Suppose 
furthermore, that people nearing retirement respond to this policy change 
by abandoning their private pension and investment plans so that when 
they reach retirement their market income is lower by the exact amount of 
the new transfers which they receive from the state. We will then observe 
that the pre-transfer poverty rate in country B is now, say, 25% whilst the 
post-transfer poverty rate is still 10%. Measured poverty reduction in 
country A is still 50% (ie 100% x 10/20), but in country B it has risen to 60% 
(ie 100% x 15/25), although post-transfer incomes are still identical.
In this hypothetical example substitution between market and state 
provision makes the poverty reduction measure misleading. How 
important is this in practice? One way of attempting to answer this question 
is to compare poverty reduction measures with both pre-transfer and post­
transfer poverty rates. If countries with high poverty reduction also have 
high pre-transfer poverty, there is some evidence that substitution does 
occur between market and state provision. If the countries with the highest 
poverty reduction do not have the lowest post-transfer poverty rates, we
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may conclude that poverty reduction measures are not a good indicator of 
the overall effectiveness of a transfer system in eliminating poverty. In 
other words, the post-transfer poverty rate is an alternative indicator of 
effectiveness which needs to be compared with the poverty reduction 
measure before we can claim that one country is unambiguously more 
effective than another in reducing poverty.
There are two further questions concerning the effectiveness of poverty 
reduction which are addressed in this chapter. First, how is poverty 
reduction distributed by demographic status? While the aggregate poverty 
rate and poverty gap measures give an overview of the effectiveness of these 
systems, they do not tell us whether the outcomes are uniformly spread 
across the population, or concentrated in a few areas. A recent OECD (1988:6) 
survey of social security programs noted that poverty amongst the aged has 
declined dramatically in the OECD countries in the period since 1945:
The available evidence indicates that the relative income position 
of the elderly has improved significantly in most countries; in some 
countries their average level of economic welfare equals or even 
slightly exceeds that of the non-elderly population.
The survey goes on to point out that among the OECD countries a number 
of new groups requiring income Support have emerged over the past decade 
(ieg: sole parents, the young and long-term unemployed). Unlike the aged, 
these groups do not attract the same level of popular support and have 
increasingly come to dominate the poor population (OECD,1988:6):
In those OECD countries which have measures of poverty or low 
income, the general trend in recent years has been of a static or 
declining number of elderly poor, with the non-elderly increasingly 
to be found in the lower parts of the income distribution.
In looking at the disaggregated measures, the study considers the 
effectiveness of these transfer systems in alleviating poverty across a range 
of groups. Poverty rates are reported for family types as a proportion of each 
family type and as a proportion of the poor population. Poverty gaps are 
reported as a proportion of the poverty line for each family type. The section 
also compares the resources devoted to each group with their pre-transfer 
poverty rates and gaps.
Second, to what extent is the poverty reduction of social security transfers 
offset by taxation? This question has been largely ignored in previous studies 
which present post-tax (ie disposable income) head-counts or gaps without 
indicating the extent to which the taxation system may reverse the gains 
made by the social security system.
The empirical analysis has produced a large number of detailed tables which 
report poverty rates and poverty gaps for: the range of poverty lines (Z*), 
both equivalence scales, seven family types and for the three stages of the 
income formation process. The complete set of results are available in 
Appendix B. Only the key results pertinent to the arguments in the chapter 
are reported here. Appendix G discusses the statistical significance of the 
empirical results reported in this study.
Where possible, the results obtained by other researchers using the LIS data 
will be noted and compared with the results in this study. A large part of the 
LIS research currently exists in the form of working papers. Appendix F 
reproduces the findings relevant to this study which have been drawn from 
the LIS Working Paper series and other published work. It is important to 
note however, that much of the analysis presented in this study (particularly 
in the ensuing chapters) covers new ground using the LIS data and 
comparable findings do not exist. Moreover, the results here have been 
obtained from the most recent version of the data (September,1989) which 
has removed certain anomalies (eg: coding errors) from the data. Some of 
these errors, especially those which affected the income observations, are 
reflected in existing publications and will contribute to some of the 
differences between this and other research.
4.2. Aggregate poverty measures: head-counts.
Following the methodology set out in Section 3.3, estimates of pre- and post­
transfer poverty rates have been made by observing the number of families 
whose pre- and post- transfer incomes are below their respective poverty 
lines. The post-transfer head-count measure is the most frequently cited 
statistic in the poverty literature. Despite its well documented flaws 
(Sen,1979; Foster,1984; Atkinson,1989b), this measure remains a vital statistic 
for politicians, policy analysts and social welfare lobbies seeking to convey a 
readily understood 'picture' of the level of poverty in the community.
In the context of comparative research the head-count holds similar 
attractions, even though LIS researchers have shown that poverty estimates 
and rankings are extremely sensitive to small variations in the poverty line 
and equivalence scales (Buhmann et al,1988).
Despite the problems with the head-count measure, these estimates have 
been made for the LIS data for two main reasons. First, following the Hill 
and Bramley model, post-transfer head-counts do represent an immediate
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outcome of the transfer process. If we concede that poverty alleviation is an 
aim common to the income transfer systems of the LIS countries then an 
estimate of the number of families or individuals who remain in poverty 
post-transfer is an inescapable requirement of the study, irrespective of the 
methodological flaws associated with head-counts.
Second, these estimates can be used as a standpoint to compare other 
measures used in this study in order to draw conclusions about the most 
appropriate methods for cross-national comparisons of poverty.
In this section I present post-transfer head-count estimates using the Fuchs' 
median income approach, but do so with a strong reminder that apart from 
extreme cases - eg: "there is less poverty in Sweden than in the US" - these 
head-count rankings need to be backed up by evidence from other measures 
such as the poverty gap, before any definite conclusions can be drawn about 
the comparative success of the income transfer systems of the LIS countries 
in reducing poverty.
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 show the estimates of pre- and post- transfer poverty rates 
for families in the LIS countries, using both the OECD and Whiteford 
equivalence scales. The tables also show the proportionate reduction in 
poverty rates pre- and post- transfer. These findings, in terms of rank orders, 
are very close to those of Buhmann et al (1988) and Smeeding et al (1989); 
and generally, are within two percentage points of the head-count estimates 
in both these studies for similar equivalence scales.25
4.2.1. Comparing post-transfer poverty rates: sensitivity to the choice of equivalence scale 
and poverty line.
The post-transfer rankings of countries by poverty rates are derived from 
Tables 4.1-4.3. These rankings are identical for the 40% poverty interval 
whether we use the OECD or the Whiteford equivalence scales. Identical 
rankings are indicated by a rank correlation coefficient (r) of 1, see Table 4.4. 
At the 50% poverty interval the rankings are almost identical (r=0.96) except 
that Norway and Sweden swap places. At the 60% poverty interval, 
however, there are significant differences between the rankings depending 
on which equivalence scale we use (r=0.88). Norway's ranking is particularly
25 Cf. Appendix Tables F.l and F.3. The equivalence scale closest to those used here, is the PROG scale 
used by Buhmann et al (1988). The only country which differs in rank order and actual count terms is 
Switzerland which is one of the countries where incomes have been adjusted since earlier versions of 
the database.
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sensitive: it has the lowest poverty rate using the OECD scale but only the 
fourth lowest using the Whiteford scale.26 The explanation for this 
difference is the combined effect of a 'clustering' of incomes between the 50% 
and 60% intervals and the larger weighting given to single persons on the 
Whiteford scale. (The disaggregated analysis in Section 4.6 investigates this 
difference).
Table 4.1. Reduction in  poverty rates for fam ilies , 40% poverty interval.
aagaaaBggaaBgrgasssasss .  ■ ■ ■ ■■ i m  m aa  a ■ aaaeaaaaBBBsaaagaaaBBgogmnBBBaMB—aBaaB
Percentage of families in poverty, pre- and post- transfer:
OECD Equivalence W hiteford Equivalence
Country Pre- Post- Reduction Pre- Post- Reduction
A ustra lia 25.7 5.9 77 26.0 6.1 77
C anada 21.2 7.6 64 21.4 8.1 62
France 31.6 4.9 85 30.9 4.6 85
Germany 29.5 3.3 89 29.4 3.8 87
N etherlands 31.1 5.6 82 31.1 5.5 82
N orw ay 28.7 3.5 88 29.0 3.8 87
Sweden 33.8 3.8 89 34.1 4.0 88
Sw itzerland 21.1 6.1 71 21.4 6.8 68
United Kingdom 27.2 1.7 94 27.3 2.7 90
United States 23.4 11.0 53 23.6 11.7 50
Table 4.2. Reduction in  poverty rates for fam ilies , 50% poverty interval.
Percentage of families in poverty, pre- and post- transfer:
OECD Equivalence W hiteford Equivalence
CQuntry Pre- Post- Reduction Pre- Post- Reduction
A ustra lia 28.0 10.3 63 28.0 10.9 61
C anada 24.9 12.5 50 24.9 13.6 45
France 36.4 7.9 78 35.3 9.0 75
Germany 31.0 6.8 78 31.1 7.2 77
N etherlands 32.5 7.0 78 32.5 6.7 79
N orw ay 30.6 5.3 83 31.1 5.6 82
Sweden 36.5 5.6 85 36.8 5.5 85
Sw itzerland 24.3 11.0 55 24.8 11.3 54
United Kingdom 30.0 8.2 73 30.1 11.2 63
United States 27.1 17.0 37 27.1 17.5 35
Table 4.3. Reduction in  poverty rates for fam ilies , 60% poverty interval
Percentage of families in poverty, pre- and post- transfer:
OECD Equivalence W hiteford Equivalence
Country Pre- Pq$t- Reduction Pre- Post- Reduction
A ustra lia 30.6 19.2 37 30.4 22.7 25
C anada 28.7 19.4 32 28.4 20.9 26
France 41.2 15.2 63 40.3 16.0 60
Germany 33.6 12.7 62 33.1 13.0 61
N etherlands 33.9 10.6 69 33.9 9.1 73
N orw ay 32.9 8.8 73 33.1 15.3 54
Sweden 39.5 9.2 77 38.9 9.5 76
Sw itzerland 28.1 17.8 37 27.7 18.0 35
United Kingdom 33.7 18.2 46 33.1 21.4 35
United States 30.8 23.2 25 30.7 23.5 23
26 This is also observed in Buhmann et al (1988:131). See Appendix Table F3.
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Table 4.4. Rank correlation between OECD and Whiteford scales, post-transfer head-count.
Rank correlates f o r : 40% interval 50% interval 60% interval
O ECD -W hiteford__________ TO__________________ 0.96__________________0,88_________
Turning to the differences across the Z* range, several countries change 
rankings as the poverty line rises. The most notable shift occurs for the UK 
which has the lowest poverty rate post-transfer at the 40% interval, but this 
rate rises sharply as the poverty line is increased to 50% and 60% of median 
income. To a lesser extent, this is also the case for Germany.27 The 
explanation for these changes is, again, the clustering of incomes around the 
various poverty lines. This clustering post-transfer is usually related to 
particular beneficiary groups who receive uniform levels of benefit and 
have very little other income. In the case of the UK, it is aged families which 
account for virtually all the increase in the poverty rates across the Z* range.
For Germany, the clustering is spread across several groups including the 
aged. In the remaining countries, the post-transfer poverty rates for Sweden, 
Norway and the Netherlands show no dramatic increases as the poverty line 
rises (apart from the Norwegian rate at the 60% interval discussed earlier.) 
While the Netherlands starts off behind the UK and Germany at the 40% 
interval, its post-transfer rates do not rise substantially; it therefore passes 
these two countries in the rankings at the higher poverty intervals. At the 
bottom of the rankings, Australia, Switzerland, Canada and the US have 
post-transfer poverty rates considerably higher than the other countries, 
particularly at the 50% and 60% intervals.
Table 4.5 gives the rank correlations for the rankings of post-transfer poverty 
comparing the 40% and 50% intervals, the 50% and 60% intervals, and the 
40% and 60% intervals. The extent to which rankings vary according to the 
choice of poverty line can be summarised by rank correlation coefficients. A 
value of 1 would imply that the rankings are identical; a value of zero 
would imply no relationship between the rankings. In fact, the rank 
correlation coefficients listed in Table 4.5 indicate that there is little 
difference between the rankings using the 50% and 60% poverty intervals 
for the OECD equivalence scale: r=0.95. There is somewhat greater disparity 
between the rankings using the 40% interval or using the Whiteford 
equivalence scale. In other words, any assessment of poverty rankings is 
robust whether we choose the 50% and 60% intervals, but it can vary
27 These patterns have also been identified by Buhmann et al (1988:133).
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substantially if we choose the 40% interval, especially with the Whiteford 
equivalence scale.
T ab l^j5^an^ on|elationcoeffidentefor£ost-toarisferhead-counte^ ^rM ige^^_^  
Z correlates OECD scale W hiteford scale
40 - 50 0.77 0.65
50 - 60 0.95 0.83
40 - 60 0.62 0.44
Table 4.6 shows the ranking of the LIS countries in terms of the post-transfer 
poverty rates at each level of the poverty line. As noted earlier there is 
considerable variation across the Z* range, to the extent that only a limited 
partial ordering of the countries is possible. In particular the UK shows 
considerable variation in rank across Z*.28
Table 4.6. Post-transfer head-count rankings for Z* range, OECD scale.
mk 40% line 50% line 60% line
1 UK 1.7 N orw ay 5.3 N orw ay 8.8
2 Germany 3.3 Sweden 5.6 Sweden 9.2
3 N orw ay 3.5 Germany 6.8 N etherlands 10.6
4 Sweden 3.8 N etherlands 7.0 Germany 12.7
5 France 4.9 France 7.9 France 15.2
6 N etherlands 5.6 UK  8.2 Sw itzerland 17.8
7 A ustralia  5.9 A ustralia  10.3 UK 18.2
8 Sw itzerland 6.1 Sw itzerland 11.0 A ustralia  19.2
9 Canada 7.6 Canada 12.5 Canada 19.4
10 U SA  11.0 USA 17.0 USA 23.2
I conclude that, with the exception of countries at the extremes of the 
rankings ie Sweden and Norway versus Canada and the US, the post­
transfer poverty counts do not give a clear picture of anti-poverty 
effectiveness in the LIS countries. Although the rankings are fairly robust 
with respect to the choice of equivalence scales, they are highly sensitive to 
the choice of the poverty line.
The problem is probably best illustrated by Diagram 4.1 (based on the data in 
Table 4.6) which shows there are a number of countries which crossover 
ranks as we move from one poverty line to another.
28 See also, Buhmann et al (1988:133).
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Despite the fact that the rankings change as we move from one poverty line 
to another, we can see from Diagram 4.1 that there are some general bands of 
ordering. At the extremes we see that the US and Canada have higher 
poverty rates at all levels of the poverty line. Australia and Switzerland 
follow in the next band. France and Germany form another band, although 
Germany crosses into the lowest band at the 40% interval. Sweden and 
Norway have poverty rates lower than all the other bands. The UK and the 
Netherlands cross these bands, particularly the UK which at each level of the 
poverty line falls in a different band. It appears that the head-count approach 
allows a partial, but far from complete, ordering of the level of post-transfer 
poverty in the LIS countries.
Diagram 4.1. Post-transfer head-counts for Z* range, OECD scale.
Percentage 
of families 
in poverty 
post-transfer
US
Canada
Aust
UK
Switz.
France
Germany
N’lands
Sweden
Norway
Percentage of 
median income 
(Z* range)
4.2.2. The post-transfer reduction of the poverty head-count.
As noted in Chapter 1, an important indicator of the effectiveness of these 
transfer systems in alleviating poverty is the extent to which the head-count 
measure is reduced from its pre-transfer level. In Tables 4.1 to 4.3 the 
proportionate reduction in the head-count has been calculated by the change 
in the pre-and post- transfer counts, divided by the pre-transfer count.
The results are summarised by Diagrams 4.2 and 4.3. First, excluding the UK, 
Diagram 4.2 shows a strong ordering of the LIS countries in terms of their
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poverty reduction achievements. The ordering also shows that there are two 
quite distinct groupings of countries when viewed from this perspective.
Diagram 4.2. Poverty reduction in the LIS countries (excluding UK) OECD equivalence scale.
Percentage 
reduction in 
poverty rates 
post-transfer
Sweden
Norway
N ’lands
France
Switz.
Canada
Percentage of 
median income
(Z* range)
Group I
Group II
Group I consists of the Northern European countries - Sweden, Norway, the 
Netherlands, France and Germany. As the poverty line rises the poverty 
reduction achieved by Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands remains fairly 
constant. In contrast, the poverty reduction achieved by Germany and 
France tails off between the 50% and 60% intervals, but still remains high 
relative to Group II.
In the Group II countries, the poverty reduction rates are consistently lower 
than those for Group I across the Z* range. In addition, the reduction rates 
are not constant across the range, but fall consistently between Z* and Z+. 
There is a sharp fall in poverty reduction between the 50% and 60% 
intervals in the Group II countries, and this is particularly true of Australia 
where the dominance of income-tested programs sharply reduces the level 
of social security payments over this range.
In Diagram 4.3 the UK is added to the analysis. We see that the UK is quite 
unlike either of these two groups in terms of its pattern of poverty 
reduction. At the lowest poverty interval the UK achieves the greatest 
reduction in the head-count. However, it is unlike the Northern Europe
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group in terms of the consistency of poverty reduction - across the Z* range 
the reduction rate falls quite sharply. At the 60% interval, the UK moves 
closer to Group II both in terms of the amount of poverty reduction 
achieved and the tailing off in the rate of reduction.
Diagram 43. Poverty reduction in the U S  countries (including UK) OECD equivalence scale.
Percentage 
reduction in 
poverty rates 
post-transfer
Group I
Group II
Ranking the effectiveness of the LIS countries in terms of poverty reduction 
rates, we see that Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands consistently achieve 
high reductions across the Z* range. France and Germany also achieve large 
reductions, although these are not as consistent as the former countries as 
the poverty line rises. The UK is difficult to place in either group as far as the 
poverty reduction measure is concerned, at very low levels of the poverty 
line the UK transfer system is extremely effective, but this falls quite sharply 
as the poverty line rises. However, its effectiveness is clearly superior to the 
countries in Group n.
At the 40% interval Australia achieves a poverty reduction rate close to that 
of the Group I countries, but this falls away sharply as the poverty line rises. 
Switzerland, Canada and the US perform quite poorly even at the lowest 
poverty interval with poverty reduction rates of around 70% or less. At the 
60% interval, poverty reduction is under 40% for this group of countries.
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In considering the effectiveness of the countries in reducing poverty across 
the range Z*, the partial ordering using the results of this study is shown 
below. This ordering is consistent with the findings of Smeeding et al 
(1985b).29
Sweden 
Norway 
Netherlands 
= France, Germany 
Australia 
Switzerland 
Canada 
United States
United Kingdom
In contrast to the post-transfer head-count which presents a fairly 
ambiguous picture of anti-poverty effectiveness, the reduction of the head- 
count gives a much clearer picture of those countries where the income 
transfer system succeeds in reducing the amount of poverty in society. The 
ordering is, however, still only partial.
4.23. The effectiveness of transfer systems in eliminating poverty.
In the introduction to this chapter I suggested that poverty reduction is not 
necessarily the best measure of anti-poverty effectiveness. It is possible that a 
high level of measured poverty reduction could be caused by offsetting 
substitution away from market sector saving to public transfers. In order to 
assess overall effectiveness we need to examine the triangular relationships 
between pre- and post- transfer poverty and poverty reduction.
First it is of interest to consider the relationship between the pre- and post­
transfer counts. The reason for this is simply to assess whether the pre­
transfer level of poverty determines post-transfer outcomes. That is, do 
countries with lower pre-transfer poverty rates also have lower post-transfer 
rates? In which case, the outcomes of the transfer process may be considered 
less relevant than say, wages or employment policy in determining the level 
of poverty in each country.
Diagram 4.4 plots the pre- and post- transfer head counts for the LIS 
countries, we see that in fact there is a moderately strong inverse
29 Only six of the countries examined here were studied by Smeeding et al (1985b). In addition to 
identical rankings of the common set of countries, the actual estimates of reduction presented here are 
within five percentage points of the Smeeding study. See Appendix table F.7.
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relationship between pre- and post- transfer rates.30 Those countries with 
the lowest pre-transfer poverty rates, such as the USA, Canada and 
Switzerland, tend to have the highest post-transfer poverty rates. The effects 
of the transfer systems are, in general, strong enough to reverse the poverty 
rankings.
Diagram 4.4. Pre- versus post- transfer poverty rates, 50% poverty interval, OECD scale.
Percentage 
of families 
poor pre­
transfer
N'lands
Percentage 
of families 
poor post- 
transfer
It was suggested in the introduction to this chapter that if market provision 
of welfare were a substitute for state provision we could expect to find a 
positive correlation between poverty reduction measures and the level of 
pre-transfer poverty. The relationship for the LIS countries is illustrated in 
Diagram 4.5.
There is some evidence of a strong positive relationship. In particular, the 
five Northern European countries with the highest levels of poverty 
reduction are also the countries with the highest pre-transfer poverty rates.
Within Groups I and n, however, there is no obvious relationship between 
poverty reduction and pre-transfer poverty. This indicates that there may be 
some degree of substitution between market and state welfare provision. 
Smeeding et al (1985b:50) have also found this relationship and note that it 
is particularly pertinent in the case of the elderly.
30 The RA2 statistic shown in the diagram indicates the strength of the linear association between the 
two variables and the straight line is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression line indicating the 
direction and magnitude of the linear association. The actual notation, RA2, in the diagrams is due to 
software constraints. It is, of course, identical to the R2 notation used in the text. The statistical 
significance of these regressions is discussed in Appendix G.
65
Further investigation of this question would require the disaggregation of 
the pre-transfer poor population into those groups whose ability to plan for 
income support from the state (eg: the aged) and those for whom the need 
for income support would be unplanned (eg: sole parents). Comparing such 
groups may provide clearer evidence of the effects of substitution.31
Diagram 4J5. Reduction in poverty rate versus pre-transfer head-count (OECD scale.)
Percentage 
reduction in 
poverty count
■ SweNor ■
■ FraGer ■
Aust
Switz. ■
■ Can
Pre-transfer 
poverty rates 
(50% poverty line)
Most importantly, we want to examine whether there is a correlation 
between poverty reduction and post transfer poverty. Diagram 4.6 illustrates 
this relationship. Here the inverse correlation is almost perfect. The 
countries with the greatest poverty reduction do achieve the lowest poverty 
rates, and vice versa. This strong relationship indicates that, despite some 
apparent substitution between state and market provision, poverty 
reduction does appear to be a good measure of the success a country achieves 
in eliminating poverty.
31 Some preliminary analysis using the data from this study shows that comparisons similar to those in 
Diagram 4.5 for the aged and sole parents, yields OLS regression results of R2=0.69 for the aged and 
R^O.Ol for sole parents.
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Diagram 4.6. Reduction in  poverty rate versus post-transfer head-count (OECD scale.)
Percentage 
reduction in 
poverty count
N'lands
Aust
Switz. O
O US
Post-transfer 
poverty rate 
(50% poverty line)
4.3. Aggregate poverty measures: poverty gaps.
Assessments of effectiveness in the context of poverty gaps require us to 
examine both the rankings of each country in terms of its residual poverty 
gap (ie the post-transfer gap) and the amount of reduction in the poverty gap 
achieved by each income transfer system.
A number of writers have argued that the poverty gap measure is a superior 
approach to the head-count in terms of its accuracy in portraying the level of 
poverty in any given society (Sen,1979; Foster,1984; Haveman,1987). 
Beckerman (1979b:8), in particular, differentiates between the policy options 
that follow from adopting the head-count versus the poverty gap as the 
yardstick for measuring the success of income transfer policy:
... one implication of the distinction between the head-count m easure 
and the poverty gap m easure that is im portant for policy analysis is 
that ... if the total am ount of funds to be transferred to the poor is 
given, and if policy objectives were conceived (as they often seem to 
be) in term s of a reduction in the num bers below the poverty line (a 
head-count m easure), the best procedure m ight appear to be to 
concentrate the transfers on those people who fall below the poverty 
line by  a relatively sm all am ount, for in this w ay the greatest 
num ber of people could be raised up to the poverty line... If, by 
contrast, the objective were to reduce the most acute poverty, then it 
w ould be preferable to concentrate the transfers on those w ith the 
largest poverty gaps, and not to reduce the num bers in poverty at all 
until everybody had been raised up to the poverty line.
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Beckerman's observation is of critical importance in the context of making 
judgements about the relative success of the LIS transfer systems and will be 
returned to in the conclusions of this chapter.
While the size of the poverty gap is relatively straightforward to measure 
(summing the gaps between family income and the poverty line) the 
yardstick against which the poverty gap should be compared at the aggregate 
level presents a number of possibilities. Generally, the poverty gap is 
presented as a percentage of the poverty line - ie each family's gap is 
separately calculated as a percentage of its poverty line and the resulting 
estimates averaged (Smeeding et al,1985b; Buhmann et al,1988). This 
approach has not been adopted here because, as the discussion on the 
disaggregated measures in Section 4.7 will show, there is considerable 
variation in the size of the poverty gaps of different family types and these 
variations are disguised when averages are taken across the poor 
population.
An alternative to this approach is presented by Beckerman (1979b) who used 
total social security expenditure as the comparative yardstick in his four 
country study for the ILO. In national contexts where social security 
expenditure, as a percentage of government outlays, is fairly stable over time 
this may be a useful yardstick to indicate whether income transfer programs 
are maintaining their impetus and it may suggest how much social security 
outlays would need to grow to close the poverty gap. In cross-sectional 
comparisons however, the value of such a measure is dubious.
A more informative measure in the comparative context may be that 
adopted by Beckerman (1982) in his later work which compares the size of 
the poverty gap to GDP. This captures the extent of poverty in relation to a 
country's total economic resources. This may give a more consonant picture 
of aggregate outcomes in relation to the resources which could be devoted to 
income transfers.
It is of interest to look at the relationship between the poverty gap and GDP 
to assess the extent to which the size of the poverty gap is related to the 
income of a country. We might expect that the richer nations would be in a 
position to devote a greater proportion of their resources to poverty 
alleviation, hence they might exhibit greater reductions in poverty. Diagram
68
4.7 plots GDP per capita (expressed in 1980 $US)32 against the poverty gap as a 
percentage of GDP, for the 50% interval .
Diagram 4.7. Comparison of post-transfer poverty gap with per capita GDP, 1980.
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The diagram shows that although we might expect the richer countries to 
have a lower poverty gap, there is in fact a tendency for the richer countries, 
notably the US and Canada, to have the highest post-transfer poverty gaps. 
At the other extreme the UK, which is the poorest country in the sample, 
has the lowest poverty gap. This has also been observed by Smeeding et al 
(1985b:43) who note that:
The UK does remarkably well in reducing the pre-transfer post-tax 
poverty gap given their relatively low percentage of GDP spent on 
income transfers.
Overall the relationship is, on this evidence, rather weak. It should be noted 
that this question has been tackled here in a fairly preliminary way and 
therefore the results should be read accordingly.
In Tables 4.7 to 4.9 the aggregate poverty gap pre- and post- transfer is 
expressed as a percentage of GDP for each poverty interval. The proportional 
reduction in the poverty gap is also shown. The tables show these estimates 
for family income adjusted by both the OECD and Whiteford equivalence 
scales.33
32 Data from Summers and Heston, 1988.
33 There have been no comparable studies comparing the poverty gap with GDP using the LIS data.
69
Tabk^7^R eductior^nj>overtsy^
Poverty gap as a percentage of GDP, pre- and post- transfer:
OECD Equivalence Whiteford Equivalence
Pre- Post- Reduction Post- Reduction
A ustralia 3.4 0.5 85 3.5 0.5 86
Canada 2.9 0.6 78 3.0 0.6 80
France 4.7 0.5 89 4.8 0.5 90
Germany 4.9 0.3 95 5.2 0.3 95
N etherlands 5.0 1.0 80 5.1 1.0 81
Norway 3.4 0.3 92 3.7 0.3 92
Sweden 3.0 0.2 94 3.1 0.2 94
Sw itzerland 3.4 0.7 81 3.6 0.7 80
United Kingdom 2.4 0.1 97 2.6 0.1 97
United States 4.0 1.2 69 4.0 1.2 69
Table 4.8. Reduction in poverty gaps for families, 50% poverty interval.
Poverty gap as a percentage of GDP, pre- and post- transfer:
OECD Equivalence Whiteford Equivalence
ZlSz Post- Reduction ZlSz Post- Reduction
A ustralia 4.5 0.9 79 4.7 0.9 81
Canada 4.2 1.3 70 4.2 1.2 72
France 6.7 1.0 85 6.6 0.9 87
Germany 6.4 0.6 91 6.7 0.6 92
N etherlands 6.5 1.4 79 6.6 1.3 80
Norway 4.6 0.5 90 5.0 0.5 90
Sweden 4.1 0.4 91 4.2 0.3 92
Switzerland 4.9 1.2 75 5.2 1.3 75
United Kingdom 3.3 0.2 93 3.5 0.3 92
• United States 5.6 2.3 60 5.6 2.1 60
Table 4.9. Reduction in poverty gaps for families, 60% ]poverty interval.
Poverty gap as a percentage of GDP, pre- and post- transfer:
OECD Equivalence Whiteford Equivalence
Pre- Post- Reduction Pre- Post- Reduction
A ustralia 5.8 1.6 72 6.0 1.7 72
C anada 5.7 2.2 61 5.7 2.2 62
France 9.0 1.8 80 8.8 1.6 82
Germany 8.0 1.2 85 8.3 1.1 87
N etherlands 8.1 1.9 76 8.1 1.8 78
Norway 5.9 0.8 86 6.4 0.9 86
Sweden 5.3 0.6 88 5.4 0.6 89
Switzerland 6.7 2.4 65 7.0 2.3 67
United Kingdom 4.3 0.7 84 4.5 0.8 82
United States 7.6 3.7 51 7.5 3.5 50
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43.1. Post-transfer poverty gaps.
A first point to note is that at each poverty interval, the estimates of the size 
of the poverty gap post-transfer for each of the equivalence scales are 
virtually identical in both absolute terms and in the rankings of countries 
based on these estimates. The rank correlation coefficients shown in Table 
4.10 are very close to unity. In addition, the poverty gap produces a fairly 
stable set of rankings across the Z* range. The rank correlation coefficients 
shown in Table 4.11 are all above 0.94.
Rank correlates for : 40% interval $0% interval 60% interval
OECD-Whiteford 1.0 0.97 0.99
Table 4.11. Correlation coefficients for post*transfer poverty gap ranks for Z* range.
Z correlates Whiteford scale
40-50 0.98 0.99
50-60 0.94 0.97
40-60 0.95 0.95
In contrast to the substantial variations in the post-transfer poverty head- 
counts, the poverty gap measure gives a virtually identical picture 
whichever equivalence scale is used, and whichever poverty line is used. It 
is clear that the poverty gap is a far more robust measure of poverty for 
cross-national comparisons than is the head-count. Because of the stability of 
these rankings the discussion in the following sections uses the OECD scale 
results for the 50% poverty interval.
Table 4.12. Ranks on size of the poverty gap at the 40,50 and 60 % intervals, OECD scale.
Rank 40% line 50% line 60% line
1 UK 0.1 UK 0.2 Sweden 0.6
2 Sweden 0.2 Sweden 0.4 UK 0.7
3 Germany 0.3 Norway 0.5 Norway 0.8
4 Norway 0.3 Germany 0.6 Germany 1.2
5 Australia 0.5 Australia 0.9 Australia 1.6
6 France 0.5 France 1.0 France 1.8
7 Canada 0.6 Switzerland 1.2 Netherlands 1.9
8 Switzerland 0.7 Canada 1.3 Canada 2.2
9 Netherlands 1.0 Netherlands 1.4 Switzerland 2.4
10 USA 1.2 USA 2.3 USA 3.7
Table 4.12 shows the ranking of the LIS countries across the Z* range based 
on the poverty gap as a percentage of GDP. Comparison with Table 4.6 shows 
that the poverty gap produces a significantly different ranking to the head- 
count measure. In particular the UK, Netherlands and Australia, are ranked 
quite differently on the post-transfer poverty gap. The effects of clustering of
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incomes in the UK around the poverty lines which causes the head-count to 
vary dramatically across Z* is removed and we see that in the UK, income 
transfer policies result in the majority of the beneficiary population 
receiving incomes which are around the 40% poverty interval. To a lesser 
extent this is also true of Australia. The reverse of this case is the 
Netherlands which has a low head-count but a sizeable poverty gap, 
indicating that those who are not lifted out of poverty remain some distance 
from the poverty line.34 Of the remaining countries, Sweden and Norway 
feature in the top ranks consistent with their head-count ranks. In the 
upper-middle ranks Germany and France are joined by Australia, while the 
Netherlands falls to the lower- middle rank with Switzerland and Canada. 
The US runs a long way last, consistent with its poverty head-count.
Diagram 4.8. Ordering of the U S countries based on die poverty gap, OECD scale.
Post-transfer 
poverty gap 
as a percentage 
of GDP Switz.
Canada
N’lands
France
Aust.
Germany
Norway
UK
Sweden
Percentage 
of median 
income 
(Z* range)
A visual representation of the post-transfer poverty gap rankings is given in 
Diagram 4.8 . Three distinct groups are evident: the lowest poverty gaps are 
found in Sweden, UK, Norway and Germany. In a fairly large middle group 
are Australia, France, Netherlands, Canada and Switzerland. Of this group, 
Australia and France have a lower poverty gap across the Z* range than the 
other three countries. At the upper extreme, the US has a poverty gap far 
greater than all these countries which is accentuated by the fact that it is one 
of the wealthiest countries in this group in GDP per capita terms.
34 This may partly reflect an under-reporting of transfer income and/or the business cycle effects which 
were discussed in Chapter 2.
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4.3.2. The post-transfer reduction of the poverty gap.
The ordering of the countries based on the reduction in the poverty gap 
achieved by the transfer system is illustrated in Diagram 4.9. In the upper 
group Sweden, UK, Germany and Norway achieve the greatest reductions in 
the poverty gap, although the rate of reduction for the UK falls considerably 
between the 50% and 60% poverty line.35
Diagram 4.9. Ordering of countries based on the proportional reduction in the poverty gap.
Percentage 
reduction in 
poverty gap 
post-transfer
Sweden
Germany 
1 Norway
France
N’lands
Aust.
Canada
Percentage of 
median income 
(Z* range)
The large middle group evident in the size measures - France, the 
Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland and Canada - breaks into two 
distinctive groups on the reduction measure. An upper-middle group 
composed of France, the Netherlands and Australia achieve reductions in 
the poverty gap of greater than 70% across the Z* range, whereas 
Switzerland and Canada fall well below this level of reduction at the 60% 
interval. As with the size measure of the poverty gap, the US falls a long 
way behind the other countries in terms of reduction.
In considering the effectiveness of the countries in reducing the poverty gap 
across the range Z*, the overall ranking would be:
35 Using a different measure of the poverty gap (ie as a percentage of the poverty line), Smeeding et al 
(1989b:34) rank identically, the six countries in common with this study.
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= UK, Sweden, Germany
Norway
France
= Netherlands, Australia
Switzerland
Canada
US
Whilst there is some ambiguity over the exact rankings depending on the 
choice of poverty line, the broad picture is very consistent. For the 
succeeding analysis, therefore, I shall use only the 50% poverty line.
4.33. Assessing effectiveness in eliminating the poverty gap.
The triangular relationships between pre-transfer poverty, post-transfer 
poverty and proportional poverty reduction in relation to the poverty gap 
measures are illustrated in Diagrams 4.10 and 4.11. This complements the 
analysis for the head-count measure which was presented in Section 4.2.3.
It is evident from Diagram 4.10 that there is no clear relationship between 
poverty reduction and the extent of pre-transfer poverty when we use the 
gap measure of poverty. This result, which stands in contrast to the positive 
relationship found using the head-count measure of poverty (see Diagram 
4.5), implies that any substitution between state and private welfare 
provision is not substantial in relation to the poverty gap.
Diagram 4.10. Reduction in poverty gap versus size of pre-transfer gap*
Percentage 
reduction in 
poverty gap ■ Nor
■ Fra
■ Aust
N'lands
■ Can
Pre- transfer 
poverty gap 
(50% poverty line)
From Diagram 4.11 it is evident that there is a strongly negative linear 
relationship between poverty reduction and the extent of the post-transfer
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poverty gap. Moreover, the rankings of countries by these two measures are 
almost identical and confirm the post-transfer gap analysis in sorting the 
countries into three distinct groups. The countries which are most effective 
in combatting poverty are, unambiguously, the UK, Sweden, Norway and 
Germany. An intermediate group is composed of France, Australia, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Canada. The US is clearly the least effective in 
eliminating poverty whether we judge in terms of the proportional 
reduction of the poverty gap or in terms of the size of the post-transfer gap.
Diagram 4.11. Reduction in poverty gap versus size of post*transfer gap*
Percentage 
reduction in 
poverty gap
o  Fra
Aust ° °  N'lands
Post-transfer 
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(50% poverty line)
4.4. Comparing aggregate poverty levels: head-counts versus poverty gaps.
I noted earlier that key theorists in the poverty measurement literature 
consider that the poverty gap is, in principle, superior to the head-count as a 
measure of poverty because it takes account of the extent of poverty and is 
less likely to be influenced by arbitrariness in the choice of a particular 
poverty line or equivalence scale. The empirical analysis presented in the 
previous two sections supports this view. Whereas the rankings using head- 
counts vary substantially depending on the choice of equivalence scale and, 
in particular, on the choice of poverty line, the rankings using the gap 
measure are almost identical whichever set of choices one makes. Buhmann 
et al (1988:133) have also noted this:
Interestingly, average poverty gaps are not often greatly affected by 
choice of equivalence scale.
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An important implication of these findings is that the analyst using poverty 
gap measures need be far less concerned with the problem of defining the 
appropriate equivalence scale and poverty line than the analyst who uses 
head-count measures. A well defined set of measures such as the OECD 
equivalence scale and the 50% poverty interval can be used in conjunction 
with the poverty gap with a high degree of confidence that the results will be 
robust.
Given that the head-count has often been used for poverty measurement it 
is of interest to investigate the extent to which the poverty gap measure 
provides a different picture of cross-national comparisons of poverty. It is 
also important to note that the information in the head-count is relevant in 
its own right, even though it does not indicate the degree of poverty. It may 
prove useful for some purposes to use the information in the two measures 
together.
Table 4.13 lists the rank correlation coefficients between the head-count and 
gap measures of pre-transfer poverty in the LIS countries. Surprisingly, the 
correlation between these measures is very weak at each of the poverty lines.
Table 4.13. Rank correlations for pre-transfer head-count and poverty gap, Z* range.
Count versus gap 40% interval 50% interval 60% interval
OECD 0.34 0.24 0.24
W hiteford 0.38 0.21 0.26
Diagram 4.12. Head-count versus poverty gap measures of pre-transfer poverty.
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The relationship between the pre-transfer head-count and gap is plotted in 
Diagram 4.12 for the 50% poverty line. Examining Diagram 4.12, we see that 
Switzerland ranks lowest in pre-transfer poverty on the head-count 
measure, but is in the middle of the poverty gap rankings. Sweden on the 
other hand, ranks highest on the head-count, but is one of the lowest on the 
poverty gap measure. These differences reflect very different distributions of 
income amongst the pre-transfer poor. In Sweden, there are a large number 
of poor families relatively close to the poverty line whereas in Switzerland, 
many of the poor are a long way below the poverty line. It appears that the 
head-count measure by itself gives a very misleading picture of the extent of 
pre-transfer poverty.
Similar comparisons of the head-count and gap measures of post-transfer 
poverty are given in Table 4.14 and Diagram 4.13. Here we observe a much 
stronger, though far from perfect, correlation between the head-count and 
gap measures of poverty. From Diagram 4.13 we can see that the head-count 
measure tells a very similar story to the gap measure of post-transfer poverty 
except in the case of the Netherlands which has relatively few people in 
poverty on the head-count but exhibits a relatively large amount of poverty 
in terms of the poverty gap.
Table 4.14. Rank correlations for post-transfer head-count and poverty gap, Z* range._______
Count versus gap 40% interval 50% interval 60% interval
OECD 0.87 0.62 0.60
Whiteford 0.87 0.59 0.43 _______
Diagram 4.13. Head-count versus poverty gap measures of post-transfer poverty.
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Equivalent comparisons in relation to measurement of poverty reduction 
are displayed in Table 4.15 and Diagram 4.14. The comparative stories of 
poverty reduction as told by the two measures are now virtually identical 
except for the Netherlands - where poverty reduction is exaggerated by the 
head-count - and the UK - where poverty reduction is understated by the 
head-count. The inference we can draw from these comparisons is that the 
transfer system in the Netherlands leaves a relatively few families a long 
way below the poverty line whereas the UK system raises a relatively large 
number of families close to, but not above, the line.
Table 4.15. Rank correlations for reduction in the head-count and poverty gap, Z* range.
Count versus gap 40% interval 50% interval 60% interval
OECD 0.96 0.74 0.89
W hiteford 0.96 0.74 0.80
Diagram 4.14. Head-count versus poverty gap measures of poverty reduction.
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4.5. Comments on the poverty intersection method for aggregate estimates.
The poverty intersection technique is an attempt to decrease marked 
variations in head-count estimates due to the effects of 'clustering' of 
particular groups around poverty lines combined with differences in 
equivalence scales which affect these groups. An example of this problem 
was noted earlier in relation to Norway, where the head-count at the 60% 
interval is reported at around 9% by the OECD scale, and over 15% on the 
Whiteford scale. Tables 4.16 to 4.18 set out the poverty rate estimates based
78
on the intersection of those defined as poor under both the OECD and 
Whiteford scales.
Comparing these estimates with those in Tables 4.1 to 4.3 we see that 
intersection estimates are, as expected, lower than those of both scales. This 
is because the intersection estimate captures only those defined as poor on 
both scales, which has the effect of decreasing the number of single persons 
who are defined as poor by the Whiteford scale, and the number of families 
defined as poor on the OECD scale.
Table 4.16. Poverty rates for families using poverty intersection, 40% poverty interval.
Percentage of families in poverty, pre- and post- transfer:
Povertv Intersection
Country Pre- Post- Reduction
A ustralia 25.6 5.3 79
Canada 20.7 6.9 67
France 30.4 4.4 86
Germany 29.3 3.1 89
N etherlands 30.8 5.4 82
Norway 28.5 3.2 89
Sweden 33.5 3.5 90
Switzerland 20.8 5.7 73
United Kingdom 26.9 1.4 95
United States 22.9 10.1 56
Table 4.17. Poverty rates for families using poverty intersection, 50% poverty interval.
Percentage of families in poverty, pre- and post- transfer:
Poverty Intersection
Country Pre- Post- Reduction
A ustralia 27.6 9.6 65
Canada 24.1 11.5 52
France 34.9 6.9 80
Germany 30.5 6.0 80
N etherlands 32.3 6.5 80
Norway 30.6 4.7 85
Sweden 36.0 5.2 86
Switzerland 24.0 10.0 58
United Kingdom 29.3 7.5 74
United States 26.3 16.0 39
Table 4.18. Poverty rates for families using poverty intersection, 60% poverty interval.
Percentage of families in poverty, pre- and post- transfer:
Poverty Intersection
Country Pre- Post- Reduction
A ustralia 29.8 18.1 39
Canada 27.7 18.3 34
France 39.7 13.5 66
Germany 32.7 10.9 67
N etherlands 33.5 8.7 74
Norway 32.4 7.8 76
Sweden 38.5 8.3 78
Switzerland 27.0 15.8 41
United Kingdom 32.7 17.1 48
United States 29.9 21.7 27
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Table 4.19 sets out the estimates where the difference in the post-transfer 
poverty rates between the OECD and Whiteford scales was greater than 1%. 
Although there were only seven instances of this degree of difference 
between the two scales, they are sufficient to cause rank changes in some 
countries of two or three places.
Table 4.19. Head-count estimates with variations >1% between equivalence scales.
Country Poverty interval
OECD scale 
estimates
Whiteford scale 
estimates
Intersection
estimates
United Kingdom 40 1.7 2.7 1.4
Canada 50 12.5 13.6 11.5
France 50 7.9 9.0 6.9
United Kingdom 50 8.2 11.2 7.5
A ustralia 60 19.2 22.7 18.1
Norway 60 8.8 15.3 7.8
United Kingdom 60 18.2 21.4 17.1
Using the poverty intersection ranks to order these countries produces a 
much more consistent correlation at the 50% and 60% intervals. (The 40% 
interval is ignored here because only the UK is affected to any degree and 
this is not sufficient to change the rank orders.) Table 4.20 shows that using 
the intersection approach to smooth the differences between the two scales, 
only Switzerland moves more than one rank.
Table 4.20. Poverty intersection ranks for post-transfer head-count estimates.
Country Rank on 50% interval Rank on 60% interval
A ustralia 7 8
Canada 9 9
France 5 5
Germany 3 4
N etherlands 4 3
Norway 1 1
Sweden 2 2
Switzerland 8 6
United Kingdom 6 7
United States 10 10
The poverty reduction rankings using the intersection of the Whiteford and 
OECD equivalence scales are illustrated in Diagram 4.15. Comparing this 
diagram with Diagram 4.3, where the OECD equivalence scale was used, it 
appears that the use of the poverty intersection method makes little 
difference to the problem that rankings are sensitive to the choice of poverty 
line.
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Diagram 4.15. Proportional reductions in the head-count using the poverty intersection.
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In conclusion, the poverty gap appears to be the superior measure in the 
comparative context both in terms of the consistency of the rankings of 
countries across the Z* range and when using alternative equivalence scales. 
This observation is particularly crucial when comparing the pre-transfer 
poverty situation in these countries, where the pre-transfer count and gap 
measures show very little relationship; indicating that it is vital that both 
measures be reported.
Post-transfer the gap and count measures are more closely related although 
the effects of income clustering, generally among transfer recipients, 
contributes to unreliability in the post-transfer head-count. Again, the 
evidence indicates that it is preferable to present both measures, although it 
is less imperative in this instance.
The most reliable indicator of the effectiveness of the transfer system (where 
data is confined to head-count measures) is the reduction measure. This is 
evidenced here by the strong positive relationship between the reduction in 
the head-count and gap measures (R2=0.84).
The use of the poverty intersection method improves the head-count 
position only marginally, although it may prove useful where a number of 
equivalence scales are employed in the analysis.
4.6. Disaggregated poverty measures: head-counts.
This section examines the pre- and post- transfer head-counts for the family 
types identified in Chapter 2. The head-counts are analysed in three ways. 
First, the 'poor' population is disaggregated into family types. Second, a 
'representation' index is used to indicate the relative presence of each family 
type within the poor population. Third, the percentage of each family type 
defined as poor pre- and post- transfer and the percentage reduction for each 
family type is estimated.
These estimates are fully reported in Appendix B. In this section I report the 
results based on the 50% poverty interval and the OECD scale adjusted 
incomes. The results from this scale are fairly representative of the findings 
and patterns of the Whiteford scale and similar trends emerge at the 50% 
interval as at the 60% interval. The results diverge from the 40% interval 
because of the clustering of incomes in the UK and German data which was 
identified at the aggregate level for the 40% interval.
4.6.1. Disaggregation of the post-transfer head-count.
Table 4.21 breaks down the pre-transfer poor population into family types. 
These percentages are compared with the composition of families in the 
overall population to produce a representation index in Table 4.22. If, for 
instance, a family type comprises 10% of the poor population but only 5% of 
the total population, its representation index is 2 (ie 10/5). The weighted 
average of the representation index must, by definition, equal 1.
We see that in all countries the aged are over-represented in the pre-transfer 
poor population by a factor of 2 to 3. The other significant group in the pre­
transfer poor population are lone parents. In Australia, Canada, the 
Netherlands, the UK and US lone parents are over-represented in the poor 
population by a factor of 2.
Post-transfer, Tables 4.23 and 4.24 show that poverty among the aged has 
significantly declined in most countries, although single aged persons 
remain over-represented in the UK, US, Germany and Norway.
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Table 4.21. The composition of the pre-transfer poor at 50% poverty interval, OECD scale.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 22.7 20.3 19.5 8.7 11.2 14.3 3.3 100
Canada 22.5 17.6 19.1 6.5 11.4 18.5 4.5 100
France 29.4 24.1 6.9 10.6 3.1 21.6 4.3 100
Germany 43.3 25.8 14.6 7.1 2.1 4.3 2.7 100
Netherlands 22.2 19.0 17.2 14.3 7.6 15.0 4.7 100
Norway 45.3 21.1 15.7 2.8 9.9 5.2 * 100
Sweden 41.1 20.9 26.5 3.9 4.0 3.6 * 100
Switzerland 42.6 19.9 27.3 3.3 3.9 3.0 * 100
UK 35.9 26.1 10.9 4.3 7.8 9.6 5.4 100
USA 24.8 18.3 16.9 5.5 16.3 12.5 5.7 100
Table 4.22. Representation of family types in poor population pre-transfer.
Aged (S) Aged (C) S(NC) C (NC) L.Parent C(CH) Other
Australia 2.9 2.5 0.9 0.4 2.1 0.4 0.9
Canada 2.9 2.2 0.9 0.3 2.0 0.5 1.1
France 2.4 2.1 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.6 1.0
Germany 2.8 2.3 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.8
Netherlands 2.2 2.0 1.4 0.6 2.2 0.4 1.3
Norway 2.7 2.0 0.9 0.3 1.2 0.1 *
Sweden 2.5 2.2 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.2 *
Switzerland 3.0 2.5 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.1 *
UK 2.9 2.3 0.9 0.2 1.8 0.3 1.0
USA 2.7 2.1 0.8 0.3 2.0 0.4 1.3
Table 4.23. The composition of the post-transfer poor at 50% poverty interval, OECD scale.
Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
(S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other Total
Australia 2.9 5.3 28.0 7.5 20.4 34.0 1.9 100
Canada 7.1 5.6 28.1 8.3 17.4 29.0 4.6 100
France 2.1 4.8 14.8 20.5 7.2 43.4 7.3 100
Germany 23.8 14.6 21.7 11.0 3.9 20.3 6.2 100
Netherlands 6.9 4.2 25.9 19.4 3.0 34.7 5.9 100
Norway 21.8 3.7 31.0 4.6 14.9 21.8 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.8 66.7 8.2 5.8 18.5 * 100
Switzerland 24.1 8.7 45.6 3.2 6.1 12.2 * 100
UK 23.7 24.2 13.5 6.3 9.9 20.2 2.3 100
USA 17.3 8.4 21.3 5.8 22.2 20.2 4.7 100
Table 4.24. Representation of family types in poor population post-transfer.
Aged (S) Aged (C) S(NC) C (NC) L.Parent C(CH) Other
Australia 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.4 3.8 1.0 0.5
Canada 0.9 0.7 1.4 0.4 3.1 0.9 1.1
France 0.2 0.4 1.4 1.0 2.5 1.2 1.6
Germany 1.5 1.3 1.2 0.6 1.3 0.7 1.9
Netherlands 0.7 0.4 2.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.6
Norway 1.3 0.4 1.7 0.4 1.8 0.6 *
Sweden 0.0 0.1 2.0 0.5 1.3 0.9 *
Switzerland 1.7 1.1 1.3 0.2 1.5 0.5 *
UK 1.9 2.2 1.2 0.3 2.3 0.6 0.4
USA 1.9 1.0 1.0 0.3 2.7 0.7 1.1
Aged couples fare better in these countries, except for the UK where they 
remain over-represented by a factor of 2. In Germany, Switzerland and the 
US they remain in the post-transfer population in about the same 
proportion as their composition in the overall population.
In all these countries the representation index for the aged generally falls 
below 1 at the 40% interval, suggesting that the statutory incomes for the 
aged are fixed at around this level. This clustering is most notable in the UK, 
Germany and the US.
The significant group which emerges as over-represented in the post­
transfer poor is the lone parent group, which is over-represented in all 
countries except the Netherlands. The disproportionate representation of 
lone parents in the post-transfer poor population is greatest in Australia, 
Canada, US, France and the UK where they are over-represented by factors 
ranging from around 2.5 (UK, France) to almost 4 (Australia).
Single persons are also disproportionately over-represented although in 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway the unit of analysis problem 
discussed in Chapter 2 contributes to the level of poverty recorded among 
this group in these countries. A significant percentage of this group are 
residing in multi-family households - most likely living with parents - and 
their poverty status may be questionable.
Smeeding et al (1989) also identify families with children as a significant 
group in the poor population. In this study these families do form a 
significant proportion of the post-transfer poor population (Table 4.24), 
however only in France are these families disproportionately present in the 
post-transfer poor population. In Australia, Canada, Sweden and the 
Netherlands their presence in the post-transfer poor population is close to 
proportional.
To summarise, the pattern which emerges across these countries is one of 
the predominance of the aged and lone parents in the pre- and post- transfer 
poor populations. While the income transfer systems considerably reduce 
poverty among aged families, lone parents (and to a lesser extent couple­
headed families with children) do not fare as well and dominate the post­
transfer poor population; along with young single persons in a number of 
countries. This pattern confirms the observations made in the OECD report 
discussed earlier.
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4.6.2. Disaggregation of the post-transfer reduction of the poverty head-count.
To give a clearer picture of the impact of transfers across these family types, 
Tables 4.25 and 4.26 show the percentage of each family type defined as poor 
pre- and post- transfer. The reduction in the poverty rate of each family type 
is shown in Table 4.27. Poverty reduction is highest among aged families. 
Apart from Switzerland, the UK and US all the LIS countries achieve 
reductions in the poverty rates for aged families in excess of 85%. Aged 
persons appear to fare worst in the US.
Table 4.25. Pre-transfer head-count at the 50% poverty interval, OECD scale.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther
A ustralia 82.1 70.2 26.6 12.1 59.3 11.6 25.5
Canada 71.5 55.2 23.5 8.0 50.4 13.5 26.3
France 87.5 77.7 23.2 17.9 39.4 21.5 34.1
Germany 85.8 70.6 24.8 11.5 22.8 4.5 25.1
N etherlands 72.9 64.0 45.2 18.6 73.0 13.5 41.5
Norway 82.7 61.8 26.7 8.1 35.7 4.4 ♦
Sweden 92.0 81.1 28.2 9.3 33.0 6.4 ♦
Switzerland 72.8 59.9 18.7 5.2 23.8 3.1 *
UK 86.2 70.1 27.9 6.1 54.3 8.5 29.8
USA 72.6 57.4 21.6 7.9 53.3 11.5 35.0
Table 4.26. Post-transfer head-count at the 50% poverty interval, OECD scale.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther
A ustralia 3.8 6.9 13.9 3.8 39.5 10.2 5.1
Canada 11.3 8.7 17.3 5.2 38.7 10.6 13.3
France 1.4 3.4 10.8 7.5 19.4 9.3 12.6
Germany 10.4 8.8 8.2 3.4 9.4 4.7 12.9
N etherlands 4.9 3.0 14.6 5.5 6.0 6.8 11.2
Norway 7.0 2.6 9.1 2.8 9.5 3.2 *
Sweden 0.0 0.0 8.5 1.0 5.4 1.6 *
Switzerland 18.6 11.9 14.2 2.3 17.1 5.8 *
UK 15.6 17.8 9.4 2.4 18.8 4.8 3.4
USA 31.9 16.4 17.3 5.3 45.7 11.7 18.4
Table 4.27. Reduction in the head-count at the 50% poverty interval, OECD scale.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther
A ustralia 95 90 48 69 33 12 80
Canada 84 84 26 35 23 21 49
France 98 96 53 58 51 57 63
Germany 88 88 67 70 59 -4 49
N etherlands 93 95 68 70 92 50 73
Norway 92 96 66 65 73 27 *
Sweden 100 100 70 89 84 75 *
Switzerland 74 80 24 56 28 -87 *
UK 82 75 66 61 65 44 89
USA 56 71 20 33 14 -2 47
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In general, poverty rate reductions are least in families with children. 
Couples with children fare worst in Australia, Canada, Norway, 
Switzerland, US and to a lesser extent the UK. Lone parent poverty is least 
reduced in Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the US. In broad terms, these 
findings are similar to Smeeding et al (1989), however there are differences 
in the rankings and levels of reduction estimated here. These differences 
may be attributed to equivalence scales and changes to the LIS database.36
The pattern of the consistency in poverty reduction across these countries is 
also interesting in assessing the effectiveness of each transfer system in 
meeting a range of needs. For example, in Sweden the reduction in poverty 
rates across the board is relatively balanced with the highest poverty 
reductions for most family types; ranging from 100% for aged families to 
70% for single persons.
Diagram 4.16. ''Balanced' poverty reduction across a range of family types.
Poverty 
reduction 
rates for 
selected 
family 
types (%)
Aged (S) Aged (Q Lone Parent Couple (CH) Family
type
By contrast, Australia's poverty reduction is fairly unbalanced, ranging from 
95% for single aged persons to only 12% for couples with children. A 
number of other countries also have an imbalance in their effectiveness 
across these family types. In addition to Australia, Germany, Switzerland, 
and the US have a large variation in their reductions across the family types. 
The most balanced reductions occur in Sweden, UK, France and the 
Netherlands. Canada and Norway lie somewhere in between these groups.
36 See also the findings reported from other studies Appendix /Tables F.2 and F.4.
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Diagrams 4.16 and 4.17 contrast the balance in poverty reduction for several 
family types.
Diagram 4.17. 'Unbalanced' poverty reduction across a range of family types.
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4.7 Disaggregated poverty measures: poverty gaps.
The estimates of the poverty gap for each family type have been calculated by 
summing the difference between each individual family's income and its 
poverty line.37 The total gap is then averaged across the families defined as 
poor in each group and expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The 
full results of these estimates are reported in Appendix B.
Like the aggregate estimates of the poverty gap, the disaggregated estimates 
of the poverty gap are virtually identical, whether the OECD or Whiteford 
scale adjusted incomes are used. Unlike the aggregate measures however, 
there is considerable variation in the average post-transfer poverty gap 
across the Z* range for each family type. There are two main causes of this 
variation. First, the very small cell counts for some family types (especially 
the aged) at the 40% and 50% intervals exaggerate the average size of the 
poverty gap. In particular, it is families which report negative or zero 
disposable incomes which affect the results at these lower levels.38 Second, 
countries which successfully reduce the poverty gap and/or have a relatively
37 The methodology for calculating the poverty line for each family is discussed in Chapter 2.
38 Families which report negative incomes are recoded to zero as discussed in Chapter 2.
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small number of families in their surveys, have lower cell counts across the 
Z* range which again contributes to the unreliability of the poverty gap 
estimates.
For these reasons, the disaggregated poverty gap measures are reported for 
the 60% poverty interval, using the OECD equivalence scale. At this level of 
the Z* range, the greatest number of observations are captured for each 
family type in each country. Generally, the number of observations at this 
interval is sufficient to offset any unreliability arising from sampling error 
and the under-reporting of income.
4.7.1. Disaggregation of the post-transfer poverty gap.
Tables 4.29 to 4.31 report the average poverty gap estimates for each family 
type pre- and post- transfer and the reduction in the poverty gap for each 
family type. Pre-transfer, the poverty gap estimates show that the average 
size of the poverty gap is fairly similar across the family types, with the 
exception of couple-headed families with children whose pre-transfer gaps 
are generally less than those of other families. The one exception to this is 
the Netherlands, where the pre-transfer gap for this family type is similar to 
other types of families. Thus although the composition of the pre-transfer 
poor population is dominated by aged families, the poverty gap estimates 
show that other families who are poor have poverty gaps of a similar 
magnitude to the aged.
Post-transfer, the poverty gap measures tell a similar story to the head-count. 
As noted earlier, the results are generally unaffected by the equivalence scale 
used, the main exception being single aged persons who are reported in 
larger numbers by the Whiteford scale. Table 4.28 shows the rank correlation 
coefficients for each family type.
Table 4.28. Rank correlation coefficients post-transfer gap at the 60% interval, OECD scale.
Single Couple Lone Couple
Aged (S) Aged (Q  (N O  (N O  Parent (CHI Other
OECD-WTord 0.80 0.95 0.85 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.98
Generally, the poverty gaps for aged families are considerably reduced after 
social security transfers. In the case of the Netherlands it should be noted 
that the estimate is based on an extremely small cell count (28 cases), the 
majority of which report a zero disposable income.
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Table 4.29. Average pre-transfer poverty gap at the 60% interval, OECD scale.
Poverty gaps for families as a percentage of the poverty line.
Aged (S) Aged (C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther
A ustralia 87 81 76 71 82 51 66
Canada 79 65 68 50 74 40 59
France 91 82 75 60 57 36 61
Germany 93 87 85 71 60 33 72
N etherlands 80 78 96 87 92 80 84
Norway 84 72 79 70 69 39 *
Sweden 82 76 65 56 56 35 *
Switzerland 69 56 63 61 60 20 *
UK 84 73 78 61 74 34 70
USA 80 65 65 53 70 39 65
Table 4.30:_A:yerage^post-toamfer poverty gap at the 60% interval, OECD scale.
Poverty gaps for families as a percentage of the poverty line.
Aged (S) Aged (C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther
A ustralia 8 13 41 29 33 30 30
Canada 16 18 44 34 41 28 29
France 10 19 47 36 38 25 35
Germany 25 21 35 38 24 16 34
N etherlands 66 26 89 53 17 39 34
Norway 48 16 48 40 24 24 *
Sweden 5 10 43 31 30 24 *
Switzerland 22 18 50 31 39 16 *
UK 14 15 25 22 21 20 14
USA 31 30 48 37 43 29 42
Table 4.31. Reduction in the poverty gap at the 60% interval OECD scale. 
Percentage reduction in the poverty gap
Aged (S) Aged (C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther
A ustralia 91 84 46 59 60 41 55
Canada 80 72 35 32 45 30 51
France 89 77 37 40 33 31 43
Germany 73 76 59 46 60 52 53
N etherlands 18 67 7 39 82 51 60
Norway 43 78 39 43 65 38 *
Sweden 94 87 34 45 46 31 *
Switzerland 68 68 21 49 35 20 *
UK 83 79 68 64 72 41 80
USA 61 54 26 30 39 26 35
The largest poverty gaps are reported for single people without children. 
Apart from the UK, the average post-transfer poverty gap for this group is 
greater than 35% of the poverty line for all countries. Detailed investigation 
of this group in the course of this study indicates that the prevalence of 
poverty among this group may be mitigated by intra-family transfers 
(upwards of 30% of this group reside with their parents in all countries). In 
several countries - Australia, US and Canada - there is a significant number
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of unemployed persons in this group. The heterogeneity of this group 
makes it difficult to ascribe any strong explanatory causes for the post­
transfer position of single persons, other than the arguments advanced in 
the OECD study discussed at the outset of this chapter, namely that young 
adults are not viewed with the same legitimacy as other groups in terms of 
their claims on the transfer system.
This latter point is also applicable to lone parents who are another group 
with a large post-transfer poverty gap, reflecting a dependence on income 
transfers as the major source of income.
Couples without children also record large poverty gaps. In head-count 
terms, this group is relatively small in all countries - excepting Australia, 
Canada, France and the US39 - and the averages are affected by the incidence 
of zero incomes for this group.
The post-transfer position of families with children, as evidenced in the LIS 
data, has been extensively discussed by Smeeding et al (1989:110-115). The 
estimates of the poverty gap for these families concur with Smeeding's 
findings.
4.7.2. Disaggregation of the post-transfer reduction in the poverty gap.
The reduction in the poverty gap for each family type is again similar to the 
picture presented by the head-count measure. Generally, it is aged families 
whose poverty gaps are most reduced by the transfer system and single 
persons the least. Surprisingly, lone parents poverty gaps are considerably 
reduced even though they are more likely to be poor post-transfer than any 
other group. Part of the explanation for this is simply that this group starts 
from a low pre-transfer position. But it also indicates that income support 
programs for lone parents, however modest, are in place in all of the LIS 
countries.
Unlike lone parents, the couple-headed families with children have far less 
reduction in their poverty gaps. In particular, families with unemployed 
household heads and the "working poor" with three or more children are a 
significant among this group. This issue was again raised in the OECD report 
discussed in Section 4.1, which noted that the necessity for program coverage
39 In these countries this group is present in the poor population in roughly the same numbers as the 
overall population.
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for this group of the "new poor" was only beginning to be recognised in the 
1980s. Thus in countries such as Australia and the UK, Family Income 
Supplement programs were introduced in the course of the decade in 
response to evidence similar to the estimates presented here for 1980. For 
the remaining family types, the reductions measures are generally not worth 
comment mainly due to cell count problems.
4.7.3. Comparing disaggregated poverty levels: head-counts versus poverty gaps.
At the disaggregated level, the poverty head-count appears to be a more 
informative measure than the poverty gap. This is largely due to the effect of 
of small cell counts post-transfer, so that just one or two families with zero 
incomes are sufficient to distort the average poverty gap when measured 
against the poverty line income. For further discussion of this point see 
Appendix G.
The head-count can be disaggregated in two ways to show: the composition 
of the poor; and indicate the representation of each family type in the poor 
population. The reduction in the head-count for each family type also 
provides critical information about the effectiveness of the transfer system. 
Each of these measures gives a slightly different perspective on the numbers, 
and significance, of different family types in poverty and the impact of 
transfers on this poverty.
Although the poverty gap is less useful in this context, it does add some 
important information to the head-count picture. For example, although the 
pre- and post- transfer poverty populations in most of the LIS countries are 
dominated by one or two groups in terms of numbers, there is considerable 
variation between, and within, these countries in terms of the direction of 
transfers to different family types to close these gaps.
While the head-count appears to be an unreliable measure at the aggregate 
level, it is a necessary starting point for disaggregated analyses. The poverty 
gap measure adds information to the head-count picture, but cannot stand 
alone as a summary measure in this context.
4.8 The role of social security and taxation in reducing poverty.
In the Introduction I noted that most studies of poverty and inequality 
estimate the net changes accruing to transfers without breaking down the
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transfer system into its direct and indirect components. In this section I 
examine the role which taxation plays in poverty reduction.40
Table 4.32 shows the poverty head-counts across the Z* range after social 
security and taxes. The table shows that, with the exception of France at the 
lowest poverty interval, the taxation systems in all these countries reduce 
the incomes of some near-poor families to the extent that these families are 
brought below the poverty line.
Table 432. Effect of taxation on poverty counts at the aggregate level, OECD scale.
Z*:
Country:
Poverty count at 40% 
Post­
social Post- Percent
sec. tax change
Poverty count at 50% 
Post­
social Post- Percent
sec. tax change
Poverty count at 60% 
Post­
social Post- Percent
sec. tax change
Australia 5.7 5.9 4 9.6 10.3 7 17.7 19.2 8
Canada 7.3 7.6 4 11.8 12.5 6 18.0 19.4 8
France 4.9 4.9 0 7.7 7.9 3 14.8 15.2 3
Germany 2.5 3.3 32 5.3 6.8 28 8.9 12.7 43
Netherlands 5.1 5.6 10 5.8 7 21 6.7 10.6 58
Norway 3.2 3.5 9 4.6 5.3 15 6.7 8.8 31
Sweden 2.7 3.8 41 3.6 5.6 56 5.4 9.2 70
Switzerland 5.3 6.1 15 9.0 11 22 14.3 17.8 24
UK 1.4 1.7 21 7.3 8.2 12 16.2 18.2 12
USA 10.4 11.0 6 15.9 17.0 7 20.8 23.2 12
Leaving aside the changes at the 40% interval, where relatively small 
changes in the post-tax counts produce dramatic percentage changes between 
the post- social security and tax head-counts, we see that at the 50% and 60% 
intervals the countries form two distinct groups with respect to the impact 
of taxes on family poverty status.
A first group of countries comprising Australia, Canada, France, UK and US 
have taxation systems which have a marginal effect on the incomes of the 
poor and near-poor. France, in particular, keeps its lower income earners out 
of the taxation net. This is largely due to the relatively small amount of 
taxation revenue collected through income taxes, combined with tax 
expenditures, thresholds and a progressive structure.41
In the remaining countries the poor and near-poor are brought into the 
taxation system at comparatively low levels of income. However, it should 
be noted that although the taxation systems in this group of countries 
significantly offsets the poverty reduction achieved by social security
40 Taxes refers to income taxes as well as payroll deductions for social insurance contributions.
41 The structure of the French taxation system is discussed in the following chapter in Section 5.7.
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transfers, they still remain (with the exception of Switzerland) the countries 
which most reduce the poverty count overall.
In the LIS countries, the tax burden does not fall evenly across the poor 
population. Tables 4.33 and 4.34 show the composition of the poor 
population post- social security and tax. Apart from the Netherlands, where 
the impact of taxation is fairly evenly spread, it is couple-headed families 
with children and to a lesser extent, couples without children, who 
disproportionately bear the burden of taxes on the low income population.
Table 4.33. Composition of poor population post- social security, 50% interval OECD scale.
Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
(S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other Total
Australia 3.1 5.6 29.6 8.0 19.9 31.9 1.8 100
Canada 7.5 5.8 29.2 8.6 18.1 26.4 4.3 100
France 2.0 4.7 14.8 20.2 7.1 43.7 7.4 100
Germany 30.7 18.1 26.4 6.2 3.4 7.7 7.4 100
Netherlands 8.3 3.2 29.5 20.1 1.5 32.2 5.3 100
Norway 25.3 5.3 32.0 5.3 14.7 17.3 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.0 80.5 3.8 6.9 8.8 * 100
Switzerland 26.7 7.8 50.5 2.5 6.4 6.0 * 100
UK 25.5 26.0 13.5 6.1 11.0 15.3 2.6 100
USA ' 18.5 8.9 21.4 5.8 22.9 17.6 5.0 100
Table 434. Composition of poor population post- tax, 50% interval OECD scale.
Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
(S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other Total
Australia 2.9 5.3 28.0 7.5 20.4 34.0 1.9 100
Canada 7.1 5.6 28.1 8.3 17.4 29.0 4.6 100
France 2.1 4.8 14.8 20.5 7.2 43.4 7.3 100
Germany 23.8 14.6 21.7 11.0 3.9 20.3 6.2 100
Netherlands 6.9 4.2 25.9 19.4 3.0 34.7 5.9 100
Norway 21.8 3.7 31.0 4.6 14.9 21.8 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.8 66.7 8.2 5.8 18.5 * 100
Switzerland 24.1 8.7 45.6 3.2 6.1 12.2 * 100
UK 23.7 24.2 13.5 6.3 9.9 20.2 2.3 100
USA 17.3 8.4 21.3 5.8 22.2 20.2 4.7 100
The effect of taxation on the poverty gap is summarised in Table 4.35. We 
see that in all countries the taxation system generally re-opens a small part 
of the gap closed by the social security system, particularly for families with 
incomes just above the 60% poverty interval.
The size of the changes for Germany, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland 
suggest that the taxation system claws-back transfers from social security
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recipients just above the 50% poverty interval.42 A point which will be 
considered further in the following chapter and Part II is that aggregate 
transfer measures which take account only of direct transfers, will overstate 
the amount of welfare effort made by the transfer systems in these countries, 
while not taking account of the role of taxes which clawback these 
expenditures at relatively low income levels.
Table 4.35. Effect of taxation on the size of the poverty gap across Z* range.
Gaps as a percentage of GDP Percentage change
Post-ss transfers Post-tax between ss and taxes
Z*: 40 50 60 40 50 60__ __ 40 50 60
Australia 0.50 0.90 1.53 0.51 0.93 1.65 -2 -4 -8
Canada 0.62 1.21 2.10 0.63 1.25 2.24 -2 -4 -7
France 0.50 0.96 1.79 0.50 0.97 1.82 -2 -2 -2
Germany 0.19 0.39 0.75 0.26 0.56 1.17 -37 -43 -56
Netherlands 0.94 1.27 1.66 1.00 1.39 1.94 -6 -9 -17
Norway 0.25 0.42 0.70 0.27 0.47 0.85 -8 -11 -20
Sweden 0.14 0.24 0.37 0.19 0.35 0.61 -33 -50 -64
Switzerland 0.59 1.06 1.87 0.66 1.24 2.36 -11 -17 -26
UK 0.06 0.20 0.59 0.07 0.24 0.71 -29 -21 -19
USA 1.17 2.12 3.42 1.24 2.27 3.74 -6 -7 -9
4.9. Summary.
In all the LIS countries income transfers do have a significant impact on 
poverty. Whether the existence of state transfers is partly responsible for the 
creation of some portion of pre-transfer poverty - as suggested by O'Higgins 
(1985) and Smeeding et al (1985b) - is a moot point on the evidence presented 
here. In Section 4.2.3, the relationship between pre-transfer poverty rates and 
levels of reduction was moderately strong (R2=0.64), while the relationship 
between the pre-transfer poverty gap and the reduction in the poverty gap 
was virtually non-existent (R2=0.02). One interpretation of these 
observations could be that while there may be some offsetting behaviour - 
according to the head-count - the poverty gap suggests that this reliance may 
be confined to the 'topping-up', rather than supplanting, of private 
provision.
Additionally it has been shown that in the LIS countries, the extent of 
poverty alleviation is independent of the income of a country.
The detailed empirical research confirms that, at the aggregate level, the 
poverty gap measure is more robust than the head-count measure; in
42 In the following chapter the question of taxation clawback is investigated further.
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particular, it is less sensitive to where the poverty line is drawn and the 
equivalence scale used. The poverty gap measure presents quite a different 
picture to the head-count of the effectiveness of several countries in 
alleviating poverty. Most notably, the UK and Australia appear more 
effective in closing the poverty gap and move up the effectiveness rankings, 
while the Netherlands and France leave a smaller number of families a long 
way below the poverty line and in aggregate terms, move down the 
rankings.
In disaggregated analyses the head-count is probably a more informative 
approach: the composition and representation of different demographic 
groups as a proportion of the poor population provides more detail about 
those in poverty than does the average poverty gap measure which may be 
unreliable and/or misleading where there are small cell counts for different 
family types.
The disaggregated analysis shows that while the head-count estimates of 
post-transfer poverty vary from around 5% to 17% in the LIS countries, the 
composition of the post-transfer poor population is fairly similar. Lone 
parents and single adults are the two groups most likely to be in poverty in 
all these countries.
This suggests that cross-national comparisons of poverty requires both 
aggregated and disaggregated estimates of the head-count and gap in order to 
give a balanced picture of the effectiveness of transfers in reducing poverty. 
For example, the aggregate size of the poverty gap gives a fairly clear picture 
of the magnitude of the poverty problem pre- and post- transfer, while the 
disaggregated head-count adds detail on which groups are most/least 
affected by the transfer system. In the absence of aggregate poverty gap 
information, the degree of correlation between the reduction in the head- 
count and the poverty gap suggests that effectiveness (using only head-count 
data) may be best gauged by the reduction of the head-count pre- and post­
transfer, rather than using the raw head-count.
C h a pter  Five
P o verty  r e d u c t io n  in  th e  LIS c o u n t r ie s :
EFFICIENCY MEASURES.
5.1. Beckerman's efficiency model.
Chapter 1 discussed the ways in which efficiency can be considered in 
relation to the goals of income transfer policies. I suggested, in the context of 
the poverty alleviation goal, that targeting efficiency and poverty reduction 
efficiency are two measures which reflect the efficiency with which transfer 
systems convert inputs (social security expenditures) into outputs (incidence 
of expenditure). These measures attempt to provide answers to the 
following questions: what percentage of social security expenditure accrues 
to the pre-transfer poor (targeting efficiency)? How much poverty does each 
unit of social security expenditure alleviate (poverty reduction efficiency)?
This approach implies that, in a highly efficient social security system, all 
expenditures would go to the poor. It should be noted however, that this 
underlying assumption may conflict with other objectives of the social 
security systems in this study. For example, the preservation of horizontal 
equity which motivates transfers to families with children may require 
"inefficient" transfers in order to be "effective". In many of the countries in 
this study, the status-preserving element of retirement benefits may also 
introduce desired inefficiencies to the social security system. For these 
reasons, the measures reported here m ust be tem pered by such 
considerations. In this chapter I propose only to report the measures and 
discuss the results at face value; the policy implications and interpretation of 
the results are considered more fully in Part II of the study.
This study distinguishes two aspects of the efficiency of social security 
expenditure. Primary expenditure efficiency refers to the percentage of 
expenditure which goes to those who were poor prior to transfers. Secondary 
expenditure efficiency refers to the proportion of the social security transfers 
received by the poor which is sufficient to take them up to a pre-defined 
level of poverty income; transfers in excess of the poverty line are referred to 
in the literature as "spillover". Combining these two aspects of efficiency, 
the study provides an overview of the efficiency with which the income 
transfer systems of the LIS countries reduce their poverty gaps.
Beckerman (1979a,b;1982) provides a framework which formalises these 
concepts.43 To illustrate Beckerman's approach, Diagram 5.1 shows the
43 Similar methodologies have been developed by several writers in the US, for example Weisbrod 
(1970), Plotnick and Skidmore (1975). Beckerman's approach is used here as it represents the most fully 
worked out model of these efficiency issues.
components of the analysis and the derivation of his efficiency measures. 
An important point to note is that Beckerman's measures are driven by the 
poverty gap, and as the analysis in the previous chapter demonstrated, this 
is a reliable means of addressing poverty issues at the aggregate level.
Diagram 5.1. Beckermart's effidency model post sodal security transfers.
Family
income
Post-
sodal
security
income
Pre­
transfer
income
Poverty
line
Families 
ranked by 
income
I__ Pre-transfer poor
Post-transfer
poor
Families classified as poor, prior to transfers, are found in the range 0 to P°; 
the size of their poverty gaps being the distance from the line Y°Z to the 
poverty line. Thus the areas marked A and D represent the total pre-transfer 
poverty gap.
After transfers, the poor are found in the range 0 to P1; the size of their 
poverty gaps being the distance between Y1Z and the poverty line. The area 
D represents the total post-transfer poverty gap.
Families raised above the poverty line are those in the range P1 to P°; and 
their distance above the poverty line is the distance between Y*Z and the 
poverty line. The area B represents the extent to which transfers have taken 
these families above the poverty line. If we were to assume that the most 
efficient way of directing expenditures was to take families to the poverty 
line but not beyond, the area B represents some level of inefficiency, that is, 
where expenditures spillover. A more telling measure of targeting efficiency
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however is the size of the area C - the sum of the transfers which accrue to 
the non-poor.
Using these concepts, Beckerman defines three targeting efficiency measures: 
vertical expenditure efficiency (VEE) or the proportion of transfers accruing 
to those who were poor prior to transfer; spillover (S); and poverty 
reduction efficiency (PRE) which combines the VEE and spillover measures.
To summarise, the areas defined in Diagram 5.1 correspond to the following 
magnitudes:
A + B + C = total social security transfer expenditure
A + B = total transfers received by the pre-transfer poor 
A + D = pre-transfer poverty gap
D = post-transfer poverty gap____________________________________
Beckerman's efficiency measures are given by:
VEE = (A + B) /  (A + B + C)
S =  B / ( A  + B)
_____________ PRE = A /  (A + B + C) = (1-S) x VEE_________________________________
Beckerman's approach has previously been applied only in aggregate. Here it 
is disaggregated in two stages: first, targeting and poverty reduction efficiency 
are estimated post- social security; second, to allow for 'clawback' through 
the taxation system, these estimates are repeated post-tax. This approach 
allows the study to establish the overall efficiency of the income transfer 
system by observing the interaction of the social security and taxation 
systems in each country. In addition, this chapter also disaggregates 
Beckerman's model to discover which families in each of these countries 
comprise: the non-poor who receive transfers; those whose transfers 
spillover the poverty line; and those who receive transfers and are subject to 
clawback through the tax system.
5.2. Efficiency of aggregate social security expenditure.
Tables 5.1 to 5.3 summarise the targeting efficiency of the LIS countries' 
social security systems for the Z* range. The results are reported only for 
OECD scale adjusted incomes since the poverty gap measures which drive 
the estimates are virtually identical for both scales (see Chapter 4).
First, in terms of the proportion of expenditure accruing to the pre-transfer 
poor (VEE), we might expect systems with elements of income testing {eg: 
Australia, US) to be more efficient than universal systems {eg: Sweden, 
Norway). As the tables show, the results are fairly mixed; generally the 
universal and social insurance systems tend to be more efficient than
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Table 5.1. Targeting efficiency measures using 40% poverty line and OECD scale.
V ertical
expenditure
efficiency
%
Spillover
%
Poverty
reduction
efficiency
%
A ustra lia 65.6 37.1 41.3
C anada 46.0 34.6 30.1
France 65.7 61.3 25.4
Germany 63.0 54.6 28.6
N etherlands 61.6 65.5 21.3
N orw ay 63.6 55.8 28.1
Sweden 57.6 69.4 17.6
Sw itzerland 56.4 46.7 30.1
UK 40.1 38.8 24.5
USA 54.0 38.0 33.5
V ertical Poverty
expenditure reduction
efficiency Spillover efficiency
% % %
A ustra lia 68.4 24.1 51.8
C anada 51.7 25.2 38.7
France 69.4 50.6 34.3
Germany 65.1 44.4 36.2
N etherlands 64.0 57.3 27.3
N orw ay 67.0 44.8 37.0
Sweden 61.5 61.2 23.9
Sw itzerland 63.2 35.3 40.9
UK 44.3 27.6 32.1
USA 59.8 30.7 41.4
Table 53. Targeting efficiency measures using 60% poverty line and OECD scale.
V ertical Poverty
expenditure reduction
efficiency Spillover efficiency
% % %
A ustra lia 71.4 14.6 60.9
C anada 56.8 17.8 46.7
France 75.8 40.9 44.8
Germany 69.6 37.0 43.9
N etherlands 65.9 49.1 33.5
N orw ay 70.6 35.0 45.9
Sweden 65.5 53.3 30.6
Sw itzerland 69.9 27.4 50.7
UK 49.4 22.1 38.5
USA 64.1 24.4 48.5
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Diagram 5.2. Post- social security VEE estimates, Z* range.
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income-tested systems on this criterion, with the exception of Australia 
which is second to France in terms of primary efficiency.
The implication of this finding is that the universal and social insurance 
social security systems do transfer the bulk of their social security 
expenditures to the pre-transfer poor, relying on mechanisms other than 
income tests to establish who is in need. The notable exception to this is the 
UK, which has the lowest VEE ratio across the Z* range.
Diagram 5.2 shows the VEE ratios for the LIS countries across the Z* range. 
Apart from Switzerland, the ordering is fairly complete at each level of Z. 
We see that it is not until the 60% interval that at least two-thirds of social 
security transfers are accruing to the poor in all countries except Canada and 
the UK. On the evidence of the VEE measure, France is the most efficient 
country in targeting the poor followed by Australia. At the other extreme, 
Canada and the UK are transferring around half their social security 
expenditures to the poor at this interval.
Where the non income-tested versus income-tested systems differ 
substantially is in the area of spillover. The results show that those countries 
with elements of income-testing in their programs (Australia, US, UK, 
Canada and Switzerland) have the lowest levels of spillover. Diagram 5.3 
shows that there is a distinct break between the spillover levels of these 
countries and the rest. There is also a second break in the spillover in the 
remaining countries. The highest levels of spillover are found in Sweden
101
and the Netherlands, where around half of the transfers accruing to the pre- 
transfer poor take them above the poverty line at the 60% interval. In the 
middle range France, Germany and Norway have spillover levels of 
between 35-40%.
In the Group El countries, we see that Canada and the UK have low levels of 
spillover at the 60% interval. Recalling the VEE results, we see that of the 
50% of transfers which do accrue to the pre-transfer poor, around 20% of 
these contribute to spillover.
Diagram 5.3. Post- social security Spillover estimates, Z* range.
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Theoretically we would expect income-tested systems to have lower levels of 
spillover, since the operation of income tests would limit or withdraw 
payments at a level close to the poverty line. However, the issue of spillover 
also needs to be considered in relation to the size of the transfer base and the 
generosity of payments. As Beckerman (1979b:54) himself points out there 
are two plausible explanations as to why spillover might be low: first, the 
social security system is extremely well targeted, and, secondly, if social 
security payments are low relative to the poverty gap, this reduces the 
probability that they will spillover. He notes: 'the easiest way to reduce 
spillover to zero, for example, is to spend nothing/44
44 Beckerman (1979b:54). Although he identified these possibilities in the four country study conducted 
for the ILO, Beckerman did not indicate which of these factors dominated the spillover in each country.
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In fact many of the systems which are efficient on the spillover criterion are 
also those with low levels of social security expenditure per capita (the 
welfare 'laggards'), an issue which will be taken up in Chapter 10. It is likely, 
therefore, that this measure of efficiency reflects a combination of, on the 
one hand, low levels of expenditure and, on the other, the effects of 
targeting through income tests. Section 5.4 investigates the number and type 
of families which receive transfers in the spillover area and how far above 
the poverty line the spillover extends.
The more generous levels of payments in some countries result in high 
levels of spillover at this stage of the redistribution process. In a later section 
I investigate the possibility that these countries' tax systems may clawback 
social security transfers, thereby acting as a de facto form of income test. If 
this is the case, we would expect to see the spillover measures post-tax to be 
considerably lower than those post- social security.
The third of Beckerman's measures, poverty reduction efficiency, is a 
summary measure which captures the overall efficiency of social security 
transfers by first, reducing aggregate social security expenditures by the 
amount which spillover the poverty line; and second, proportionately 
reducing the remaining expenditures by the ratio of transfers received by the 
non-poor. Thus: PRE = (1-Spillover) x VEE.
Diagram 5.4 shows the ordering based on the PRE estimates across the Z* 
range. It is interesting to note that this summary measure produces an 
ordering which conforms to the conventional wisdom that income-tested 
systems are more efficient, even though the components of the measure 
(VEE and spillover), examined individually produce mixed results.
Australia's position as the most efficient country is unambiguous and 
reflects the extensive income-testing elements of its social security system. 
At the other extreme, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK are the least 
efficient systems on the post- social security estimates of poverty reduction 
efficiency. The intervening countries show no strong ordering with several 
countries changing ranks across Z*.
There is no doubt that the spillover estimates strongly influence these 
results and (as I have noted earlier) there is some doubt whether the 
spillover is reflecting the efficiency, or simply, the 'meanness' of some 
systems.
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Diagram 5.4. Post- social security PRE estimates, Z* range.
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Table 5.4 shows the distribution of families in the Beckerman model for 
each country. These groups are discussed in the following sections.
Table 5.4. Distribution of families in the Beckerman model post-social security, 50% interval.
Percentage of families
Non-poor who Families in Post-transfer Receive 
receive trans. spillover area poor no transfers
% % % % Total
A ustralia 42.7 17.8 10.2 29.3 100
Canada 56.6 12.4 12.5 18.5 100
France 32.3 28.7 7.7 31.3 100
Germany 42.5 25.3 5.7 26.5 100
N etherlands 43.8 26.5 6.1 23.7 100
Norway 42.1 25.3 5.3 27.2 100
Sweden 57.1 32.9 3.6 6.4 100
Switzerland 11.8 14.3 10.0 63.8 100
UK 52.6 21.6 8.3 17.3 100
USA 20.1 10.3 16.8 52.8 100
5.3. Transfers to the non-poor.
The vertical expenditure efficiency ratios shown in Tables 5.1 to 5.3 imply 
that 30-40% of total social security expenditure in all these countries accrues 
to families whose market income is above the range of poverty intervals. 
This section examines these families in detail.
Table 5.5 shows the amount of social security expenditure accruing to the 
'non-poor' at the 50% and 60% poverty intervals and the percentage of 
families over which this expenditure is spread. The amount of transfers
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accruing to the non-poor at the 50% and 60% intervals declines in most 
countries by about 5 percentage points. The exceptions to this are Canada and 
Sweden, where there is a decline of about 15 percentage points. This implies 
that there is a cluster of low income families - just above the 50% poverty 
interval - who receive substantial social security benefits in these two 
countries.
In discussing the non-poor who receive transfers, I concentrate on those 
above the 60% interval as it is more likely that at this level we are capturing 
the non-poor (rather than the 'near-poor', ie those just above the 50% 
interval.)
Table 5.5. Sodal security transfers to families with pre-transfer income above the 50% and 
60% poverty intervals, OECD scale.
Amount of transfers to non-poor as Percentage of non-poor who receive 
a percentage of social security social security transfers
50% interval 60% interval 50% interval 60% interval
Australia 32 29 43 40
Canada 48 33 57 53
France 31 24 32 28
Germany 35 30 43 40
Netherlands 36 34 44 42
Norway 33 29 42 40
Sweden 38 24 57 54
Switzerland 37 30 12 10
UK 56 51 53 49
USA 40 36 20 18
Comparing the amount of transfers received by the non-poor and the 
percentage of families which receive these transfers four tendencies can be 
discerned as shown in Diagram 5.5. In this diagram, the diagonal represents 
proportionality between the percentage of transfers accruing to the non-poor 
and the percentage of (all) families receiving these transfers. It serves to 
illustrate whether the transfers are: spread across a small number of families 
(above and to the left of the diagonal); closely proportional (on or near the 
diagonal); roughly proportional (fairly close on either side of the diagonal); 
or spread across a large number of families (below and to the right of the 
diagonal).
First, in Switzerland and the US, transfers to the non-poor are concentrated 
on a relatively small percentage of families. Referring to Table 5.6, we see 
that it is the non-poor aged which dominate this group in both countries, 
followed by couples with children in the US.
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In France and the UK, the percentage of transfers accruing to the non-poor is 
proportionate to the percentage of families. In these countries, it is couple­
headed families with children who benefit most from these transfers.
Countries where there is rough proportionality are the Netherlands, 
Germany, Australia and Norway. The tendency in these countries is for the 
transfers to be spread across a slightly larger than proportionate number of 
families and again - as Table 5.6 shows - it is couple-headed families with 
children who are the predominant non-poor recipients of transfers. In 
Norway, the other significant group is lone parents.
In Canada and Sweden, the spread of transfers to the non-poor is even 
larger, dominated to a lesser extent by couple-headed families with children.
Diagram 5.5. The spread of transfers among the non-poor at 60% interval, OECD scale.
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Table 5.6. Composition of non-poor families receiving social security, 60% poverty interval.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 2.4 2.6 4.9 11.5 4.3 69.7 4.6 100
Canada 3.7 4.5 13.2 17.8 4.9 51.6 4.4 100
France 4.3 3.8 3.2 16.6 3.8 62.7 5.6 100
Germany 3.7 4.2 3.1 13.1 4.8 67.1 4.0 100
Netherlands 5.9 5.4 0.6 11.9 1.9 71.2 3.2 100
Norway 4.4 6.2 3.3 5.3 10.3 70.4 * 100
Sweden 1.9 7.6 34.6 17.7 4.9 33.4 * 100
Switzerland 29.7 26.1 18.7 15.5 3.9 6.1 * 100
UK 2.6 3.9 5.9 19.3 3.3 58.7 6.3 100
USA 10.4 23.1 12.0 14.7 4.0 28.2 7.6 100
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5.4. The pattern and size of the spillover.
Table 5.7 shows the breakdown of the families identified in Table 5.4 whose 
social security transfers spillover the 50% poverty interval. This group is 
broken into four successive levels of spillover. Column 1 shows those 
families who are just above the poverty line (ie between 50-55% of the 
adjusted median income level). Column 2 includes families who are below 
the 60% poverty interval. In Column 3 are families just above the 60% 
poverty interval, while those in Column 4 have transfers which take them 
above 65% of adjusted median income.
Table 5.7. Spillover levels at the 50% poverty interval using OECD equivalence scale.______
Percentage of families with spillover:
<10% above 10-20% above 20-30% above >30% above
poverty line poverty line poverty line poverty line
Australia 10.9 29.1 20.7 39.3
Canada 12.5 10.3 7.7 69.4
France 11.9 14.9 11.8 61.4
Germany 6.0 9.1 9.4 75.5
Netherlands 2.3 5.3 7.9 84.5
Norway 5.6 26.2 13.3 54.8
Sweden 1.0 0.7 3.5 94.7
Switzerland 2.7 3.8 7.6 85.9
UK 26.8 21.1 15.2 36.9
USA 14.3 11.0 9.0 65.7
Diagram 5.6 shows three patterns of spillover which emerge after social 
security transfers. In the UK and Australia around 60% of families whose 
transfers do spillover, do so at a level less than 30% above the poverty line. 
At the other extreme, in Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands, around 
85% of families in the spillover range receive transfers which take them 
more than 30% above the poverty line. In the remaining countries the 
percentage of families receiving transfers which take them more than 30% 
above the poverty line is between 50% and 70%.
Table 5.8 shows the composition, by family type, of those whose social 
security transfers spillover. While these countries vary in respect of the size 
of their spillover, there is high degree of similarity in the spread of the 
spillover amongst family types. In all countries, the aged account for 
upwards of 60% of families whose transfers spillover (except the 
Netherlands where the aged account for around 50%). The predominance of 
the aged is explained by a number of factors which operate variably across 
these countries for example, the relative generosity of transfers to this group, 
universal payments, or more relaxed income tests - in the case of Australia 
at this time there was no income testing of age pensions for those over 70.
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In France, the Netherlands and the UK another sizeable group whose 
payments spillover are families with children. This is probably due to child 
related benefits which are non income-tested.
The extent of the spillover amongst these two groups supports the 
observation made at the outset of this chapter concerning 'desirable 
inefficiencies' to achieve effective outcomes among some sections of the 
population.
Many of the countries also have a significant number of single persons 
whose benefits spillover. In these countries the transfers received by this 
group spillover by only a small margin, predominantly at a level of less than 
20% above the poverty line.
Diagram 5.6. Pattern of the spillover at the 50% poverty interval.
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Table 5.8. Breakdown of the spillover by family type, 50% poverty interval.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 33.8 26.6 13.9 11.1 5.4 5.0 4.1 100
Canada 36.1 23.9 12.5 6.8 7.1 9.0 4.6 100
France 33.9 28.0 4.7 11.4 2.2 16.2 3.6 100
Germany 46.4 26.1 11.2 8.1 3.8 1.6 3.2 100
Netherlands 25.7 22.4 14.3 14.4 8.6 11.0 3.8 100
Norway 50.9 24.8 13.3 2.3 5.7 3.1 * 100
Sweden 45.7 23.5 21.2 3.6 3.4 2.7 * 100
Switzerland 56.4 25.3 12.7 2.8 1.5 0.9 * 100
UK 37.4 21.6 9.1 6.8 4.1 14.4 6.5 100
USA 39.1 27.3 8.5 8.0 6.6 4.2 6.4 100
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5.5. The poor who don't receive transfers.
Table 5.9 shows the percentage of families whose pre-transfer incomes are 
below the 50% poverty interval and who do not receive social security 
transfers. The reasons for this include: intra-family transfers to support 
students or other young dependents without income; non take-up of 
benefits; ineligibility; or non-reporting of social security income. It is not 
possible to discern which of these causes may be operating in each instance. 
It is important to recall here the discussion of Chapter 2 concerning the 
number of families with zero and negative incomes and the possible 
connection of the incidence of these observations and the business cycle, this 
may partly explain the unexpectedly high percentage of apparent non-receipt 
of transfers in the Netherlands. Apart from the US (and perhaps the 
Netherlands) the percentage of the poor not receiving some form of 
government assistance is fairly small in relation to the population as a 
whole. Examining this group in greater detail is difficult since, in most 
countries, the cell sizes are too small to pursue any meaningful analysis.
Table 5.9. Percentage of families whose market income is below the 50% poverty line and who 
receive no transfers._________________________________________
Percentage of pre-transfer poor families
Australia 2.4
Canada 1.5
France 3.2
Germany 0.9
Netherlands 4.5
Norway 1.6
Sweden 0.7
Switzerland 3.7
UK 0.9
USA 5.1
5.6. The efficiency of social security transfers.
Using the PRE measure, the approximate ordering of the LIS countries
across the Z* range is:
Australia 
United States 
= Canada, Norway 
= France, Germany 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Sweden
Switzerland
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As Diagram 5.4 illustrated, Australia's overall efficiency is around 20% 
greater than the nearest country across the Z* range, clearly indicative of the 
impact of extensive income-testing in the Australian system.
The major source of 'inefficiency' in these social security systems may be 
gauged from the ratio of the proportion of transfers accruing to the poor to 
the proportion which does not spillover. This ratio is shown in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10. Ratio of primary and secondary expenditure efficiency, 60% poverty interval.
Ratio of 
VEE:1-S
Sweden 1.4
Netherlands 1.3
France 1.3
Germany 1.1
Norway 1.1
Switzerland 1.0
USA 0.8
Australia 0.8
Canada 0.7
UK 0.6
The table shows that for those countries above Switzerland, the major 
source of inefficiency is transfers which spillover the poverty line. In 
Switzerland, inefficiency is equally attributable to both transfers to the non­
poor and transfers which spillover. While in those countries below 
Switzerland, it is the transfers to the non-poor which are the major source of 
inefficiency.
In the following section I examine the impact of taxes on the overall 
efficiency of the income transfer systems in the LIS countries.
5.7. Clawback through the tax system: an extension of the Beckerman model.
Table 5.11 shows estimates of the percentage of social security transfers 
which are clawed back through the taxation system. The clawback has been 
calculated for each family by subtracting taxes (payroll and mandatory social 
insurance contributions) from social security transfers to give a net transfer 
figure. If net transfers are negative then the net transfer variable has been set 
to zero, ie the model assumes that at the point where the taxation system 
has clawed back 100% of social security transfers, the negative amount 
represents the taxation of other income sources.
As would be expected, the more generous social security systems in Sweden 
and the Netherlands clawback a large percentage (around 43%) of social
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security payments through the tax system. The clawback in Canada and the 
UK is also considerable, at around one-third. Of the remaining countries 
Germany, the US, Switzerland, Australia and Norway clawback in 
increasing order 20% to 30% of transfers. The figure for Australia is 
surprisingly high since we would expect that benefits would have been 
clawed back through the operation of the income test on benefits.45
France has the lowest clawback of all these countries. This is partly due to 
the structure of tax revenue raising in France. OECD revenue statistics show 
that personal income taxes in France comprise only 12% of total taxation 
revenues and Pechman (1987:88) estimated that, in 1983, the share of 
personal income tax revenue in the tax base in France was 20% less than the 
OECD average.46
Table 5.11. Clawback of social security transfers through the tax system.
A ustralia
Clawback
26.5
Canada 33.3
France 11.7
Germany 19.3
N etherlands 43.3
N orw ay 28.5
Sweden 42.9
Sw itzerland 24.6
UK 36.9
USA 22.4
The next stage of the analysis modifies Beckerman's approach by substituting 
net transfers for total social security expenditure. In Diagram 5.7, the line 
Y1Z bounds the post- social security income levels. After taxes, disposable 
income is pushed back to the area bounded by Y2Z. As the diagram shows, 
the effect of clawback (darker shading) through the tax system is to reduce 
the percentage of transfers which spillover (B) and which accrue to the non­
poor (C). In some countries, the tax system may even clawback transfers 
from those who are below the Z* range of poverty lines post- social security 
(D).
45 Although it should be recalled that at the time of the data collection, there were two universal 
elements in the Australian social security system: Family Allowances and the over-70s age pension.
46 The structure of taxation raises important questions for comparative studies of well-being. In Part II 
of the study, I examine the implications of the balance between direct and indirect taxes and how this 
may modify our view of the evidence presented in microdata, as well as some further observations 
concerning the limitations of income measures.
Diagram 5.7. The extension of the transfer efficiency model post tax.
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To summarise, the areas defined in Diagram 5.7 correspond to the following 
magnitudes:
(A+B+C) - Clawback= net transfer expenditure 
(A+ B) - Clawback = net transfers received by the pre transfer poor 
A+D = pre-transfer poverty gap
__________D + Clawback = post-tax poverty gap__________________________________
The efficiency measures are calculated using the same formulae set out in 
Section 5.1 with the proviso that net transfers, rather than total social 
security transfers, are used as the denominator.
Using this approach, Tables 5.12 to 5.14 summarise the results of the post-tax 
efficiency measures across the Z* range. The following sections examine: the 
net efficiency of transfers; which families are most affected by taxation 
clawback; the level of transfers which accrue to the non-poor after taxes; and 
the amount of the spillover clawed back through the tax system. The final 
section compares the changes in the efficiency measures post- social security 
and post-tax.
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Table 5.12. Targeting efficiency measures after clawback, 40% poverty line and OECD scale.
V e rtic a l
expenditure
efficiency
%
S p illo v e r
%
P overty
reduction
efficiency
%
A u s tra lia 87.4 36.1 55.9
C an ad a 67.7 33.8 44.8
France 70.1 59.0 28.7
Germ any 77.1 54.3 35.3
N e th e rla n d s 83.4 55.5 37.1
N o rw ay 82.9 52.8 39.1
Sw eden 79.9 61.6 30.7
S w itze r lan d 69.4 43.0 39.6
U K 62.3 37.7 38.8
USA 68.4 37.5 42.8
Table 5.13. Targeting efficiency measures after clawback, 50% poverty line and OECD scale.
V e rtic a l
expend itu re
efficiency
%
S p illo v e r
%
P overty
reduction
efficiency
%
A u s tra lia 90.3 22.7 69.8
C an ad a 74.6 23.7 57.0
France 75.6 48.8 38.7
G erm any 78.9 43.7 44.5
N e th e rla n d s 86.4 45.1 47.4
N o rw ay 86.6 40.7 51.4
Sw eden 84.2 50.8 41.4
S w itze r lan d 76.6 30.6 53.1
U K 67.6 25.4 50.4
USA 75.1 30.0 52.6
Table 5.14. Targeting efficiency measures after clawback, 60% poverty line and OECD scale.
V e rtic a l
expend itu re
efficiency
%
S p illo v e r
%
Poverty
reduction
efficiency
%
A u s tra lia 93.0 12.6 81.2
C an ad a 80.2 15.6 67.7
France 82.0 38.9 50.1
G erm any 83.1 36.0 53.2
N e th e rla n d s 88.2 35.0 57.3
N o rw ay 90.0 29.6 63.4
Sw eden 87.9 40.1 52.7
S w itz e r lan d 83.5 22.3 64.9
U K 73.6 18.6 59.9
USA 79.7 23.3 61.2
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5.8. The impact of taxation clawback.
Diagram 5.8 shows the post-tax vertical expenditure efficiency ratios for the 
LIS countries across the Z* range. In general, the VEE ratios of these 
countries increases markedly after the clawback by the tax system. 
Comparing the countries with their post- social security positions we see 
that Australia moves to the top of the efficiency table with around 90% of 
net social security expenditure accruing to the pre-transfer poor. In Norway, 
the Netherlands and Sweden more than 85% of net expenditure accrues to 
the pre-transfer poor. This confirms the observation made in the 
Introduction to this study concerning the importance of the interaction of 
the tax and social security systems in countries where universal and/or 
generous social insurance programs predominate.
It is interesting to note that such radically different patterns of provision can 
produce fairly similar outcomes. The bracketing of Australia with Norway, 
the Netherlands and Sweden in Group I might be evidence to support 
Ringen's (1987:12) contention that progressive taxes are a form of de facto 
income test. This issue will be considered further in Chapter 12.
Diagram 5.8. Post- taxation VEE estimates, Z* range.
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Group I
Norway
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rij Germany Group II
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60 Z* range
In the Group II countries, Switzerland, Germany and France have moved 
down the rankings post-tax and this is mainly due to a combination of less 
progressive tax structures and lower levels of the tax 'take'. The latter is a 
particularly prominent feature of the French system, as noted earlier. The
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ranks of Canada, the US and the UK are virtually unchanged from the post­
social security position; although the VEE increases, in absolute terms, by 
around 20 to 25 percentage points.
Once again, the spillover presents quite a different grouping of countries. 
Diagram 5.9 illustrates that the spillover distinguishes quite clearly those 
countries where the combination of income tests, now supported by 
taxation, limit the extent to which transfers spillover the poverty line.
Diagram 5.9. Post- tax Spillover estimates, Z* range.
70 n
Spillover (%)
Group I
60 Z* range
Comparing Diagrams 5.9 and 5.3, we see that the effect of the clawback pulls 
Sweden and the Netherlands into the same group as France, Germany and 
Norway. The steeper gradient of the spillover plots across the Z* range in 
the Group I countries indicates that considerable clawback of generous 
transfers is occurring. This can be contrasted with the tailing off of the 
clawback between the 50% and 60% intervals in Switzerland, Canada, the US 
and UK.
Combining these changes, Diagram 5.10 shows the net poverty reduction 
efficiency of these transfer systems. There is considerable re-ranking on this 
measure, as a comparison with Diagram 5.4 will confirm. I noted in Section 
5.2 that the PRE rankings post- social security conformed to the pattern 
predicted by the conventional wisdom that income-tested systems are more 
efficient. Post-tax, there are some notable exceptions to this pattern. In 
particular, Norway and the Netherlands have jumped two ranks, while
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France, which was in the middle of this group post- social security, is last on 
the post-tax rankings.
In all countries, except France and Germany, taxation clawback enhances 
poverty reduction efficiency (at the 50% interval) by more than 10 percentage 
points.
Diagram 5.10. Post- tax PRE estim ates, Z* range.
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5.9. Who is affected by clawback?
Table 5.15 shows how much of the tax clawback of social security transfers 
comes from families located in different parts of the Beckerman model. The 
balance between clawback from the spillover and transfers to the non-poor 
varies considerably, with half the countries clawing back the bulk of 
transfers from the non-poor (Australia, Canada, Germany, UK) and others 
predominantly clawing back from those in the spillover range (France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). In Norway and the US, the balance 
is roughly equal. In all countries except France, the clawback also affects the 
pre-transfer poor, most notably in Switzerland and the US.
It is interesting to compare this table with Table 5.10 which shows the ratios 
of the VEE and Spillover measures. In the top half of that table were the
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countries whose major source of inefficiency is the spillover of transfers. We 
see from Table 5.15 that this is where more than 60% of the clawback occurs 
for these countries. Conversely, Australia, Canada and the UK 
predominantly clawback social security transfers from the non-poor.
On either side of the division of Table 5.10, are Norway and the US, and this 
is matched in Table 5.15 by fairly equal clawback of transfers from both 
sources of inefficiency.
In Switzerland, where inefficient transfers were evenly spread between the 
spillover and transfers to the non-poor, the taxation system operates most 
strongly on the spillover. This suggests that the taxation system is either 
weakly progressive or that there are a series of tax exemptions, rebates or 
concession which leave social security transfers untaxed for specific groups.
Table 5.15. Distribution of the clawback, 50% poverty interval.
Breakdow n o f the claw back o f  social se c u r ity  tran sfers fro m  those:
In spillover range Non-poor who Who were poor
after social security received transfers pre-transfer
A ustralia 32 66 2
Canada 35 63 2
France 76 24 0
Germany 37 61 2
N etherlands 59 40 1
N orw ay 49 50 1
Sweden 61 39 1
Sw itzerland 67 30 3
UK 44 55 1
USA 49 48 3
While the distribution of the clawback in terms of volume varies markedly 
in these countries, the taxation system radically changes the spread of the 
clawback such that the percentage of non-poor families who receive net 
positive transfers declines dramatically. This is illustrated in Tables 5.16 and 
5.17. This information, together with that contained in Table 5.15, suggests 
that in most countries the transfers received by the non-poor are relatively 
small and widely spread. So that in volume terms, the clawback is smaller 
than the clawback from the spillover, but larger in terms of the numbers of 
families affected. These families are re-located in the model to "non- 
recipient" status. Families in the spillover area post- social security and who 
are affected by clawback tend to remain in the spillover area post-tax, but 
often at a lower level of spillover (in some countries the clawback moves a 
small percentage of these families below the poverty line). In the following 
sub-sections I investigate these changes in greater detail.
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Table 5.16.Distribution of families in the Beckerman model after clawback, 50% interval.
Percentage of families
Non-poor who Families in Post-transfer Receive zero
receive trans. spillover area poor net transfers
% % % % Total
Australia 6.0 17.3 10.7 65.9 100
Canada 14.6 11.8 13.1 60.5 100
France 22.9 28.6 7.8 40.7 100
Germany 10.6 24.8 6.2 58.4 100
N etherlands 8.1 25.6 6.9 59.4 100
Norway 7.9 24.9 5.7 61.5 100
Sweden 13.1 32.3 4.2 50.4 100
Switzerland 8.4 13.4 11.0 67.2 100
UK 21.0 21.1 8.9 49.0 100
USA 8.7 10.1 17.0 64.2 100
Table 5.17. Differences in the distribution of families in  the Beckerman model after 
clawback,. 50% interval.__________________________________________________________
Differences after clawback
^Australia
Canada
France
^Germany
N etherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
*UK
*USA
Non-poor who 
receive trans. 
-36 
-42 
-9 
-32 
-36 
-34 
-44 
-3 
-32 
-11
Families in 
spillover area 
-1 
-1 
0 
-1 
-1 
0 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1
Post-transfer
poor
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
Receive zero 
net transfers 
37 
42 
9
32
36
34
44
3
32
12
5.9.1. Non-poor families affected by clawback.
Table 5.18 compares the volume and spread of net transfers to the non-poor. 
This information is displayed visually in Diagram 5.11. Comparing this 
diagram with Diagram 5.5 we see a dramatic shift in the proportionality 
between the volume and spread of net transfers. In Diagram 5.5 only two 
countries (US, Switzerland) were above and to the left of the proportional 
diagonal indicating a large volume of transfers being spread across a small 
number of families. After clawback, all countries are found above the 
diagonal, indicating that the spread of transfers to the non-poor is tightly 
restricted in all these countries. However, there are substantial differences in 
the volume. The exceptions to this are France and the UK whose positions 
change very little in either volume or spread terms.
118
W ith less than 20% of net transfers accruing to the non-poor, Australia is 
the m ost efficient in vertical d istribution  term s. In the next band  are 
Norway, Germany and France where between 20-30% of net transfers accrue 
to the non-poor, a lthough here there is considerable differences in the 
spread. In a tight cluster above this group are Sweden, the N etherlands, 
Canada, the US and Switzerland where 30-40% of transfers accrue to around 
5-15% of the non-poor population. Least efficient in vertical d istribution 
term s is the UK, w here around 50% of net transfers accrue to 20% of the 
non-poor population.
Table 5.18. Net transfers to families with pre-transfer income above the 50% and 60% poverty 
intervals, OECD scale.
Amount of transfers to non-poor as Percentage of non-poor who receive 
a percentage of net transfers positive net transfers
50% interval 60% interval 50% interval 60% interval
A ustralia 19.2 15.6 6.0 4.7
Canada 40.9 33.8 14.6 11.8
France 31.5 25.9 22.9 19.2
Germany 28.6 23.5 10.6 8.8
N etherlands 32.8 29.8 8.1 7.3
Norway 26.1 21.5 7.9 6.5
Sweden 38.3 31.5 13.1 10.8
Switzerland 39.2 30.3 8.4 6.5
UK 55.7 48.2 21.0 18.1
USA 37.9 32.5 8.7 7.2
Diagram 5.11. The spread of net transfers among the non-poor, 60% interval.
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The composition of non-poor families receiving positive net transfers also 
changes significantly after the taxation clawback. Comparing Table 5.19 with 
Table 5.6, we see that with the exception of France, Sweden and the UK, it is 
couples with children who are most affected by the clawback and their 
relative presence in this group declines by as much as 80% in some countries 
(Australia, Norway) to around 50% in the US.
In the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the US the aged become the 
predominant non-poor transfer recipients comprising around 50% of this 
group.
Table 5.19. Non-poor families receiving positive net transfers, 60% interval.
■■ ■,r111-1 4r. is, V| fL  , v,^, ■ it  1..................  -  ;-■■■■ m?:1 :.s'., .,i ^  1 ■■■■■■ u1 s
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 11.5 15.6 10.4 19.3 7.8 14.4 21.1 100
Canada 12.6 20.0 11.7 16.5 5.3 24.9 9.1 100
France 6.2 8.4 3.1 12.7 4.8 57.7 7.0 100
Germany 15.9 20.4 11.0 15.2 5.5 20.4 11.6 100
Netherlands 28.1 28.1 2.1 19.9 2.6 9.9 9.2 100
Norway 22.6 23.6 6.6 13.2 19.8 14.2 * 100
Sweden 8.3 9.4 28.8 17.3 10.2 26.0 * 100
Switzerland 38.4 29.6 19.2 7.9 2.5 2.5 * 100
UK 5.5 10.3 8.9 17.9 4.3 43.5 9.5 100
USA 22.5 31.6 7.8 13.5 3.4 11.7 9.5 100
5.9.2. Pattern and size of the spillover after clawback.
After clawback the pattern of the spillover changes very little in these 
countries. Table 5.20 reports the spillover at various levels above the 
poverty line and this information is displayed visually in Diagram 5.12.
The two notable shifts are Canada which joins Australia and the UK in 
having the least number of families whose net transfers take them more 
than 30% above the poverty line.
At the other extreme Switzerland moves from a high level of spillover into 
the intermediate range leaving Sweden and the Netherlands as the only 
countries where more than 80% of families receive net transfers which take 
them more than 30% above the poverty line. In the remaining countries 
there are small incremental changes which reduce spillover at the upper 
end.
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Table 5.20. Spillover levels after clawback at the 50% poverty interval. 
Percentage of families with spillover:
<10% above 10-20% above 20-30% above >30% above
povertv line povertv line povertv line povertv line
A ustralia 9.8 29.8 21.8 38.6
Canada 20.6 19.0 17.2 43.2
France 9.4 10.5 12.4 67.7
Germany 6.2 6.6 8.9 78.3
N etherlands 3.0 5.1 5.1 86.8
Norway 3.9 3.0 22.4 70.6
Sweden 1.3 4.8 5.6 88.4
Switzerland 14.6 15.8 16.5 53.0
UK 22.2 17.5 16.7 43.5
USA 14.2 12.8 13.0 59.9
Diagram 5.12. Pattern of the spillover after clawback at the 50% poverty interval.
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Table 5.21 shows the composition of the families whose net transfers 
spillover the poverty line. Comparing this table with Table 5.8, we see that 
there is virtually no difference in the composition of spillover families. This 
information, together with the volume measures, suggests that the taxation 
systems in these countries are clawing back fairly small amounts from a 
large number of transfer recipients and doing so in a fairly equitable fashion 
ie there is no evidence of groups which are exempted from tax on their non­
transfer incomes.
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The one exception to this is Switzerland, where there is a rise in the 
percentage of the aged, suggesting that there may be some tax exemption of 
benefits for this group.
Table 5.21. Breakdown of the spillover after dawback by family type, 50% poverty interval.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther Total
A ustralia 33.5 28.7 13.7 9.0 5.3 3.8 6.0 100
Canada 39.2 30.8 8.8 4.5 4.1 8.0 4.6 100
France 36.9 29.3 4.8 7.9 2.0 15.7 3.4 100
Germany 46.9 28.2 11.5 7.0 1.7 2.1 2.6 100
N etherlands 26.2 23.0 14.8 12.9 8.5 10.3 4.3 100
Norway 50.7 24.9 13.2 2.4 6.3 2.4 * 100
Sweden 46.4 23.6 20.2 3.8 3.5 2.5 * 100
Switzerland 57.4 36.2 4.0 0.7 1.2 0.5 * 100
UK 41.2 27.4 8.9 3.8 4.5 7.0 7 2 100
USA 36.5 34.4 7.7 5.2 3.9 4.1 8.2 100
5.10. Net efficiency of transfers: a summary.
Table 5.22 compares the difference between the Beckerman measures post­
social security and post-tax at the 50% interval. The discussion below 
examines both the ordering evident across the Z* range for each measure 
and the difference between the post- social security and tax measures.
Table 5.22. Targeting efficiency measures using 50% poverty interval, OECD scale.
Vertical expend itu re Poverty reduction
e f f ic ie n c y S p i l l o v e r e f f ic ie n c y
Post Post Post
social Post social Post social Post
security tax security tax security tax
% % % % % %
A ustralia 68.4 90.3 24.1 22.7 51.8 69.8
Canada 51.7 74.6 25.2 23.7 38.7 57.0
France 69.4 75.6 50.6 48.8 34.3 38.7
Germany 65.1 78.9 44.4 43.7 36.2 44.5
N etherlands 64.0 86.4 57.3 45.1 27.3 47.4
Norway 67.0 86.6 44.8 40.7 37.0 51.4
Sweden 61.5 84.2 61.2 50.8 23.9 41.4
Switzerland 63.2 76.6 35.3 30.6 40.9 53.1
UK 44.3 67.6 27.6 25.4 32.1 50.4
USA 59.8 75.1 30.7 30.0 41.4 52.6
Table 5.22 shows that the tax clawback has a marked effect on the percentage 
of social security transfers which finally accrue to the non-poor as
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dem onstra ted  by the vertical expenditure efficiency m easure. In Diagram 
5.13 we see that through the operation of the tax system, Australia, Canada, 
the N etherlands, N orw ay, Sw eden and the UK effectively reduce the 
percentage of transfers accruing to the non-poor by around 20 percentage 
points. In Germ any, Sw itzerland and the US the reduction is a round  15 
poin ts. France has the least clawback w ith  a reduction  of a round  5 
percentage points, although this is from a m uch higher starting position 
than a num ber of other countries.
In Diagram  5.14 we see that large reductions in the spillover are confined to 
Sw eden (11 percentage points) and the N etherlands (8 percentage points). 
There are sm aller reductions in  N orw ay and Sw itzerland of a round  5 
percentage points, w ith the rem aining countries having little clawback from 
pre-transfer poor recipients.
Diagram 5.13. A comparison of post-social security and post-tax VEE ratios, 50% interval.
100
VEE 50 -
Aust Nor N'l Swe Ger Switz Fra USA Can UK
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Diagram 5.14. A comparison of post-social security and tax Spillover ratios, 50% interval.
Spillover
Aust Can UK USA Switz Nor Ger N'l Fra Swe
In Diagram 5.15 we see that the overall affect of the tax clawback is to make 
substantial efficiency gains in all countries with the exception of France, and 
to a lesser extent Germany. In absolute terms, there are gains of around 20 
percentage points in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK. Gains of around 12 points are made in Norway, Switzerland and the 
US.
Diagram 5.15. A comparison of post-social security and post-tax PRE ratios, 50% interval.
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Table 5.22 and Diagram 5.15 show that the rankings on overall poverty 
reduction efficiency alter considerably once the tax clawback is taken into 
consideration. Notably Canada,the UK and Netherlands move up two ranks, 
while Sweden is promoted one rank. Australia retains its position at the top 
of the table with the gap between it and the remaining countries 
substantially reduced, as compared with the post social security measures.
Finally, Table 5.23 presents the ratio of primary to secondary expenditure 
efficiency for net transfers. The ratios for social security expenditures are also 
shown. It is evident that in all countries, except the UK, net spillovers are 
the major source of inefficiency. This is further evidence that the taxation 
systems in many of these countries operate to restrict the level of transfers 
which finally accrue to the pre-transfer non-poor.
Table 5.23. Ratio of primary and secondary expenditure efficiency, 60% poverty interval.
Sweden
Ratio of 
VEE:1-S 
post - SS 
1.4 Sweden
Ratio of 
VEE:1-S 
post - Tax 
1.5
Netherlands 1.3 Netherlands 1.4
France 1.3 France 1.3
Germany 1.1 Germany 1.3
Norway 1.1 Norway 1.3
Switzerland 1.0 Switzerland 1.1
USA 0.8 Australia 1.1
Australia 0.8 USA 1.0
Canada 0.7 Canada 1.0
UK 0.6 UK 0.9
This chapter has analysed poverty reduction efficiency, defined as the 
percentage of transfers which accrue to the poor but do not spillover the 
poverty line. It has been shown that taxation can play an important role in 
reducing spillovers. Taxation is even more significant in increasing primary 
targeting efficiency, that is to say in reducing the size of net transfers to the 
non-poor.
The evidence presented here raises doubts about the commonly held view 
that income-tested social security systems are necessarily more efficient in 
targeting the poor rather than the non-poor. Indeed, primary expenditure 
efficiency in the universal or social insurance systems is at least as high on 
social security transfers and tends to be higher with respect to net transfers. 
This evidence lends some credence to the claim that taxation can act as a de 
facto income test in non income-tested systems. The one country with
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widespread income testing which does stand out as the most efficiently 
targeted on the poor is Australia.
The area in which income-tested systems do appear to be more efficient is in 
relation to transfers which spillover the poverty line. Taxation plays an 
important role in reducing the size of the spillover in some of the non 
income-tested systems, especially in Sweden and the Netherlands, but even 
on net transfers spillover is less in the income-tested systems.
In aggregate, poverty reduction efficiency, which is the product of the 
primary and secondary efficiency measures, bears some relation to income­
testing, especially after taking account of the role of taxation. The income- 
tested systems tend to be more efficient but, with the exception of Australia, 
the efficiency differences are minor.
This chapter has presented an extension to the Beckerman model to take 
account of the 'clawback' of benefits through taxation. Clawback is especially 
significant in reducing the proportion of non-poor families who receive net 
transfers (except in the case of France).
Analysis of the clawback of transfers to the non-poor by family type indicates 
that in almost all countries it is predominantly targeted on couples with 
children. The aged, on the other hand, are much less affected by clawback in 
most countries.
Disaggregation of the clawback of spillover benefits indicates, however, that 
in almost all countries the clawback is both small and evenly distributed 
across family types. The principal exception to this is Switzerland, where 
clawback does not appear to affect the aged as much as other family types.
Chapter Six
The measurement of inequality.
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6.1. The measurement of inequality.
The measurement of inequality, like the measurement of poverty, presents 
researchers with a wide range of potential analytical tools and approaches. 
Unlike the poverty methodology, however, it is not possible to preclude any 
of the inequality approaches on the basis of their suitability in the 
comparative context or on the type of data required to support the measures: 
each method is driven by the same type of data (income) and each is equally 
applicable in a comparative context. In this respect, the choice of an 
appropriate inequality measure is less apparent than the choice of the 
poverty measure. Moreover, various writers (eg: Champemowne,1974) have 
pointed out that alternative measures of inequality do not provide the same 
ranking of distributions and that these rankings can be quite contradictory. 
Essentially the choice of approach comes down to what is appropriate in 
terms of the focus of this study. In this section I discuss the main approaches 
to the measurement of inequality in order to illustrate the properties of each 
measure. In the following section, I discuss the choice of perspective for this 
study and the reasons for this choice.
The literature dealing with the description and measurement of income 
inequality is largely associated with the disciplines of economics and 
econometrics. The discussion below begins with the description of the 
Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient which, together, form the main 
conceptual bases for the inequality methodology. Since the mid-70s this 
work has broken into a number of branches and I provide a brief guide to 
the main theories in the field.
6.1.1. The Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient.
Cowell (1977) describes a number of methods which chart inequality. The 
best known of these is the Lorenz curve (Diagram 6.1), which is derived by 
arranging the observations of the incomes of the recipient units in 
ascending order. The cumulative population of these units is then plotted 
against the cumulative incomes received by the recipient population. If 
income were equally distributed, that is if each of n recipient units receives 
1/ m of total income, we would find that the diagonal described by OA 
represents the income distribution. Thus in Diagram 6.1 we see that the 
bottom 20% of the population receives 20% of total income, the bottom 40% 
of the population receives 40% of total income and so on. The diagonal OA 
is referred to as the "line of equality" because cumulative income increases
in direct proportion to cumulative population. The closer the Lorenz curve 
is to this line, the more equitable the income distribution.
Diagram 6.1. Lorenz curve and line of equality.
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If income is not equally distributed we find distributions described by the 
curves OB, OC and OD in Diagram 6.2. These curves have been derived from 
the hypothetical data contained in Table 6.1. Note that these are four 
alternative ways of distributing the same amount of income. If we wished to 
compare two distributions to make statements about the degree of income 
inequality it is sometimes possible to deduce from the Lorenz curves 
whether one distribution is less unequal than another. For example, 
distribution A is clearly the most equitable and C the least equitable, since at 
all points OA lies above the other Lorenz curves and OC, below.
Table 6.1. Four examples of income distributions.
Distribution Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Gini
A 5 5 5 5 5 0.000
Cum . d istrib 'n 5 10 15 20 25
B 2 3 5 7 8 0.256
Cum. d istrib 'n 2 5 10 17 25
C 1 2 2 4 16 0.512
Cum. d istrib 'n 2 5 10 17 25
D 3 3 3 6 10 0.272
Cum. d istrib 'n 2 5 10 17 25
But what of the other distributions? It is possible to say that distribution B is 
more equitable than distribution C. This is apparent from both the 
cumulative total of income accruing to the ordered population and from the
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fact that the Lorenz curve for B (OB) lies wholly inside of the Lorenz curve 
for C (OC) and closer to the line of equality. This is a condition referred to in 
the literature as 'Lorenz dominance' as there is no ambiguity in the ranking 
of the two distributions.47 Problems arise in interpreting Lorenz curves 
when the curves intersect, ie where there is no Lorenz dominance, as is the 
case for distributions B and D.
Diagram 6.2. Lorenz curves for income distributions A-D.
Cumulative 
income %
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OD
Statements comparing distributions B and D are less easy to make, visual 
inspection allows some comparisons to be made about parts of the 
distribution but these do not make an overall statement possible.
Comparisons of this kind are left to summary measures such as the Gini 
coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a summary measure which compares the 
ratio of the area between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve (the 
shaded area) with the area bounded by OAZ as shown in Diagram 6.1. Thus 
the closer the Lorenz curve lies to the line of equality, the smaller the ratio 
of the two areas and hence the lower the Gini coefficient. Using the Gini 
coefficient we may now rank the distributions shown in Table 6.1 from 
lesser to greater inequality as A, B, D and C.
47 See Cowell (1977) for a fuller discussion of Lorenz dominance.
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The ranking of income distributions using the Gini coefficient as described 
above, has been subject to several criticisms. If we inspect Diagram 6.2 more 
closely, the reasons for this will become clearer. W hile d istribution B is 
ranked on the Gini coefficient as being more equal than distribution D, 
closer inspection raises a very im portant issue. Diagram  6.3 reproduces 
distributions B and D, notice that the bottom  two quintiles (ie the bottom  
40% of income earners) have a larger share of income under distribution D 
than for B.
Thus if we are concerned w ith  income inequality  am ong low income 
households, we may consider distribution D to be preferable to distribution 
B even though , overall, the la tter d istribu tion  according to the Gini 
coefficient is the m ore equal. H ow  does this result occur? It should be 
recognised that the Gini coefficient (as w ith  all sum m ary m easures) is 
concerned w ith  all parts of the income distribution, thus a more equal 
distribution at the top end of the distribution can offset a less equal one at 
the lower end. This is the situation described in Diagram 6.3.
Diagram 63 . The problem of intersecting Lorenz curves.
Cumulative 
income %
Cumulative 
population %
OA
OB
OD
6.1.2. The Atkinson measure.
A second critical problem  in using and in terp reting  Gini coefficients, 
referred to as transfer sensitivity, was dem onstrated by Atkinson (1970) who
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showed that changes in the Gini coefficient are sensitive to where transfers 
accrue. Atkinson noted that the Gini coefficient usually attaches more 
weight to transfers affecting middle income earners. Kakwani (1986) more 
specifically notes that it is transfers around the modal classes to which the 
Gini coefficient is most sensitive. These views do not necessarily conflict, it 
is a matter of recognising whether the middle income range coincides with 
the modal income class.
To illustrate this point, consider the income distributions shown in Table 
6.2. Y° represents an initial income distribution which is concentrated 
around the median income. In Y1, a transfer of 10 units occurs between two 
individuals (B and A) who are initially separated by an income gap of 25 
units, at the lower end of the distribution. As a result of this transfer, the 
Gini coefficient falls from 0.4363 to 0.4336, implying a reduction in inequality 
of 0.6%
Table 6JL Income redistributions around the median.
Distr. A B Q D E F £ H I Gini
Y° 5 30 40 45 50 65 180 200 205 0.4363
Yl 15 20 40 45 50 65 180 200 205 0.4336
Y2 5 30 50 45 50 55 180 200 205 0.4295
Y3 5 30 40 45 50 65 190 200 195 ] 0.4322
In Y2 a transfer of 10 units is again effected across a similar income gap, but 
this time in the middle of the distribution (between individuals F and C). As 
a result of this transfer, the Gini coefficient falls to 0.4295, representing a 
reduction in inequality of 1.6%. Thus for a transfer of a similar magnitude of 
that in Y1, in Y2 there is a much greater fall in the Gini coefficient and a 
redistribution estim ated which is more than double that of the 
redistribution estimated for the transfer in the lower income range. In Y3 a 
similar transfer takes place at the upper end of the income distribution, 
between individuals I and G. The resultant Gini coefficient is 0.4322, 
representing a redistribution of 0.9%.
To overcome this bias Atkinson (1970) proposed the use of an inequality 
aversion parameter 'S', which would reflect the relative sensitivity to 
transfers at different income levels. As £ rises, more weight is attached to 
transfers at the lower end of the distribution and less weight to transfers at 
the top. The limiting cases for this measure are where £ —> 00 which takes 
account of transfers only to the very lowest income group; and at the other
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extreme, where £ = 0, which is completely insensitive to transfers and ranks 
distributions solely according to aggregate income.
Atkinson’s approach can be best illustrated by the following example. We 
start with two individuals A and B, where B has an income four times 
greater than A. If we are inequality averse we would approve of a 
redistribution of $1 from B to A with no net loss of income (ie the 
redistribution process is "cost-less.") In reality, the transfer process is in fact 
not cost-less, so that we may still approve of a transfer even if it is going to 
take more than $1 from B in order to give $1 to A. How much more we are 
prepared to take from B will be reflected in the weighting given to £. Let us 
suppose that we are prepared to take up to ($4)e from B in order to give $1 to 
A. So that:
£ = 0 implies a transfer of $1 from B to provide $1 to A;
£ = 0.5 implies a transfer of $2 from B to provide $1 to A;
£ = 1 implies a transfer of $4 from B to provide $1 to A; and
£ = 2 implies a transfer of $16 from B to provide $1 to A.
If we return to the problem raised earlier in Section 6.1.1, in relation to the 
preferred ranking of distributions B and D, Table 6.3 shows that for higher 
values of £ (ie attaching greater weight to the lower end of the income 
distribution), the Atkinson measure reverses the inequality ranking of the 
Gini coefficient, so that distribution D is to be preferred to distribution B.
Table 63 . Atkinson's inequality aversion ranking of income distributions.
Atkinson parameter Distribution B Distribution D
0.5 0.0571 0.0655
1.0 0.1167 0.1231
1.5 0.1760 0.1714
2.0 0.2315 0.2105
5.0 0.4324 0.3222
Gini coefficient 0.256 0.272
An even more marked result is demonstrated for distributions Y° to Y3 in 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5, where for all values of £ > 0 the given transfer reduces 
inequality most when it occurs at the lower end of the distribution (ie Y1) 
and reduces inequality least at the upper end (ie Y3). For values of £ > 2, the 
transfer at the upper end of the distribution (Y3) is given such a low 
weighting that the impact on inequality is considered negligible and thus the 
inequality index is identical to the original distribution Y°.
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_Table^4^A ^dn^n^inequ^i^ave^ion^m dexfordis^butions^^toY ^.
Atkinson
parameter yO Y1 Y2 Y3
0.5 0.1808 0.1674 0.1786 0.1805
1.0 0.3730 0.3228 0.3691 0.3728
1.5 0.5576 0.4484 0.5539 0.5574
2.0 0.7019 0.5399 0.6999 0.7019
5.0 0.9050 0.7359 0.9050 0.9050
Gini coefficient 0.4364 0.4336 0.4295 0.4322
Table 6.5. Rank of distributions YO to Y3 based on the Atkinson index.
Distrib'n Gini 0 5 LÜ L5 Z&
Y° 4 4 4 4 =3 =2
Y1 3 1 1 1 1 1
Y2 1 2 2 2 2 =2
Y3 2 3 3 3 =3 =2
6.1.3. Additively decomposable inequality measures.
A third group of inequality measures, deriving from the work of Theil 
(1967), concerns the extent to which inequality in the total population can be 
attributed to income differences within and between sub-groups in the 
population. These sub-groups may be defined by income (eg: the lowest 
quintile of income earners) or by demographic characteristics (eg: age, sex, 
race, occupation, level of education and so on).45
A well-known contribution in this area is the work of Shorrocks (1980), who 
derives a class of additively decomposable inequality measures. Briefly, 
Shorrocks’ approach shows that an aggregate distribution can be 
decomposed into distributions for a number of sub-populations and 
inequality indices derived for the 'within group' inequality index and a 
'between group' index. Thus:
Aggregate inequality = inequality amongst sub-group 1 X proportion of population in sub-group 1 
+ inequality amongst sub-group 2 X proportion of population in sub-group 2 
+ inequality between the average incomes of sub-groups 1 and 2.
In theory, any number of sub-populations may be decomposed. To illustrate 
the use of Shorrocks’ work consider the income distributions Y° to Y3 
described in Table 6.2. These distributions are replicated in Table 6.6, 
showing the sex of the income recipient.
48 A discussion of the various forms of decomposition can be found in Nygard and Sandstrom (1981).
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In distribution Y1, a transfer occurs within the group of female income 
earners (from B to A). In Y2, a transfer occurs between a male income earner 
(F) and a female income earner (C). In Y3, a transfer occurs within the group 
of male earners (from I to G). The effects on inequality of these transfers for 
the sub-populations (females and males) is shown in Table 6.7.
Person A B Q D E F G H I Gini
SEX female female female male male male male male male
Y° 5 30 40 45 50 65 180 200 205 0.4363
Y1 15 20 40 45 50 65 180 200 205 0.4336
Y2 5 30 50 45 50 55 180 200 205 0.4295
Y3 5 30 40 45 50 65 [ 190 200 195 0.4322
For distribution Y1, where there is a transfer within the female sub-group 
only the within group indices for females (Columns ii and iii) and the 
aggregate index (Column i) change. There is no change in inequality among 
the male sub-population (Columns iv and v) or between the two sub­
populations (Column vi) since the total income for each sub-population 
remains the same.
Table 6.7. Shorrocks* inequality indices for distributions YO to Y3*
[i] [iii [iii] [iv] [v] [vi]
Aggregate I n e q u a l i t y  in d ex  f o r I n e q u a l i ty  in d ex  f o r
inequality f e m a l e s m a l e s Inequality
(total /N  of between
Distrib'n PQp'n) Total females Total /N  of males sub-pop'ns
yO 0.4669 0.3190 0.1064 0.2037 0.1358 0.2247
Yl 0.3899 0.0879 0.0293 0.2037 0.1358 0.2247
Y2 0.4606 0.3698 0.1233 0.2181 0.1454 0.1920
Y3 0.4664 0.3190 0.1064 0.2031 0.1354 0.2247
Notes to table: Aggregate inequality^ iii+v+vi
Inequality within female pop'n= iii 
Inequality within male population= v
In distribution Y2, a transfer occurs between the male and female 
populations, thus inequality between the two groups falls (from 0.2247 to 
0.1920). In this case, inequality within the male group rises and since the 
transfer accrued to the top income earner within the female group, 
inequality within this group also rises. (If the transfer accrued to the bottom 
income earner we would expect a decrease in inequality within the female 
population).
In Y3, a similar result to distribution Y1 obtains ie there is no change to the 
between group index (Column vi) there is no change to the female group
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index and inequality within the male group falls slightly, resulting in a fall 
of equal magnitude in the aggregate index.
6.1.4. Decomposition of the redistribution process.
The methodology described above examines income distribution and 
inequality from a static perspective. That is, the methods reveal the extent of 
inequality before and after redistribution. The work of Kakwani (1980;1986) 
departs from these measures by introducing a dynamic perspective to 
redistribution. His work attempts to capture the intermediate processes by 
which one income distribution is transformed into another. These 
'intermediate processes' are of course, social security and taxation transfers. 
The logic of Kakwani's approach is summarised below.
An initial distribution may be labelled A, representing the set of initial 
incomes a1 for each unit i (typically a person, family or household):
A = ( a1, a1, a3 an) where n is the total number of units
or A s  (a'} i- 1 ... n
The transfer system is a set of net transfers B, where each unit receives a net 
transfer b* which may be positive or negative:
B = fW i= 1... n
Each net transfer may be composed of a number of positive transfers 
(benefits) and negative transfers (taxes) indexed by j:
=  Ij Vj
where b*j represents the jth transfer paid to (or by) the ith unit:
B = (Ibij).
After the transfers, each unit has income c1: 
cz = a1 + b1
and we can define the post-transfer income distribution as C:
C = A+B.
Kakwani's analysis focuses on the properties of B, ie how the reduction (or 
increase) in inequality is brought about by the transfer system. Moreover, 
Kakwani's approach enables the researcher to analyse separately the effects of 
the social security and taxation systems, as well as their net effects. If we 
have some inequality measure I(x) which reduces any income distribution 
to a single-value index of inequality, the redistributive effect, R, of the 
transfer system can be measured as the proportional change in the index:
R(B)
1(A) -  1(B) 
KA)
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Note that the redistributive effect is defined in proportional terms so as to 
make it independent of the scale of the inequality index. Thus R=0.2 
measures, for instance, a 20% reduction in the inequality measure.
In principle, any inequality index could be used. If for example, we use an 
Atkinson inequality measure, the index might be IAt 0 5 (where 0.5 is a chosen 
value for the Atkinson inequality-aversion parameter) in which case we can 
define the Atkinson redistributive effect of a given transfer system as:
R At0.5 (B)
IA t0.5(A)- I A t0.5(C)
IAt 0.5(A)
Kakwani uses a particular inequality index, the Gini coefficient (G). As noted 
earlier the Gini coefficient has two main limitations: its relative 
insensitivity to changes at the upper and lower ends of the distribution, and 
the fact that it cannot be decomposed simply across constituent groups of 
income units (whereas the Shorrocks measure, for example, can be 
decomposed into inequality within each group, and inequality between 
groups).49
Kakwani's major contribution is to show that, despite the limitations of 
Gini as a base measure of inequality, its use in the analysis of redistribution 
makes possible a decomposition of redistribution into the effects of three key 
features of transfer systems: the progressivity of social security transfers and 
income taxes; the average rate of benefit received, or taxes extracted from, 
the income unit; and the inefficiencies introduced into the transfer system 
by the "leap-frogging" of equivalent income units.
Progressivity is defined as a "concentration" measure and is most easily 
understood when applied to analysing taxes. By superimposing on the 
Lorenz curve for the initial income distribution, the concentration curve of 
taxes, where each point on the concentration curve plots the cumulative 
proportion of total taxes paid by the bottom fth proportion of income units. 
It is, in effect, the Lorenz curve for tax payments, with the vital proviso that 
the units are ranked not by tax payments but by income. In Diagram 6.4, the 
concentration curve for taxes has been plotted with the Lorenz curve for
49 Although Kakwani (1986:94) describes the decomposition of G by factor components (eg: wage 
income, property income etc).
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income. The diagram shows that the poorest 20% receive 10% of total 
income and pay no taxes, while the poorest 70% of income units receive 50% 
of total income and pay 30% of total taxes.
Diagram 6.4. The concentration curve for taxes.
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A tax system is defined as progressive (under the liability definition) if the 
average tax rate (the ratio of tax to income) rises with income. In other 
words, if income rises by a given proportion, tax rises by a greater proportion 
ie, the tax elasticity is greater than unity. Under a progressive tax system the 
concentration curve must lie below the Lorenz curve; under a proportional 
tax system, where everyone pays the same proportion of income in tax, the 
two curves must coincide; under a regressive system the tax concentration 
curve will lie above the Lorenz curve.
Kakwani's measure of progressivity (P) is twice the area between the two 
curves.50 (The area is doubled to make it consistent with the Gini index 
which is twice the area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve.) Thus: 
P = C-G, where C is the concentration index of taxes, computed in the same 
way as the Gini coefficient, taking tax payments as the basic measure, and 
ranking by income.
50 More precisely, twice the area between the two curves where the concentration curve lies below the 
Lorenz curve, and minus twice the area where the concentration curve lies above.
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From Diagram 6.4, it is obvious that the maximum value of P is (1-G), which 
occurs if all taxes are paid by the richest unit, and its minimum value is - 
(1+G ) if all taxes are paid by the poorest. P is positive if the tax is progressive 
and negative if it is regressive.
Although Kakwani (1986) analyses only taxes, his formulae are extended in 
this study and applied to social security benefits, thus: P = G - C. The 
application of this extension is illustrated in Diagram 6.5.
Diagram 6.5. The concentration curve for social security transfers.
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Here the poorest 20% receive 10% of pre-transfer income and 60% of 
benefits, whilst the poorest 70% receive 50% of income and all the benefits. 
A progressive benefit system, as shown, must have a concentration curve 
above the Lorenz curve. Again, the progressivity can be measured as twice 
the area between the curves - with a maximum value of G+l (if all benefits 
go to the poorest individual) and a minimum value of G-l (if all benefits go 
to the richest individual); as noted above, P is positive if the benefit is 
progressive and negative if it is regressive.
Knowing the progressivity of a tax or social security benefit does not in itself 
tell us how much redistribution will occur. A system might be highly 
progressive, taking taxes only from the rich and giving benefits only to the 
poor; but if the tax and benefit rates are small, little redistribution will occur. 
The average transfer rate 'E' (the ratio of total taxes or benefits to total
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income), is clearly an important element of redistribution. Thus Kakwani 
defines a measure of gross vertical redistribution ’V: V = PE/(1-E)G.51 So as 
V increases the more progressive the redistribution and/or the greater the 
average tax or benefit rate.
Kakwani points out that, even though a transfer system may bring about 
significant vertical redistribution, it is possible that the Gini coefficient for 
the post-transfer distribution (G*) may still be close to the initial Gini 
coefficient (G). That is, the net redistribution R (=[G-G*]/G) may be smaller 
than the vertical redistribution. This will occur if the transfers result in 
some (equivalent) income units being re-ranked, which Kakwani refers to as 
"horizontal inequity." Kakwani's terminology should not be confused with 
the general concept of horizontal inequity used by taxation policy analysts to 
refer to the differential treatment of tax units. To avoid confusion, I will 
retain Kakwani's notation (H) but refer to this aspect of the transfer process 
as "leap-frogging" or "re-ranking" which is exactly what Kakwani's measure 
is capturing.52
An extreme example of leap-frogging would occur if a highly progressive 
transfer system transfers $90 from a person with an initial income of $100 to 
a person with an initial income of $10; the vertical redistribution would be 
large, but the final income distribution would be just as unequal as the 
initial distribution, since the two households simply change places.
Kakwani measures leap-frogging (H) by comparing the post-distribution 
Gini coefficient (G*) with the concentration curve of the post-transfer 
distribution (Cd). Cd can be thought of as the post-transfer Gini coefficient 
based on pre-transfer rankings, thus: H = (Cd - G*)/G. If no re-ranking 
occurs, Cd=G* and H=0. In the example above, where the two households 
change places in the distribution, a positive vertical redistribution would be 
offset by a negative horizontal redistribution of equal magnitude. In this 
instance the net redistribution would be zero, so that R=0 and G*=G. The 
implications of this result are discussed below.
Kakwani's crucial result is that the net redistribution R is the sum of the 
vertical and horizontal equity measures: R=H+V. That is, the net
5  ^ l+E in the case of social security transfers and 1-E in the case of taxes.
52 The phenomenon of "leap-frogging" was first discussed by Plotnick and Skidmore (1975: Chapter 6). 
Their approach to measuring the extent of "leap-frogging" is fairly similar to that of Kakwani. However 
Kakwani's approach has the advantage, for this study, of being able to provide a summary index.
redistribution can be decomposed into the effects of progressivity (P) and tax 
or social security 'effort' (as measured by E), which together determine V; 
and the re-ranking of income units (as measured by H).
The merits of this decomposition are illustrated in Table 6.8, which shows 
an initial income distribution, a set of taxes and the resultant redistribution 
(disposable income).
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Table 6.8. Kakwani's decomposition of the income distribution process.
Equivalent Equivalent Equiv.disp. Kakwani
Household gross income tax liabilitv income measures
1 5 0 5 G =03465
2 20 0 20 G*=0.3164
3 30 5 25 P =0.1285
4 40 5 35 R =0.0869
5 50 5 45 H =0.0000
6 70 20 50 V =0.0869
7 80 20 60 E =0.4750
8 100 20 80 C =0.4167 
Cd=0.3258
Kakwani's measures as shown are interpreted as follows: the Gini coefficient 
for the original income distribution falls from G=0.3465 to G*=0.3164 after 
taxes, producing a net redistribution (R) of 8.69%. This can be decomposed as 
follows: the concentration index of taxes (C=0.4750) is only slightly higher 
than the initial Gini coefficient, so the progressivity measure (P=0.1285) is 
low. The tax effort (E=0.1899) is combined with the progressivity measure to 
give the vertical redistribution V:
0.1285 x 0.1899 
V " (1 - 0.1899) x 0.3465 0.0869
No leap-frogging occurs, ie each income unit retains its ranking in the post­
tax distribution, so H=0. In this case the net redistribution ,R, is identical to 
the vertical redistribution, V.
Table 6.9 analyses the effects of a shift in the tax threshold which pushes 
household 5 - in the original distribution in Table 6.8 - into the upper tax 
bracket. Initially this household paid 5 units in tax and now pays 20 units. 
The tax effort (E=0.2278) is now higher, but is also less progressive for the 
middle income range, so P falls from 0.1285 to 0.0701. As a result, vertical 
redistribution falls to 0.0597. Household 5 in the initial distribution, is now 
ranked 4th, in the post-tax distribution and this re-ranking is measured as a 
loss of horizontal equity, H= -0.0118 (-1.18%). So the net redistribution is 
lower than V, thus R= 0.0479 (4.79%). Thus the result of this change to the
tax threshold is a decrease in the progressivity of the incidence of the tax and 
a decrease in the redistributive effect of the tax system.
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Table 6.9. Kakwani's analysis of a change to the tax threshold.
Equivalent Equivalent Equiv.disp. Kakwani
Household gross income tax liabilitv income measures
1 5 0 5 G =0.3465
2 20 0 20 G*=0.3299
3 30 5 25 P =0.0701
4 40 5 35 R =0.0479
5 50 20 30 H= -0.0118
6 70 20 50 V =0.0597
7 80 20 60 E =0.2278
8 100 20 80 C =0.4167 
Cd=0.3258
A corresponding example of a change in a social security transfer payment is 
shown in Table 6.10. We see that, although the average benefit level is low 
(E=0.0633) -ie, on average transfers account for 6.3 cents of each $1 of 
household income - it is targeted exclusively on low income earners, so the 
progressivity measure is very high (P=0.9215).53 As a result, the vertical 
redistribution is much higher than for the tax system, with V=0.1583. Since 
no re-ranking occurs, H=0 and the post-transfer Gini is substantially lower 
(G*=0.2917), with a net redistribution of around 16%.
Table 6.10. Kakwani's analysis of a change in the targeting of social security payments.
Equivalent Social security Gross Kakwani
Household Market income pavments income measures
1 5 10 15 G =03465
2 20 10 30 G*=0.2917
3 30 5 35 P =0.9215
4 40 5 45 R =0.1583
5 50 0 50 H =0.0000
6 70 0 70 V =0.1583
7 80 0 80 E =0.0633
8 100 0 100 C =03750
Cd=0.2917
The distribution presented in Table 6.10 is now modified in Table 6.11 to 
illustrate the effects of targeting benefits on a narrow income range. In this 
new redistribution, households 3 and 4 lose their benefits to households 1 
and 2, so that only the poorest households receive benefits. With a higher
33 When applied to other countries, the units will change. Thus E=0.063 in the UK means an average 
benefit of 6.3 pence per £1 of household income etc.
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average benefit (E=0.0759) and a more progressive system (P=1.0965), the 
vertical redistribution rises to V=0.2234. However, the increased targeting 
results in some re-ranking - household 3 loses its benefits and is now the 
2nd poorest household in the post-transfer distribution - so there is some 
leap-frogging (H=-0.0085) and the net redistribution is 21.49%.
Table 6.11. Kakwani's analysis of further targeting of social security payments.
Equivalent Equiv. SS Equiv. gross Kakwani
Household Market income payments income measures
1 5 15 20 G =03465
2 20 15 35} G*=0.2721
3 30 0 30} P =1.0965
4 40 0 40 R =0.2149
5 50 0 50 H= -0.0085
6 70 0 70 V =0.2234
7 80 0 80 E =0.0759
8 100 0 100 C =0.7500 
Cd=0.2691
6.2. Using inequality measures to assess efficiency and effectiveness.
The measures discussed in the previous section all provide useful and quite 
different perspectives on the effectiveness of income transfer systems in 
reducing inequality. The simple Gini coefficient estimates how much 
redistribution occurs between the pre- and post- transfer states; the Atkinson 
measure improves on the Gini estimate by increasing sensitivity to transfers 
at lower income levels; the Shorrocks measures examine changes among 
different sub-populations; and the Kakwani measures allow the effects of the 
transfer instruments to be analysed separately.
In addition, there are also a number of simple descriptive statistics such as 
the analysis of the distribution based on deciles or quintiles of household 
units which describe in a broad brush fashion, the cumulative proportion of 
income accruing to each decile /quintile. Much of this basic descriptive 
material for the LIS data has been presented in a number of papers prepared 
by LIS researchers (see O'Higgins et al,1985; Smeeding et al,1985b; 
Saunders,1989b). The information conveyed by these measures is fairly 
similar to that of the poverty gap data and for this reason is not reported 
here.
To some extent the information conveyed by the Atkinson and Shorrocks 
measures is also covered by the poverty analysis. For example, the poverty
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measures concentrate exclusively on that section of the population with 
which the Atkinson measure is most concerned and the disaggregated 
analysis of family types in the poverty head-count and gaps sections gives an 
overview of how different family units fare in the transfer process.
The poverty head-count and gap measures, however, are not entirely 
satisfactory in giving a view of the taxation side of the transfer process - 
other than to indicate the extent to which taxation affects those below the 
poverty line. The size and distribution of the clawback of social security 
transfers through taxation (Chapter 5) indicated that the interaction of the 
transfer mechanisms is quite important in the LIS countries. The findings of 
Chapter 5 suggest that further investigation of taxation is critical to a more 
complete understanding of how the patterns of final disposable income in 
these countries are shaped.
On the efficiency side, only the Kakwani measures provide any substantive 
means by which efficiency questions can be addressed. The leap-frogging 
index (H) is a Pareto type efficiency measure which indicates whether the 
transfer instruments are redistributing the inputs in such a fashion as to 
cause households to swap places without any actual addition to aggregate 
welfare. The progressivity index (P) reflects the incidence of transfers across 
the distribution, providing a view of the transfer instruments akin to the 
targeting measure (VEE) discussed in Chapter 5.
In the context of this study, the Kakwani approach offers a number of 
distinctive features. In particular, the ability to decompose the redistribution 
process into its social security and taxation components supplements the 
picture of the effectiveness of the social security system presented in the 
poverty analysis; while the derivation of the progressivity and leap-frogging 
indices allow the efficiency aspects of these systems to be addressed.
6.3. The application of Kakwani's methodology.
Kakwani's main indices - as derived in Section 6.1 - form the focus of the 
efficiency and effectiveness discussions in the following chapters. In these 
chapters, I report: the Gini coefficients pre- and post- transfer; the 
redistribution achieved by each transfer instrument, and the vertical and 
horizontal components of this redistribution; the progressivity of the 
transfer instrument; and the average rate of tax extraction/benefit receipt for 
the income unit. In each chapter, the analysis decomposes the redistribution
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process into the post- social security and post-tax position, allowing the 
effects of each instrument to be viewed.
In applying the Kakwani methodology to the LIS data, two operational 
issues arise in respect of: the appropriate measure of unit income; and the 
weighting of the income unit prior to rank-ordering the observations. These 
issues have been discussed by Atkinson (1983) and O'Higgins (1985a,b). The 
approach adopted here is that favoured by O'Higgins ie family equivalent 
income per person.
On the effectiveness side, the post-transfer Gini coefficient and the 
redistribution measure form the indicators of effectiveness for each transfer 
instrument. The amount of redistribution achieved by the social security 
and taxation components as a percentage of total redistribution is also 
presented. These are discussed in Chapter 7.
In Chapter 8 the efficiency of these systems is gauged by: the amount of 
redistribution achieved for the given tax and social security inputs; the 
relationship between the redistribution and progressivity; and the amount 
of leap-frogging associated with each instrument.
The abbreviated forms of Kakwani's measures to be used in the following 
chapters are:
G = pre-transfer Gini coefficient
G*= post-transfer Gini coefficient
P = progressivity index of the benefit or tax
R = net redistribution achieved by the social security or tax system 
H = re-ranking or "leap-frogging" index 
V = vertical (or gross) redistribution
E = average incidence of benefits and taxes for the income unit 
C = concentration index of benefit/tax received/paid by the unit ranked by 
pre-transfer position
CD= concentration index of post-transfer income.
Chapter Seven
Inequality reduction  in  the LIS countries:
EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES.
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In Chapter 1 it was proposed that the effectiveness of an income transfer 
system may be judged by the extent to which indices of inequality, such as 
the Gini coefficient, decrease (or increase) during the transfer process. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, such a change measures the amount of 
redistribution achieved by the transfer system. The analysis to be presented 
in this chapter uses Kakwani's methodology to focus on the social security 
and taxation components of the redistribution process as well as on the net 
outcome of these processes.
Section 7.1 reports the Gini coefficients for the pre-transfer distribution (ie 
the distribution of market incomes) and the post-tax distribution (ie the 
distribution of disposable income). The net redistributive effects of the 
transfer systems are compared with both the pre-transfer and post-transfer 
measures of inequality in order to determine whether transfer systems are 
actually effective in reducing inequality.
In Section 7.2 the relationship between the wealth of a country (measured in 
terms of GDP per capita) and the level of inequality is examined. The 
question here is whether the richer/poorer countries achieve a more/less 
greater degree of redistribution and whether they achieve a more/less equal 
final distribution. Put simply, is the degree of reduction in inequality a 
function of a country's income or is it the result of autonomous policy 
decisions?
Section 7.3 compares both the redistribution achieved by the social security 
and taxation instruments in each country, and how much of the net 
redistribution accrues to each instrument in each country.
Section 7.4 focuses on the determinants of redistribution, in particular, the 
progressivity of the transfer instruments in each country and the amount of 
inputs to the transfer process. This analysis leads into the following chapter 
on efficiency considerations.
7.1. The impact of transfer systems on income inequality.
The purpose of this section is twofold: first, to establish which countries 
achieve the greatest reduction in inequality through their transfer systems 
(social security and taxation taken together); second, to investigate whether 
the post-transfer degree of inequality is determined by the amount of 
redistribution, or whether it is determined by the market distribution of 
income.
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It is usually assumed in the social policy literature that a high level of 
redistribution will achieve the aim of a low level of post-transfer 
inequality.54 This should indeed be so if the pre-transfer inequality is 
independent of the transfer system. It is possible, however, that market 
incomes might react to the transfer system so as to nullify its effect. For 
instance, highly progressive taxation might simply have the effect of 
increasing wage differentials, resulting in exactly the same dispersion of 
disposable incomes as would result from a less progressive taxation system. 
We need, therefore, to establish empirically whether redistributive 
instruments are actually effective in achieving lowered inequality.
In Chapter 6 I described the operational aspects of adapting the Kakwani 
measures to the LIS data. Like the poverty measures, both the OECD and 
Whiteford equivalence scales were used to adjust family incomes prior to 
weighting and ranking the files. Both scales produced virtually identical 
results for all the computed Kakwani indices, as evidenced by the correlation 
coefficients shown in Table 7.1. For this reason only the OECD results are 
reported in this chapter. A full tabulation of the inequality indices using 
both equivalence scales is reported in Appendix C.
Table 7.1. Correlation coefficients for Kakwani indices, OECD and Whiteford equivalences.
D istr ib u tio n G Q1 P R H V E
P ost-ss 0.99 1.0 0.98 0.99 0 .99 0.99 1.0
P o st-ta x 1.0 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.0 0.99 1.0
Table 7.2 shows the Gini coefficients computed for the pre-transfer and post­
transfer distributions (G and G* respectively) and the associated measure of 
redistribution (R = [G - G*]/G).
Table 7.2. Gini coefficients and estimated redistribution post- transfers
G = G ini G* = G ini R = net
(p re -tra n sfe r ) (p o st-tra n sfer ) red istr ib 'n
A u s tr a l ia 0.4143 0.2872 0.31
C a n a d a 0.3865 0.2931 0 .24
France 0 .4707 0.3065 0 .35
G erm any 0.4066 0 .2517 0.38
N e th e r la n d s 0.4672 0.2932 0 .3 7
N o r w a y 0 3 8 4 8 0.2342 0 .39
S w ed en 0.4168 0 .1967 0 .53
S w itz e r la n d 0.4142 0.3355 0.19
U K 0.3928 0.2638 0 .33
U S 0.4252 0.3168 0 .25
54 Cf. the discussion of this issue in Chapter 4.
150
Countries where the income transfer system has the least impact on the 
distribution of disposable income are Switzerland, Canada and the US, 
where the overall change in the Gini coefficient is 25% or less. In France, the 
UK and Australia the transfer system achieves a 30-35% decrease in 
inequality; while in Norway, Germany and the Netherlands the decrease is 
around 40%. There is a large gap to Sweden at the top of the table, where 
income transfers effect a 53% reduction in inequality.
In the poverty analysis presented in Chapter 4, I examined the extent to 
which the level of pre-transfer poverty was related to the post-transfer 
outcome. In this section I present a similar analysis in the context of 
inequality. The purpose here is to establish whether the degree of inequality 
evident from the market distribution of income is consistently related to the 
degree of inequality in disposable incomes.
Diagram 7.1 plots the post-transfer Gini coefficients against the pre-transfer 
Gini coefficients. We see that the relationship between the market 
distribution and the distribution of disposable income is very weak (and 
statistically insignificant). This result indicates that redistribution can in 
practice sever the relationship between market distribution of income and 
the final distribution of disposable income.
Diagram 7.1. Relationship between pre- and post- transfer income distributions.
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151
Diagram 7.2. Redistribution and pre-transfer inequality.
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Diagram 7 3 . Redistribution and post-transfer inequality.
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Diagrams 7.2 and 7.3 plot the degree of redistribution (R) against the pre­
transfer Gini and the post-transfer Gini respectively. We find first that there 
is no relationship at all between the level of inequality in market incomes 
and the degree of redistribution. This suggests that, in aggregate, market 
incomes do not adjust in any systematic and significant way to nullify
attempts at redistribution.55 On the other hand, there is a strong, statistically 
significant and negative relationship between redistribution and the post­
transfer level of inequality. In other words, countries such as Sweden which 
redistribute strongly through their transfer systems are in practice effective 
at reducing the level of inequality in disposable incomes.
It appears from these cross-country comparisons that transfer systems are 
effective in reducing income inequality, they are not nullified by counter­
acting changes in the dispersion of market incomes. In particular, I note that 
the amount of redistribution is a good indicator of the inequality of 
disposable income.
On the basis of this result, it is possible to define a partial ordering of LIS 
countries in terms of their effectiveness in reducing inequality. The criteria 
for the ranking are that a country has both a higher degree of redistribution 
(R) and a lower level of inequality in disposable income (G*). The relevant 
country groupings are shown in Diagram 7.3.
Sweden
Norway
Germany
=Netherlands, France, UK, Australia,
Canada, USA 
Switzerland
Sweden, Norway and Germany are unambiguously the most effective, in 
that order, in reducing inequality, whether one judges in terms of 
redistribution or inequality in disposable income.
The group of four countries shown next cannot be unambiguously ranked. 
The UK, for instance, achieves lower inequality (G*) but has less net 
redistribution (R) than France or the Netherlands; Australia has the lowest 
redistribution of the group, but achieves lower inequality than either France 
or the Netherlands.
Canada and the USA achieve substantially lower redistribution than the 
group of four placed above them in the rankings. (Strictly speaking, 
however, they should be grouped together because Canadian inequality is 
less than that for France; but the substantial gap in redistribution justifies 
ranking them below).
55 Micro-economic analysis might suggest, however, that micro-changes are significant.
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Finally, Sw itzerland is unam biguously  the least effective in reducing 
inequality.
7.2. Aggregate income and redistribution.
In this section I exam ine w hether income d istribution  is related to the 
income of a country, in particular, do richer countries have less inequality 
than poor countries a n d /o r  do they achieve more redistribution than poorer 
countries?
Two hypotheses m ight p red ict a relationship  betw een inequality  and 
income. First, reducing inequality m ight be seen as a Tuxury good', which 
only the well-off countries can afford. If so, we should expect to find a 
positive re la tionsh ip  betw een  aggregate incom e and the am ount of 
redistribution carried out. On the other hand, supply-side economists might 
argue that substantial income differentials are a necessary pre-condition for 
an economy to generate the appropriate incentives required for economic 
efficiency and grow th. In this case, we m ight expect to find a positive 
relationship  betw een post-transfer inequality  (a proxy for the level of 
economic incentives) and income (a proxy for economic efficiency). Income 
is approxim ated here by GDP per capita.56 Diagram 7.4 shows that there is 
virtually no relationship betw een a country 's wealth and the distribution of 
income in the LIS countries from the market. (R2= 0.06).
Diagram 7.4. Relationship between GDP per capita and pre-transfer inequality.
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56 Source: Summers and Heston, 1988.
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Post-transfer, Diagram 7.5 shows that this relationship remains virtually 
unchanged (R2= 0.09). We can conclude, therefore, that amongst the LIS 
countries, the aggregate income of a country does not predispose it to a more 
or less equal distribution of income whether we examine market or 
disposable incomes. There is little support here for the 'economic incentives' 
argument.
Diagram 7.5. Relationship between GDP per capita and post-transfer inequality.
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The amount of redistribution achieved does, however, have a slightly 
stronger relationship with GDP per capita. In contradiction to the 'luxury 
good' hypothesis, however, the relationship is weakly negative. That is, the 
poorer countries (eg :the UK) achieve larger redistributions than some of the 
richer countries (eg: the US and Canada). This relationship is shown in 
Diagram 7.6.
We can conclude that there is virtually no systematic relationship in the LIS 
sample between a country's wealth on the one hand and either inequality or 
redistribution on the other. It appears, therefore, that neither the 'economic 
incentives' nor the 'luxury good' arguments apply. Instead, it seems that a 
country's policy towards inequality and redistribution can be regarded as an 
autonomous policy decision.
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Diagram  7.6. Relationship betw een GDP per capita and net redistribution.
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7.3. The relative impact of benefits and taxes on income inequality.
Table 7.3 shows the Gini coefficients computed for the pre-transfer, post­
social security and post-tax distributions and the associated redistribution 
measures for the social security and taxation transfers. The same 
information is displayed graphically in Diagram 7.7, where the countries are 
ordered (from left to right) by decreasing size of net redistribution.
Table 73. Gini coefficients and estimated redistribution post- social security and taxes.
Gini Gini R edistrib 'n Gini Redistrib 'n
(pre-transfer) (post-soc seel (soc. seel (post-taxi (tax)
A ustra lia 0.4143 0.3359 0.1892 0.2872 0.1426
C anada 0.3865 0.3245 0.1605 0.2931 0.0899
France 0.4707 0.3435 0.2703 0.3065 0.1085
Germany 0.4066 0.2796 0.3125 0.2517 0.0946
N etherlands 0.4672 0.3291 0.2957 0.2932 0.1074
N orw ay 0.3848 0.2854 0.2583 0.2342 0.1682
Sweden 0.4168 0.2407 0.4225 0.1967 0.1829
Sw itzerland 0.4142 0.3574 0.1373 0.3355 0.0504
UK 0.3928 0.2933 0.2532 0.2638 0.0841
US 0.4252 0.3690 0.1322 0.3168 0.1307
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Diagram 7.7. Gini coefficients pre-transfer, post- social security and post-taxes.
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In Table 7.4 the countries are ranked from lesser to greater inequality at each 
stage of the income formation process. There is considerable change in ranks 
between the pre-transfer (market income) distribution and the post- social 
security (gross income) distributions; the rank correlation coefficient, r=0.49. 
The rank changes post-tax are minor, generally one rank switches and 
r=0.93.
Before examining these changes in detail, it is worth noting whether the LIS 
countries diverge or converge in the distribution of income during the 
transfer process. At the market income stage, the difference between the Gini 
coefficients of the top country (Norway) and the bottom (France) is .086, and 
the coefficient of variation (the sample standard deviation divided by the 
sample mean) is 7.2%. After social security transfers, the difference between 
the Gini coefficients for the top and bottom of the range increases to .128, 
coefficient of variation is 12.6%; and post-tax the range increases to .139, 
coefficient of variation is 15.0%.57
This indicates that while social security and taxation systems do reduce the 
level of inequality within each country, the amount of reduction achieved 
varies considerably across countries and has the effect of increasing the inter­
country differences in inequality.
57 Appendix G discusses the statistical significance of the inequality measures.
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Table 7.4. Ranks based on Gini coefficients pre- and post- transfers.
Rank Pre-transfer Gini Post- social security Gini Post-tax Gini
1 N orw ay .385 Sweden .241 Sweden .197
2 Canada .387 Germany .280 N orw ay .234
3 UK .393 N orw ay .285 Germany .252
4 Germany .407 UK .293 UK .264
5 Sw itzerland .414 Canada .325 A ustralia .287
6 A ustralia .414 N etherlands .329 Canada .293
7 Sweden .417 A ustralia .336 N etherlands .293
8 US .425 France .344 France .307
9 N etherlands .467 Sw itzerland .357 US .317
10 France .471 US .369 Sw itzerland .336
ran ge .086 .128 .139
coefficien t o f  
v a r ia t io n
7.19% 12.64% 14.97%
The next question of interest is whether it is the social security or the 
taxation system which has the greatest impact in reducing inequality. In 
principle, social security and taxation are alternative (or complementary) 
instruments for lowering inequality. For example, support to low income 
parents can be achieved either through child benefit payments or through 
child tax allowances.
In Table 7.5 the net redistribution effected by the total transfer system is 
shown in the first column (net R). The second column shows the 
redistribution which occurs between market and gross incomes, ie the 
redistributive effect of the social security system (R post-ss). The final 
column shows the redistribution which occurs between pre-tax income and 
disposable income, ie the redistributive effect of taxation (R post-tax). Note 
that the second and third columns do not sum to equal the first because they 
have different denominators.
Table 7.5. Redistributive effects of social security and taxation systems (%),
Sweden
N et R 
53 Sweden
R post-ss 
42 Sweden
R post-tax 
18
N orw ay 39 Germany 31 N orw ay 17
Germany 38 N etherlands 30 A ustralia 14
N etherlands 37 France 27 US 13
France 35 N orw ay 26 France 11
UK 33 UK 25 N etherlands 11
A ustralia 31 A ustralia 19 Germany 9
US 25 Canada 16 Canada 9
Canada 24 Sw itzerland 14 UK 8
Sw itzerland 19 US 13 Sw itzerland 5
158
While social security transfers have the greatest impact on inequality, there 
are several countries whose taxation systems generate a significant amount 
of the overall redistribution most notably, the US, Australia, Canada and 
Norway. In Table 7.6 the net redistribution is broken down into the 
proportions carried out by the social security and taxation instruments. The 
social security share of net redistribution (R to SS) is calculated as [(R post 
SS)/net R] and the taxation share (R to taxes) is calculated as [1 - (R to SS)]. In 
all countries except the US social security transfers account for more than 
60% of the net redistribution. In Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden the 
social security system is responsible for over 80% of the net redistribution.
Table 7.6. Percentage share of redistribution accruing to social security and taxation 
instruments.
R to SS R to taxes Net R
Australia 62 38 100
Canada 66 34 100
France 77 23 100
Germany 82 18 100
Netherlands 79 21 100
Norway 66 34 100
Sweden 80 20 100
Switzerland 72 28 100
UK 77 23 100
US 52 48 100
In gen era l, it is the cou n tries w h ich  ach ieve  the largest am ou n t o f
redistribution through social security transfers which are the most successful
in reducing income inequality. There is a positive correlation between Net R 
and R to SS, the simple correlation coefficient is r=0.54. An important 
exception to this relationship is Norway, which is ranked 2nd both in terms 
of amount of redistribution achieved and post-tax inequality. Unlike the 
other countries which are most effective in reducing inequality, Norway 
achieves sizeable redistribution through its tax instruments.
It appears, therefore, that although social security is the principal instrument 
for reducing inequality taxation can play an important and independent 
role.
7.4. The determinants of redistribution.
In the previous sections I have discounted the effects of the initial market 
distribution of incomes and the aggregate wealth of a country in explaining 
the post-transfer outcome (ie the measured level of income inequality). In 
this section, I examine the relationship between the am ount of
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redistribution (R) achieved by the social security and taxation systems and 
two characteristics of these instruments, namely the progressivity of the 
instrument (P), and the average incidence of benefits and taxes for the 
income unit (E). The section also examines the relationship between 
progressivity, average incidence of benefits and taxes and net redistribution. 
The variables to be analysed are set out in Table 7.7.
In Section 6.1 I noted that Kakwani's measure of redistribution (R) is a 
product of the progressivity of the transfer instrument (P) and the amount 
of inputs to the instrument (E). Multiple regressions have been carried out 
to determine how strong this relationship is for each instrument, and also 
which variable most strongly determines the level of redistribution.
Table 7.7♦ Kakwani indices of progressivity, average incidence and redistribution.
P-SS E-SS R-SS P-Tax E-Tax R-Tax R -Net
A ustralia 0.946 0.099 0.189 0.180 0.216 0.143 0.31
Canada 0.772 0.097 0.161 0.175 0.152 0.090 0.24
France 0.919 0.248 0.270 0.398 0.087 0.109 0.35
Germany 0.919 0.200 0.313 0.148 0.238 0.095 0.38
N etherlands 0.896 0.239 0.296 0.084 0.337 0.107 0.37
N orw ay 0.906 0.148 0.258 0.160 0.254 0.168 0.39
Sweden 0.813 0.384 0.423 0.139 0.296 0.183 0.53
Sw itzerland 0.937 0.075 0.137 0.109 0.178 0.050 0.19
UK 0.654 0.203 0.253 0.142 0.169 0.084 0.33
US 0.860 0.084 0.132 0.198 0.210 0.131 0.25
Nearly all of the variation in the redistribution accruing to social security 
transfers (Rss) can be explained by a linear regression on the progressivity of 
the social security system (Pss) and the average incidence of social security 
benefits (Ess). Comparison of the t-statistics (the coefficient estimate divided 
by its standard error) suggests that redistribution is mostly attributable to the 
volume of transfers rather than the progressivity of the transfer instrument 
as the summary of the regression equation demonstrates:
Rss= 0.005 + 0.09 Pss + 0.90 Ess R2= 0.91
0=0.8) 0=8.6)
On the taxation side, the amount of redistribution is less strongly related, in 
a linear regression, to P and E, In this case however the progressivity of the 
instrument has a stronger effect on the amount of redistribution achieved, 
although again not as strong as the effect of the volume of taxes. The 
resulting regression equation is:
Rtax= "0.077 + 0.39 Ptax + 0.59 Etax 
(t=2.3) 0=23)
R2= 0.56
160
A linear multiple regression explaining net redistribution indicates that it is 
most strongly influenced by the volume of transfers through the social 
security system followed by the volume of taxation transfers and, to a lesser 
extent, the progressivity of the taxation system. The effect of the 
progressivity of the social security system is virtually negligible and in fact 
appears weakly negative.
Rnet= 0.066 + 0.65 Ess + 0.71 Etax + 0.36 Ptax * 0.071 Pss R2 = 0.881 
0=2.8) 0=1.5) 0=1.0) 0=0.3)
With so few degrees of freedom (5) and the presence of multi-collinearity 
between explanatory variables, we cannot place much reliance on the 
individual coefficient estimates or their t-statistics. The overall regression 
equation is, however, statistically significant (the overall significance level is 
given by p=0.0156; adjusted R2 = 0.786). In other words, almost all of the 
variation in net redistribution is explained by the progressivity and volume 
of taxation and social security. But we cannot identify with any great 
certainty, the relative importance of these components. There is, however, 
some indication that it is differences in volume, particularly of social 
security transfers, which explain the greatest part of the differences which we 
observe in overall redistribution.
7.5. Summary.
The results presented here show that the social security and taxation systems 
in the LIS countries achieve reductions in inequality without causing 
systematic adjustments to market incomes. In addition, the level of 
redistribution achieved appears to be independent of aggregate income in 
these countries.
The LIS countries diverge substantially in terms of the level of measured 
inequality at each stage of the income formation process. While there is a 
general reduction in inequality in each country, the results suggest that there 
is considerable variation in the extent of policy commitment to inequality 
reduction - as opposed to poverty reduction - in these countries, as discussed 
in Chapter 1.
Chapter Eight
Inequality reduction in the LIS countries:
EFFICIENCY MEASURES.
Kakwani's methodology provides us with two direct measures of efficiency 
of the transfer system: the amount of re-ranking which occurs between 
equivalent income units (H) and the progressivity of the transfer system (P). 
These measures and their implications are examined in Section 8.1. The 
section also considers the relationship between these efficiency measures 
and the volume of transfers as expressed by the average incidence (E).
In Section 8.2, the cost-effectiveness of the transfer system is analysed by 
comparing the amount of redistribution achieved for each unit of benefits 
received and taxes paid (ie R/E).
8.1. Kakwani's efficiency indicators.
Table 8.1 shows the progressivity and re-ranking indices computed for the 
social security and taxation transfers. The table shows that in all countries 
the progressivity of the social security system is extremely high, around 
three to four times more progressive than the taxation system. This would 
be expected since in most countries the social security system is focused on 
lower income earners.
The amount of re-ranking is also higher in the social security system than in 
the taxation system and again this would be expected because of the much 
higher volume of transfers, and because of the more targeted (ie progressive) 
nature of the social security system. This aspect is considered later in this 
section.
The progressivity of the taxation system is similar in most of these countries 
except for the extremes of France with the highest P index and the 
Netherlands with the lowest. Although the degree of progressivity varies, 
the tax systems in these countries are all progressive, ie there are no 
negative indices which would indicate a regressive tax system. The rankings 
for each of these variables are shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.3.
Examining the efficiency measures on the social security side, we see that the 
top six countries have indices of 0.9 or better, with the US slightly behind on 
0.85. Countries such as Sweden, Canada and the UK which have a significant 
amount of transfers accruing across a wide range of income classes, as would 
be expected, have lower progressivity indices. As the VEE measures 
discussed in Chapter 5 suggested there is some relationship between 
countries which target either through income tests or category selection and
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efficiency measures, this observation is again supported by the progressivity 
index.55
Table 8.1. Kakwani's progressivity and re-ranking indices for social security and taxes.
P -S S H -S S P-T ax H -T a x
A u s tr a l ia 0.946 -0 .0155 0.180 -0 .005
C a n a d a 0.772 -0 .0157 0.175 -0 .008
France 0.919 -0 .118 0.398 -0 .002
G erm any 0.919 -0 .0643 0.148 -0 .072
N e th e r la n d s 0 .896 -0 .0739 0.084 -0 .023
N o r w a y 0.906 -0 .0454 0 .160 -0 .025
S w ed en 0.813 -0 .1185 0.139 -0 .060
S w itz e r la n d 0.937 -0.0211 0.109 -0 .017
U K 0.654 -0 .0276 0.142 -0 .016
U S 0.860 -0 .0248 0.198 -0 .013
Table 8.2. Post-social security ranks for progressivity, re-ranking, inddence and redistribution 
indices.
P-SS H-SS E-SS R -SS
A u s tr a l ia 0 .946 A u s tr a l ia -0 .015 S w ed en 0.384 S w ed en 42
S w itz e r la n d 0.937 C a n a d a -0 .016 France 0.248 G erm any 31
France 0.919 S w itz e r la n d -0.021 N e th e r la n d s 0.239 N e th e r la n d s 30
G erm any 0.919 U S -0 .025 U K 0.203 France 27
N o r w a y 0.906 U K -0.028 G erm any 0.200 N o r w a y 26
N e th e r la n d s 0 .896 N o r w a y -0 .045 N o r w a y 0.148 U K 25
U S 0.860 G erm any -0.064 A u s tr a lia 0 .099 A u s tr a l ia 19
S w e d e n 0.813 N e th e r la n d s -0 .074 C a n a d a 0.097 C a n a d a 16
C a n a d a 0.772 France -0 .120 U S 0.084 S w itz e r la n d 14
U K 0.654 S w ed en -0 .120 S w itz e r la n d 0.075 U S 13
Efficiency losses due to re-ranking vary considerably over the LIS countries. 
In Table 8.2 we see that, in the top six countries, less than 5 percentage points 
of the gross redistribution from social security transfers is lost through re­
ranking. In France and Sweden however, the efficiency loss decreases 
redistribution by 12 percentage points. For Sweden, this loss has a smaller 
impact on the redistributive effect of the social security system because of the 
volume of social security transfers (on average, 38% of family income is in 
the form of social security transfers). In the case of France however, this 
inefficiency strongly affects the redistributive performance of the social 
security system. Table 8.2 shows that the French social security system is both 
highly progressive and involves a large volume of transfers, yet its final 
redistributive impact is ranked 4th, below Germany and the Netherlands.
55 Chapter 9 directly compares the relationship between the poverty and inequality effidency 
measures.
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Both these countries have lower progressivity and transfer volumes but, 
most critically, lower efficiency losses due to re-ranking.
Analysis of the re-ranking measures show that there is virtually no 
relationship between the degree of progressivity in a system and the amount 
of re-ranking which takes place (R2=0.14). While Australia figures as the 
most efficient on both these criteria, it does not follow that high 
progressivity means less re-ranking. A case in point is the UK where, 
although progressivity is relatively low, the structure of the transfer 
instrument appears to ensure that very little re-ranking occurs (less than 3% 
loss of redistribution).
Table 8.3. Post-tax ranks for progressivity, re-ranking, inridence and redistribution indices.
France
P-Tax
0.398 France
H-Tax
-0.002 N etherlands
E-Tax
0.337 Sweden
R-tax
18
US 0.198 A ustra lia -0.005 Sweden 0.296 N orw ay 17
A ustra lia 0.180 C anada -0.008 N orw ay 0.254 A ustra lia 14
C anada 0.175 US -0.013 Germany 0.238 US 13
N orw ay 0.160 UK -0.016 A ustra lia 0.216 France 11
Germany 0.148 Sw itzerland -0.017 US 0.210 N etherlands 11
UK 0.142 N etherlands -0.023 Sw itzerland 0.178 Germany 9
Sweden 0.139 N orw ay -0.025 UK 0.169 C anada 9
Sw itzerland 0.109 Sweden -0.060 C anada 0.152 UK 8
N etherlands 0.084 Germany -0.072 France 0.087 Sw itzerland 5
On the taxation side (Table 8.3), the French taxation system stands out in 
terms of its high progressivity; as discussed in previous chapters this would 
be expected because of the structure of taxes which has a minimal impact on 
lower income earners. Because of the low volume of income which is 
transferred through the French taxation system, the redistribution accruing 
to taxes is only 11%. At the other extreme, the progressivity of the Dutch 
taxation system is nearest to a proportional system (ie when P=0), but 
because of the large volume of taxes, it achieves the same level of 
redistribution as the French taxation system.
As noted earlier, efficiency losses through the taxation system are lower than 
those of the social security system and generally do not affect the rankings 
expected from the combination of progressivity and volume. The exception 
to this is Germany where the efficiency loss does have a marked effect on the 
net redistributive impact of taxes. This can be illustrated by comparing the 
German outcome with that of Norway. Table 8.3 shows that Norway and 
Germany are adjacent in ranks on the progressivity and volume measures 
(separated by just over 1% in absolute terms), on the final redistribution
however they are separated by four ranks and a difference of 8% in the 
amount of redistribution. The source of the disparity in outcomes is the 
level of re-ranking, where the efficiency loss for Germany is 5% higher than 
that of Norway.
In Chapter 5 I noted that government policy may consciously encourage 
certain forms of "inefficiency" in order to achieve desirable outcomes for 
some groups in the population and that this should be borne in mind in 
drawing conclusions about efficiency measures generally. This is also true of 
the progressivity measures described above, but not of the re-ranking ('leap­
frogging') measures.
The 'leap-frogging' of equivalent income units - which is reflected in the 
level of H - apart from decreasing the net redistributive effort, has two other 
undesirable features. First, because transfers are not 'cost-less' the 
expenditure required to effect redistributions which cause income units to 
merely exchange places without any addition to welfare represents a dead­
weight loss. Second, these inefficiencies engender unequal treatment 
between equal units, especially on the boundaries of transfer programs (eg: 
where pre-transfer poor families may leap-frog near-poor families who are 
ineligible for transfers). In the long-run, this may have disincentive effects 
for families on the boundaries of these systems for example, substituting 
leisure for labour. A full discussion of this issue is found in Plotnick and 
Skidmore (1975:154-158.) Most governments are aware of the problem of 
leap-frogging and attempt to structure their transfer instruments to avoid 
such problems.
Apart from the ability to structure the transfer instruments to avoid leap­
frogging, we can observe in the LIS data a strong relationship between the 
volume of transfers, the progressivity of the instrument and the amount of 
leap-frogging. On the social security side, the relationship is very strong as 
the following regression equation demonstrates:
Hss= 0.142 - 0.39 Ess - 0.15 Pss R2=0.89 
(t=7.6) (t=2.6)
Leap-frogging (H) is measured as a negative number, so we should interpret 
the negative coefficients to imply that the more progressive is the transfer 
system, and the greater the volume of transfers, the greater the amount of 
leap-frogging we can expect to observe. The volume of social security 
transfers appears to be the dominant explanatory variable. On the taxation 
side this relationship is far weaker (R2=0.31).
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8.2. The cost-effectiveness of the income transfer system.
In Table 8.4 the cost-effectiveness ratios have been calculated by dividing the 
net redistribution achieved by each transfer instrument by the average 
incidence of the transfer. This measure indicates the percentage reduction in 
the Gini coefficient which is achieved for each percentage point of GDP 
devoted to social security or taxation. We see that in the case of social 
security transfers, the Australian system is most cost-effective, achieving 
nearly a 2% redistribution for each percentage of transfer income accruing to 
family income. This is closely followed by Switzerland, Norway, Canada, US 
and Germany. In the remaining countries the ratio is just over 1:1.
On the taxation side, France again stands out, but the usual caveats apply. In 
general the taxation systems are not as cost-effective as social security in 
terms of achieving redistribution, in themselves, ie other than as a source of 
revenue for direct transfers. This finding reflects the lower progressivity of 
the taxation systems in comparison with the social security systems.
Table 8.4. Cost-effectiveness ratios for the sorial security and taxation systems.
R/E-SS R/E-Tax
Australia 1.9 France 1.2
Switzerland 1.8 Norway 0.7
Norway 1.7 Australia 0.7
Canada 1.7 US 0.6
US 1.6 Sweden 0.6
Germany 1.6 Canada 0.6
UK 1.2 UK 0.5
Netherlands 1.2 Germany 0.4
Sweden 1.1 Netherlands 0.3
France 1.1 Switzerland 0.3
8.3. Summary.
The analysis presented in this chapter highlights the diversity of policy 
approaches adopted in the LIS countries in terms of the volume of transfers 
and the progressivity of the instruments which distribute these transfers. 
For example, Sweden and Australia stand out as systems which have 
radically different approaches to combining these characteristics. On the one 
hand, the Swedish transfer system combines high volumes of transfers with 
low progressivity; while on the other, the Australian system combines 
much lower volumes with much higher progressivity. In Chapter 9, I 
consider the implications of these very different approaches in the context of 
the outcomes of the transfer process.
C h a pter  N in e
T h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  th e  r ed istr ib u tiv e
STRATEGIES OF THE LIS COUNTRIES.
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This chapter draws together the empirical findings of the study reported in 
Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8. Section 9.1 summarises and ranks countries on the 
basis of their effectiveness in alleviating poverty and reducing income 
inequality. The section also examines whether there is any relationship 
between the two policy aims as reflected in the outcomes. In other words, is 
the extent to which poverty is alleviated in these countries related to 
reductions in income inequality, and vice versa?
In Section 9.2 effectiveness is considered from another perspective: how 
balanced is poverty and inequality reduction? Are the reductions achieved 
confined to specific groups or effective across a range of families?
Section 9.3 focuses on the efficiency of the transfer systems in aggregate and 
its social security and taxation components. There are two points of interest 
here: first, from a methodological perspective I compare the Beckerman and 
Kakwani measures in order to establish how closely related the VEE and 
spillover measures are to the progressivity and leap-frogging measures. 
Second, the section poses a similar question to that raised in Section 9.1 ie 
does efficiency in poverty reduction have any relationship to efficiency in 
inequality reduction?
Related to this last question, is the issue of cost-effectiveness, which is 
discussed in Section 9.4. Here the poverty reduction efficiency measure 
(PRE) is compared to the amount of redistribution achieved per unit of 
transfer to assess whether cost-effectiveness in meeting one aim of policy 
has any bearing on the other.
Section 9.5 considers whether there is any trade-off between the efficiency 
and effectiveness policy goals. Here a number of issues are raised, for 
example does poor targeting, leap-frogging and so on, affect the eventual 
outcomes as reflected in the effectiveness measures? Or do systems require 
certain "inefficiencies" in order to be effective?
9.1. Aggregate effectiveness of income transfers.
This section examines whether those countries which are most (least) 
successful in reducing inequality are also the most (least) successful at 
reducing poverty. The two objectives are clearly related since a reduction in 
poverty will almost certainly compress the lower end of the income 
distribution and hence lead to a reduction in inequality. On the other hand, 
policies which reduce inequality primarily through transfers within and
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between the middle and upper ends of the income distribution will not 
affect poverty. So countries can attach differing weights to the twin 
objectives of poverty alleviation and inequality reduction.
I compare poverty and inequality effectiveness through two sets of 
measures. First, examining the post-transfer outcomes. Second, comparing 
the proportional reduction of poverty with the proportional reduction in 
inequality.
Table 9.1 summarises the rankings of countries at the 50% poverty interval 
for each of the outcome measures derived in Chapters 4 and 7: the poverty 
head-count, the poverty gap and the Gini coefficient.
Table 9.1. Post-transfer effectiveness rankings, 50% poverty interval OECD scale.
H ead -co u n t P o v e rty  gap G in i
R an k % fam ilies % GD P co effic ien t
1 N o rw a y  5.3 U K  0.2 S w ed en  0.1967
2 S w ed en  5.6 S w ed en  0.4 N o rw a y  0.2342
3 G erm an y  6.8 N o rw a y  0.5 G erm an y  0.2517
4 N e th e r la n d s  7.0 G erm any  0.6 U K  0.2638
5 F rance  7.9 A u s t r a l ia  0.9 A u s t r a l ia  0.2872
6 U K  8.2 F rance  1.0 C a n a d a  0.2931
7 A u s t r a l ia  10.3 S w itz e r la n d  1.2 • N e th e r la n d s  0.2932
8 S w itz e r la n d  11.0 C a n a d a  1.3 F rance  0.3065
9 C a n a d a  12.5 N e th e r la n d s  1.4 U S A  0.3168
10 U S A  17.0 U S A  2.3 S w itz e r la n d  0.3355
The two notable differences in rankings between the head-count and gap 
measures are the UK and the Netherlands. The large rank changes in these 
countries reflect the issue raised by Beckerman (discussed in Chapter 5) 
concerning the choice in policy approach to poverty alleviation, ie whether 
governments aim to maximise the number of units lifted out of poverty or 
to minimise the size of the poverty gap. In Chapter 4 I discussed the disparity 
between the head-count and poverty gap measures. I argued that - in the 
context of cross-national comparisons - the head-count is a less robust 
measure than the poverty gap and may give a misleading picture of the 
magnitude of poverty which remains post-transfer. For this reason, the 
following comparisons between poverty reduction and inequality reduction 
focus on the relationship between poverty gaps and Gini coefficients.
Moving across the table and comparing the post-transfer poverty gap with 
the post-transfer Gini coefficient we see some clear policy choices emerging 
with respect to emphasis on poverty alleviation versus reduction in 
inequality. Countries where the emphasis in poverty reduction appears to 
have least effect on the income distribution are the UK, Switzerland and
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France. On the other hand, while the poverty gap in the Netherlands is the 
second highest in this group of countries, it moves up several ranks on the 
inequality measures.
The final outcomes analysed above are, of course, influenced by the pre­
transfer distribution. So the emphasis of policy may be best gauged from the 
rankings of each country in terms of the pre- and post- transfer reductions in 
the head-count, poverty gap and Gini coefficient (ie net redistribution). 
These are summarised in Table 9.2.
Using this measure we see a clear dominance of the anti-poverty policy 
focus in the UK as it drops ranks from 1st to 6th place in terms of the 
reduction in the poverty gap as opposed to inequality.59
Sweden, Norway and Germany, achieve high degrees of effectiveness 
whether one focuses on poverty or inequality suggesting that both these 
goals are pursued actively in these countries.
Table 9.2. Post-transfer percentage reduction and redistribution rankings.
R ank R ed u ction  in  h ea d -co u n t R ed u ction  in  p o v erty  ea p N e t red istr ib u tio n
1 S w ed en 85 U K 93 S w ed en 53
2 N o r w a y 83 S w ed en 91 N o r w a y 39
3 G erm any 78 G erm any 91 G erm any 38
4 France 78 N o r w a y 90 N e th e r la n d s 37
5 N e th e r la n d s 78 France 85 France 35
6 U K 73 A u s tr a lia 79 U K 33
7 A u s tr a l ia 63 N e th e r la n d s 79 A u s tr a l ia 31
8 S w itz e r la n d 55 S w itz e r la n d 75 U S A 25
9 C a n a d a 50 C a n a d a 70 C a n a d a 24
10 U S A 37 U S A 60 S w itz e r la n d 19
In the Netherlands the goal of reducing inequality also appears to be 
pursued actively, although the size of the reduction in the head-count 
versus the poverty gap suggests that this may be at the cost of some groups 
remaining well below the poverty line.60
In France both the rankings on poverty alleviation and inequality reduction 
are similar and suggest that the success in poverty alleviation reduction may 
be closely linked to redistribution. The main evidence for this is the size of 
the reduction in the head-count. To a certain extent this is also true of
59 It should be stressed again that the Gini coefficient may disguise the effectiveness of some systems 
at the lower end of the redistribution and thus the comments here are intended to be broadly indicative 
rather than absolute judgements.
60 This result does not take account of the possibility of intra-family transfers to some single adults, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.
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Australia, although it is less effective in reducing both the number of 
families in poverty and the poverty gap, resulting in a lower reduction in 
inequality.
In Switzerland, Canada and the US the income transfer systems appear to be 
moderately effective in reducing poverty and have very little impact on 
income inequality. This is particularly true of Switzerland whose transfer 
system has the least impact on income inequality.
How close is the relationship between the poverty and inequality 
effectiveness measures? Using the poverty gap as the preferred effectiveness 
measure for the poverty side of the picture, Diagrams 9.1 and 9.2 plot the 
aggregate outcome and reduction measures of effectiveness.
In Diagram 9.1 the OLS regression of the two outcome measures shows that 
there is a moderately strong positive relationship between poverty gap and 
inequality reduction (R2=0.51). In other words, countries which achieve low 
inequality, on average, substantially close the poverty gap. We can identify 
three distinctive groups of countries. First, a group of Northern European 
countries - Sweden, Norway, Germany and the UK - which achieve both low 
poverty gaps and low inequality. Second, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia 
and France achieve moderate levels on both measures. Third, the US and 
Switzerland which have large post-transfer poverty gaps and/or levels of 
inequality.
Diagram 9.1. Post-transfer poverty and inequality measures, 50% poverty interval OECD 
scale.
Post­
transfer
gap
(GDP %)
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There are, however, important differences of emphasis within some of these 
groups. A country which lies substantially below the regression line in 
Diagram 9.1 can be judged to have relatively greater emphasis on poverty 
reduction compared with inequality reduction, and vice versa for countries 
which lie substantially above the line. Within the first group we observe 
that the UK appears to be relatively more successful in lowering the poverty 
gap, whereas in Sweden, the emphasis is on lowering inequality. Within the 
middle group, the variations in emphasis are relatively minor. Within the 
third group we observe a strong difference in emphasis: the US has a large 
poverty gap relative to the degree of inequality, whereas Switzerland 
exhibits the highest level of post-transfer inequality but a lower poverty gap.
The reduction measures - the proportional reduction in poverty and the 
proportional reduction in the Gini coefficient resulting from the combined 
effects of social security and taxation - show a similar moderately strong 
positive relationship (R2= 0.50). The groupings of countries observed in 
Diagram 9.2 are similar to those identified in terms of post-transfer 
outcomes (noting that in this diagram it is the countries furthest from the 
origin which are the most effective). The Northern European group which 
achieves the lowest poverty rates and the lowest inequality are also the 
countries which have the greatest proportional reduction in both measures. 
The relative emphasis on poverty versus inequality reduction also appears 
to be the same, with the UK system emphasising poverty reduction whilst 
the Swedish system emphasises inequality reduction.
Diagram 9.2. Post-transfer reduction measures, 50% poverty interval OECD scale.
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France, Australia and the Netherlands are again in the middle group in 
terms of effectiveness on both measures, although the Netherlands appears 
to place relatively more emphasis on inequality reduction (net 
redistribution). Using the proportional reduction measure of effectiveness, 
Canada now appears to belong to the group of least effective countries. We 
observe again that the Swiss system emphasises poverty reduction and the 
US system emphasises inequality reduction.
Taken together, diagrams 9.1 and 9.2 provide a fairly robust ranking of 
groups of countries in terms of effectiveness in terms of the twin aims of 
poverty and inequality reduction. At the same time, we can see that some of 
these countries place relatively greater emphasis on one objective as 
opposed to the other.
9.2. Disaggregated effectiveness of income transfers.
In Section 4.6.2 I discussed the impact of transfers on the family types 
selected for analysis in this study. The analysis showed that it is aged 
families in all these systems which are least likely to remain in poverty post­
transfer whether measured by the head-count or poverty gap. Conversely, it 
is families with children whether headed by a couple or lone parent who are 
most likely to be in poverty. I nominated Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands 
and France as the countries which achieve the most balanced reductions in 
poverty across the range of family types and Australia, the US, Germany and 
Switzerland as having far less balance in their transfer systems. Canada and 
Norway are difficult to nominate as belonging to either group.
These results should be treated as only a cursory view of this issue although 
they do suggest that a fuller treatment of this issue is warranted: there is no 
doubt that the effectiveness of a transfer system should include an 
assessment of policy commitment to the total population. Such a study 
could usefully contrast the disaggregated head-count and poverty gap 
measures with a decomposition of inequality within and between different 
demographic groups using an approach such as that developed by Shorrocks.
9.3. Efficiency of income transfers.
In examining the efficiency of these systems both the net efficiency and the 
efficiency of the individual instruments (social security and taxation) are 
discussed. On the social security side we would expect, theoretically, the VEE 
and progressivity measures to be closely related. Both measures attempt to
convey a picture of the extent of vertical redistribution. That is, VEE 
measures the proportion of transfers which accrue to the pre-transfer poor 
and similarly the progressivity measure reflects the extent to which lower 
income earners receive a higher proportion of transfers than higher income 
earners. The OLS regression confirms the theoretical expectation (R2=0.89). 
Diagram 9.3 plots the relationship.
Diagram 9.3. Primary efficiency measures, 50% poverty interval OECD scale.
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The relationship between the spillover (which is a measure of inefficiency 
in relation to the objective of poverty alleviation) and losses to 
redistribution through re-ranking (which captures inefficiencies in relation 
to the objective of reducing inequality) would be expected, theoretically, to be 
weaker than that of the vertical efficiency measures. We would expect the 
relationship to hold along the boundaries of the transfer system where the 
spillover takes pre-transfer poor families above the poverty line to such an 
extent that they leap-frog families which may not be eligible for transfers on 
either an income or category basis. This will result in re-ranking. The re­
ranking measure however, will also capture the effects of universal transfers 
to non-poor families which meet certain categorical criteria irrespective of 
their income (eg: child benefits). These transfers in the Beckerman model 
are captured by the VEE measure.
The OLS regression partially confirms these expectations the correlation - 
(R2=0.79) - is slightly lower than that observed between the primary 
efficiency measures. The relationship between the secondary efficiency
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measures is plotted in Diagram 9.4. The two outliers in the diagram are 
France and the Netherlands. In the case of France, the combined measures 
are suggestive of boundary related inefficiencies ie the high levels of 
spillover for some families cause them to leap-frog non-transfer recipients 
causing significant re-ranking and a loss to social security redistribution of 
around 12%. In the case of the Netherlands, the spillover appears to have a 
moderate re-ranking effect.
Diagram 9.4. Secondary efficiency measures, 50% poverty interval OECD scale.
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On the taxation side, the relationship between the post-tax VEE and 
progressivity of tax measures is fairly weak (R2=0.31). This would be expected 
as the post-tax VEE measure incorporates efficiencies already achieved 
through the social security system. There is a slightly stronger relationship 
between the size of the clawback of social security transfers through the 
taxation system and the progressivity of taxes measure (R2=0.49). 
Interestingly, this relationship is inverse ie the higher the clawback, the less 
progressive is the taxation system. The size of the post-tax spillover and re­
ranking also shows no statistically significant relationship.
Comparing the net efficiency of the income transfer systems in reducing 
poverty and inequality poses some difficulties for the inequality side. The 
overall post-transfer PRE measure on the poverty side is the appropriate 
summary measure, but there is no counterpart summary measure for 
inequality. As a proxy for this, I have compared the net PRE with the four 
component efficiency measures ie Pss/ HSs, Ptax/ Htax arid find that there is a
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moderately strong relationship (R2=0.75). The resulting regression equation 
is:
PREnet = 45.4 + 0.20 Pss + 1-57 Hss - 0.12 P ^  + 0.83 Htax R2=0.75
(t=0.93) (t-22) (t=0.36) (t=0.67)
Although this regression explains three quarters of the variation in poverty 
reduction efficiency, since there are only ten observations there are only five 
degrees of freedom. The adjusted R2 is 0.54 and the probability level for the 
overall regression is 0.08. In other words, the relationship is not statistically 
significant at the five percent level. So I conclude that the relationship 
between efficiency in poverty reduction and efficiency in inequality 
reduction is not very strong. (See Appendix G for a discussion of the degrees 
of freedom problem raised here.)
9.4. Cost-effectiveness of the transfer system.
In Section 8.3 I estimated the cost-effectiveness of the social security and 
taxation systems by dividing the amount of redistribution (R) achieved in 
each system by the average incidence of the transfer (E). Here I compare 
these indices with the poverty reduction efficiency measures calculated in 
Chapter 5.
Diagram 9.5 plots the PRE and R/E index for the social security system. As 
shown, the relationship between the two measures is moderately strong and 
positive (R2=0.73). In other words, those countries which are cost effective in 
terms of reducing poverty through social security are also cost effective in 
terms of reducing inequality.
Inspection of diagram 9.5 reveals three distinct groups of countries in terms 
of their cost effectiveness in reducing both inequality and poverty. Australia 
stands out as the most cost effective in relation to both objectives. The US, 
Canada, Germany, Norway and Switzerland are moderately cost effective. 
France, the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden are unambiguously the least 
cost-effective.
The relationship on the taxation side between cost effectiveness in poverty 
reduction and cost effectiveness in inequality reduction, as would be 
expected shows virtually no relationship since the impact of taxes on 
poverty alleviation is small and negative. Because of this, the net 
comparisons have little meaning; the multiple regression of PREnet against 
R/Ess and R/Etax yields an R2=0.61.
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Diagram 9.5. Cost-effectiveness of social security in relation to the reduction of poverty and 
inequality, 50% poverty interval OECD scale.
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9.5. The relationship between efficiency and effectiveness.
Does the efficiency of a transfer system have any bearing on its effectiveness? 
This is a very important question for policy purposes. On the one hand, for a 
given level of welfare effort, those countries with a more efficient delivery 
system (with better targeting and appropriate levels of payment and 
taxation) will - by definition - be the more effective in reducing poverty or 
inequality. In this case, where welfare effort is given, we would expect to 
find a positive relationship between efficiency and effectiveness.
On the other hand, countries may only achieve efficiency by limiting their 
welfare payments to selected groups and to small amounts - achieving 
"efficiency through meanness". At the same time, countries which wish to 
be effective in reducing poverty and inequality may find it administratively 
and politically difficult to achieve these aims without spreading welfare 
payments more widely and generously. For instance, the middle classes 
might have to be "bought off" in order to gain their acceptance for an 
effective anti-poverty programme (Ringen,1987; Esping-Anderson,1990). In 
this case, we may expect to observe a negative relationship between 
efficiency and effectiveness.
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To investigate these questions I have compared the efficiency and 
effectiveness measures for the poverty and inequality analyses using simple 
regressions, the results are reported in Tables 9.3 and 9.4.
In terms of the poverty alleviation goal, each of the two measures of 
effectiveness, the post-transfer poverty gap (as a percentage of GDP) and the 
reduction in the poverty gap have been compared with the three efficiency 
measures ie VEE, Spillover and PRE. Note that these measures relate to the 
combined effects of the social security and taxation systems. The simple 
correlation coefficients, r, are reported in Table 9.3. (I report r because it 
shows whether the relationship is positive or negative; the R2 statistic is the 
square of r which must be positive).
Table 9.3. Correlation coefficients between poverty efficiency and effectiveness measures.
Post-transfer gap (r) Reduction in gap (r)
VEE -0.069 VEE 0.110
Spillover -0.224 Spillover 0.470
________________ PRE________ 0.198________________________ PRE________ -0.417_______
The post transfer gap is not significantly correlated with any of the efficiency 
measures. On the other hand, the proportional reduction in the poverty gap 
is weakly correlated with both spillover and poverty reduction efficiency 
(although the relationships are weak in a statistical sense, significant at only 
the 80 percent confidence level). Note that the correlation between poverty 
reduction and spillover is positive, but spillover is a measure of inefficiency, 
so this implies a negative relationship between efficiency and effectiveness.
Multiple regression analysis, not reported here, confirms these findings. 
This suggests that many of the theoretical arguments concerning the vices 
and virtues of universal versus income-tested systems in alleviating 
poverty may have very little basis in practice. It appears that it is possible for 
a system to be effective either with or without a high degree of efficiency. 
(This issue will be returned to in Part II where I review some of the 
commonly held views about alternative transfer instruments).
Diagram 9.6 illustrates the relationship between the principal measure of 
effectiveness (the proportional reduction in the poverty gap) and the 
principal measure of efficiency (poverty reduction efficiency).
Although the linear correlation between the variables is weak, there is some 
broad evidence for the existence of a trade-off between efficiency and 
effectiveness in relation to the goal of reducing poverty. The most effective
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systems, the UK, Sweden, Germany, Norway and France do tend to have 
lower efficiency than the less effective systems. This implies some weak 
support for the 'buying off the middle class' hypothesis or the 'efficiency 
through meanness' hypothesis. The exceptions to this rule, however, are 
very significant. Those countries lying above the regression line shown in 
Diagram 9.6 are relatively efficient given their level of poverty reduction, 
whereas those countries lying below the line are relatively inefficient.
Diagram 9.6. Reduction in poverty gap versus poverty reduction efficiency.
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It is particularly interesting to compare Australia and the Netherlands. 
These countries both achieve an 80 percent reduction in the poverty gap, 
about average for the LIS countries, but they are widely differing in their 
levels of efficiency. Australia is far and away the most efficient whilst the 
Netherlands is one of the least efficient.
The implication we can draw from this analysis is that there is substantial 
room for a well-targeted system to combine efficiency with effectiveness. 
There is no 'iron law' requiring effectiveness to go hand in hand with 
widespread, 'inefficient' welfare payments.
On the inequality side, the effectiveness measures, the post-transfer Gini 
coefficient (G*) and the net redistribution (Rnet) are compared with the 
progressivity and re-ranking measures for both the social security and 
taxation systems. (The efficiency measures in relation to the objective of 
reducing inequality have to be computed separately for social security and 
taxation). Table 9.4 shows the multiple regression statistic (R2) for these
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measures. Both regressions indicate that there is a moderately strong 
relationship between the two sets of measures.
Table 9.4. Multiple regression analysis of inequality effitiency and effectiveness measures.
Post-transfer Gini (Gh Net redistribution (Rnet)
P and H for social 0.61 0.75
_________ security and taxes_____________________________________________________
If we consider the efficiency-effectiveness trade-off for social security alone 
we find that there is a negative relationship. In other words, the more 
efficient systems, with less re-ranking and higher progressivity, tend to be 
those with lower proportional redistribution. The most significant 
relationship is between re-ranking (Hss) and proportional reduction in the 
Gini coefficient (Rss)- This relationship is illustrated in Diagram 9.7.
RSS = 0.332 - 0.22 Pss -1.92 Hss R2=0.75
(t=1.09) (t=4.15) adj. R2 = 0.63, p=0.012
Diagram 9.7. Reduction in Gini coefficient versus ineffidency due to re-ranking for social 
security.
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In the main, we observe a strong efficiency-effectiveness trade-off here in 
relation to inequality reduction through the social security system. This 
implies that the systems which are most effective in reducing inequality 
tend to be less progressive (although this tendency is weak) and they achieve 
their success through a high volume of transfers which have an almost 
inevitable consequence of a substantial degree of re-ranking. A notable
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exception is France which has an exceptionally high level of re-ranking but 
only achieves a moderate reduction in inequality.
On the taxation side, multiple and simple regression analysis reveal no 
relationship at all between efficiency and effectiveness in relation to 
inequality reduction. This implies that redistribution through the tax system 
can be effected either through progressivity and targeting (ie efficiency) or 
through volume, but that there is no systematic relationship between these 
two approaches.
The main empirical findings of this and the preceding chapters will be 
considered from a number of perspectives in Part II. For example, the 
outcomes of the transfer process will be compared with predictions based on 
the size of transfer expenditures, attempting to gauge whether 'more is 
better' when it comes to decreasing poverty and inequality. The variation in 
the balance between direct and indirect transfers in these systems is also 
considered and the relationship between this balance and the outcomes are 
analysed and discussed.
Many typologies of welfare states base their characterisations of different 
welfare states on the characteristics of the income transfer systems, generally 
using the characteristics of the social security system, rather than those of the 
taxation system. Part II will examine the assumptions which under-pin 
these typologies to determine whether there is any consistent relationship 
between different systems and their outcomes. The empirical evidence is 
also contrasted with the claims made about the pros and cons of different 
approaches to the provision of income support and tests whether several 
key assumptions about regime types are justified.
PartII
M ic r o d a t a  s t u d ie s  a n d
COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY.
C h a p t e r  T e n
A  NEW PERSPECTIVE 
IN COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY?
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10.1. Comparing income transfer systems: an overview of the literature.
The existence of the LIS database presents researchers in the field of 
comparative social policy with a new perspective on evaluating and 
comparing income transfer systems. In a paper introducing the LIS database, 
Smeeding et al (1985a: 1) claim that a shift to cross-national studies using 
microdata will improve social policy analysis:
Over the past decade the use of household income survey data in 
policy analysis has increased dramatically. Today the capacity to 
describe the effects of existing policy and simulate the effects of 
changes in policy is well-established in most modem nations with 
elaborate welfare states. However, these analyses tend to be 
parochial except for the fact that the techniques are similar from 
country to country. The next step in improving policy analysis can 
come from moving to a cross-national focus using comparable income 
surveys in a number of countries. To this end, we have assembled a 
databank of income surveys that can be used by scholars and policy 
analysts to study the effects of different kinds of programs on 
poverty, income adequacy in retirement, and the distribution of 
economic well-being generally.
In this chapter I review those streams of the comparative social policy 
literature which are most closely related to the studies generated by the LIS 
microdata. The purpose of the review is to distinguish the perspective 
which studies based on microdata bring to the comparative social policy 
field; how the findings from such studies might influence the related 
streams of literature; and to assess whether, and in what respects, such 
studies might 'improve' policy analysis.
The comparison of income transfer systems can be approached in a number 
of ways, focusing on whole systems, particular programs or groups of 
beneficiaries. Studies may be concerned with issues as diverse as 
expenditures on programs, institutional history, characteristics of client 
groups, delivery mechanisms and so on. In addition to studies specifically 
concerned with income transfers, studies which are broadly concerned with 
the welfare state are also an important consideration here for two reasons. 
First, income transfer expenditures are the dominant component of social 
welfare expenditures in most OECD countries. In this respect, much which is 
written about the welfare state is closely associated with income transfer 
programs. Second, many comparative studies of the welfare state use the 
characteristics of the transfer system as a way of differentiating between types 
of welfare states.
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Therefore in surveying the literature three streams of studies can be 
distinguished. These can be divided into those studies which focus on the 
welfare state in general and those which focus specifically on social security 
programs (including the interaction between social security and taxation 
programs). This latter group can be further sub-divided into essentially 
descriptive comparisons of policies and policy instruments and those which 
examine the impact of policy. In this section I briefly describe the central 
concerns and methodologies adopted by each of these streams.
In Section 10.2 I examine how these streams are related to each other in 
terms of Hill and Bramley's production of welfare model. This model is 
used to characterise the concerns of each stream in relation to the transfer 
process; locate microdata based studies in relation to the literature; and as a 
vehicle for examining the limitations of each approach.
Section 10.3 sets out several areas where microdata studies may provide a 
useful addition to the knowledge gained from the existing literature and 
also raises issues which may need further consideration by comparative 
social policy analysts. The section sketches out several questions in these 
areas which then form the subject matter of Part II of the study.
10.1.1. Welfare state comparisons.
The first stream of literature which deals with welfare state programs in 
general, includes many studies which emphasise the role of social security 
programs. Within this stream two approaches are relevant to this 
discussion.
The first, which compares aggregate welfare expenditures, starts from the 
observation that there is considerable variation among OECD countries in 
the size of welfare expenditures, whether measured as a percentage of GDP, 
government spending or on a per capita basis. Two key questions arise from 
this observation: what are the determinants of these variations in 
expenditure? And what are the implications of greater/lesser expenditures 
for societal living standards, income distribution, equality, economic 
growth? These studies examine both the broad range of social welfare 
expenditures - that is social security transfers, social welfare services, 
education and health - as well as examining each of these sectors 
individually. Examples of these approaches are: Cutright (1965), Wilensky 
(1972), Castles (1982).
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A second approach is one which develops typologies of welfare states based 
on the broad characteristics of welfare programs. For example, whether 
program s are financed from general revenue or social insurance 
contributions; whether entitlement is universal or selective; whether a 
system provides a minimal level of benefits or is income replacing. Other 
studies seek to characterise welfare states based on larger goals of transfer 
programs for example poverty alleviation versus reducing inequality. 
Examples of this work are Titmuss (1958;1974;1976), Marshall (1975), Fumiss 
and Tilton (1977), Esping-Andersen (1989;1990).
10.1.2. Social security policy comparisons.
The second stream is that concerned specifically with social security policies. 
Much of this literature focuses on the detailed description of programs on a 
country-by-country basis, setting out the types of programs available, their 
operation, coverage, and method of financing. The descriptive material is 
usually organised around some systematic theme and is frequently 
accompanied by some historical background on the development of the 
system, its underlying philosophy, major changes in coverage and trends in 
recipient numbers and costs. Examples of this approach are Kamerman and 
Kahn (1978), Flora (1986a,b) and Dixon and Scheurell (1989).
A second group of studies within this stream provide detailed comparisons 
of a program (or set of programs) directed at a specific group of recipients. 
These studies compare the level of benefits available under the program in 
some standardised fashion and draw out implications about the standard of 
living of recipients relative to the rest of the community. The aim of such 
approaches (in the absence of incidence data) is to give hypothetical 
comparisons of the relative generosity of welfare states towards specific 
demographic groups. This approach is exemplified by Kaim-Caudle (1973), 
Bradshaw and Piachaud (1980), Kamerman and Kahn (1983) and the OECD 
(1978) annual studies of the tax-benefit position of a typical worker.61
10.1.3. Comparisons of the impact of transfer policies.
A third stream of the literature is distinguished by its use of survey data to 
compare the impact of social security and taxation policies on poverty
61 This series reports the theoretical tax/benefit position of wage earners of particular family types 
assuming they claim all benefits entitled to them and pay scheduled taxes.
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alleviation and income inequality. Early examples of this work include 
Cutright (1967), Lydall (1968), Sawyer (1976), and Beckerman (1979a,b). These 
early studies faced considerable difficulties because of the variation in the 
definition and measurement of income and taxation variables, or because 
they used secondary sources.
More recently, a second generation of impact studies based on the LIS data 
attempts to give a clearer picture of the incidence of transfers using highly 
comparable data to make direct comparisons of the income levels of various 
demographic groups at various stages of the transfer process. Like the 
existing literature, the focus of these studies may be both general and 
specific. At the general level, the earliest LIS studies provided a descriptive 
analysis of the impact of income transfer programs on poverty rates and 
income inequality measures (eg: O'Higgins et al,1985; Buhmann et al,1988). 
At the specific level, a number of studies focused on particular demographic 
groups such as the aged and families with children, attempting to assess the 
differential impacts of transfers on these groups in the LIS countries (eg: 
Smeeding et al,1985b,1989; Palme,1989). 62
10.2. The comparative literature and the "production" of welfare.
From this brief survey it is clear that there are many bases for comparing 
transfer systems. These involve a range of variables and employ a diverse 
set of methodologies and comparative criteria. One way of understanding 
how these streams of the literature are related is presented in Diagram 10.1. 
In this diagram I have again used Hill and Bramley's model of the 
production of welfare which was presented in Chapter 1. Using the same 
basic components of the model, but adapting these to the case of income 
transfer processes, we see that there is a clear division of the literature along 
the lines of the various elements which "produce" a welfare outcome in 
terms of disposable income.
One feature which stands out most strongly in the diagrammatic 
representation of the literature is the relative isolation of each stream of the 
literature from the others. This is a distinct difficulty when attempting to 
comprehend the large scale effects that follow from state intervention in
^2 At the time of writing most of these studies have been published as working papers by LIS. A full 
volume entitled Poverty. Inequality and the Distribution of Income in an International Context is 
forthcoming, edited by Smeeding, T et al.
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income distribution processes.63 It should be stressed that the intensive and 
detailed description and analyses in each area of the transfer process are a 
vital part of comprehending and comparing income transfer systems. 
However, the lack of linkages between each of these streams is also a critical 
issue.
Diagram 10.1. Comparing income transfers: a view of the literature .
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The division of the literature in many ways reflects a lack of data to provide 
an overview of how the various components of the transfer system work 
together to produce the desired goals of policy. In the absence of such data, 
the various streams of the literature have isolated the components of the 
transfer system in order to draw a fairly detailed picture in each area.
In addition, writers in each stream frequently attempt to generalise from 
that part of the transfer system with which they are concerned to the whole. 
In particular they attempt to convey either directly, or by implication, what 
sorts of outcomes we might expect from given levels of inputs, types of 
instruments used, the relative generosity of payments.
63 Although it should be noted that occasionally some authors may venture across several parts of the 
process.
Using the Hill and Bramley model it is quite clear that the perspective which 
microdata based studies bring to the comparative field is that of examining 
the outcomes of transfer policies. In that sense, such studies 'complete' the 
detailed view of the transfer process which authors in other parts of the 
process have presented.
Examining this division of the literature in detail I begin with the policy 
component, here the archetypal studies are descriptive discussions of 
transfer policies such as Flora's four volume work on the welfare states of 
Europe. Here also are similar works on taxation such as the OECD and 
McDaniel and Surrey surveys of taxation expenditures.
On the inputs side is the 'leaders' and 'laggards' literature described above in 
Section 10.1.1. As I noted earlier, the concerns of writers in this stream are 
largely focused on explanations of why some welfare states spend more on 
welfare programs than others. However, there is also a normative element 
in this work which is inferred by the labels 'leaders' and 'laggards'. Part of the 
implication of this labelling is that 'more is better' -ie that expenditure levels 
will influence outcomes. Whether this is so is an issue which will be taken 
up by this study as it is clearly an area in which the LIS studies may confirm 
or deny such a relationship.
Studies which focus on the 'production' element are generally concerned 
with two levels of analysis. At a lower level, studies such as the OECDs 
tax/benefit position of a typical worker combines the interaction of market 
incomes, social security entitlements and tax structures, to give a theoretical 
outcome in terms of the disposable income of its typical worker.
Some writers may focus on the characteristics of the production to form part 
of a wider argument. For example, writers such as Esping-Andersen are 
concerned with the "production" element of transfer systems. Here the 
various instruments and the entitlement rules which welfare states employ 
to achieve their policy goals become a central means by which welfare states 
may be differentiated. Esping-Andersen rejects approaches such as the 
aggregate expenditure measures (which he calls the 'black box of 
expenditures') as a means of distinguishing welfare states in favour of 
unpacking more detail about how programs operate. He argues for a:
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... move away from the black box of expenditures towards the content 
of w elfare states: targeted versus universalistic program s, the 
conditions of eligibility, the quality of benefits and services and, 
perhaps m ost importantly, the extent to which em ploym ent and 
working life are encom passed in the state's extension of citizen  
rights.64
Because of a lack of detailed incidence data other writers have focused on the 
disaggregated outputs of transfer systems in the form of the level of benefits. 
These analyses compare the relative generosity of transfer payments, hoping 
as the aggregate studies do, that these will bear some relation to the eventual 
outcomes. Such studies like the aggregate expenditure analyses use these as a 
proxy for outcomes. However, as this study will show, the eventual 
outcomes are mediated by interaction with other parts of the transfer process 
for example, taxes and the actual incidence of the transfers.
Moving to the outcomes we see that the existence of a data set such as LIS 
does not automatically mean that these studies should take precedence over 
other types of studies. Focusing on outcomes in isolation from other parts of 
the process also has its problems. For example many writers who do report 
outcomes, do so in a fairly limited fashion. They arrive at a set of 
observations which compare what has happened in each country's transfer 
process without making clear how it has happened.
The potential for microdata to act as a link between the various stages of the 
income transfer process is considerable and this has partly been the reason 
for the approach adopted by this study, which has examined how the inputs 
are used by different instruments, the incidence of both direct and indirect 
transfers, and the final outcomes in the form of poverty and income 
inequality reduction. However it should be stressed that this supplements 
rather than supplants the other approaches discussed above.
In summary, microdata studies complement the analyses of other streams in 
the literature by supplying a means of comparing the outcomes of transfer 
policies with the expenditure, instrumental and financing aspects of these 
policies. These analyses represent a key means of assessing and comparing 
welfare states. While other streams of the literature provide useful criteria 
for comparative assessments, outcomes must be considered an important 
element that has long been missing from the literature. The LIS data has the 
potential for supplying information which links the findings from other
64 Esping-Andersen (1989:20).
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areas together; but this requires some considerable research to develop new 
theoretical models which comprehend all parts of the transfer process rather 
than attempting to generalise from the part to the whole which has been the 
practice in the past.
The review of the literature discussed above has identified some areas in 
which the analysis of the LIS data may contribute to further developments. 
The following section examines some of these issues.
10.3. New perspectives on old problems?
There are of course many issues to which the LIS data could potentially 
bring a useful perspective.The issues outlined here in brief, and studied in 
detail in the ensuing chapters, have no special claim or priority. The 
purpose is to demonstrate the spread of possible perspectives which the LIS 
data can provide.
To begin with some of the earliest literature in the comparative field, I 
examine the relationship between welfare effort (expenditure) and welfare 
outcomes. These parts of the income transfer process are the furthest apart, 
yet there are very strong and obvious theoretical links between the two. That 
is, we would expect the outcomes of income transfers to be strongly linked to 
inputs. However, we also know that there are many intervening variables 
between these parts of the transfer process which may influence the "straight 
line" effect of inputs. Part I of this study identifies variations in the role of 
taxation, the distributional and efficiency characteristics of the transfer 
systems in the LIS countries and how these influence the incidence of 
transfers. To complete this analysis, we need to link these findings to the 
larger picture.Thus Chapter 11 addresses the question: are welfare leaders/ 
laggards, in terms of aggregate expenditures, welfare leaders/laggards in 
terms of outcomes? Is it possible to use the microdata findings to improve 
the predictability of these measures in terms of expected outcomes?
In Chapter 12, the larger issue of the welfare state is considered. The chapter 
will focus on the typologies of welfare states which have been developed to 
characterise the different approaches to the provision of welfare among the 
OECD countries. Clearly the welfare state encompasses more than just 
income transfer programs, so this chapter is confined to describing a small 
part of the implications which microdata studies may have for the larger 
context of the literature. On the other hand, it is also important to note that 
many theorists in this field use the characteristics of direct income transfers
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as a means of developing these typologies. In this respect, the findings based 
on the LIS data may have greater significance. There are several questions 
which Chapter 12 will address. Are different welfare state types consistently 
associated with particular types of outcomes? Do these typologies adequately 
capture critical characteristics (as evidenced by the microdata) of transfer 
policy and policy instruments? Are these typologies sufficiently tolerant of 
alternative forms of welfare provision?
Chapter Eleven
Welfare 'effort' and welfare outcomes.
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In Chapter 10 I noted that there are several reasons why a "straight line" 
relationship between inputs to a transfer system and its outcomes may not 
hold. In this chapter I examine this relationship and the intervening 
variables in detail. To begin with, Section 11.1 discusses the problems with 
the aggregate social expenditures approach (also referred to in the literature 
as 'welfare effort') identified by other researchers as well as those identified 
in this study. The section also notes that there are several advantages of 
these types of measures which may suggest that such measures should be 
refined rather than rejected in favour of incidence based approaches.
In Section 11.2 I construct a conventional welfare effort table for the 
countries in this study and compare the welfare outcomes against the inputs 
or 'effort'.
Section 11.3 suggests a number of refinements which might improve such 
aggregate approaches and again tests these against the outcomes in order to 
draw conclusions about whether the predictive powers of aggregate 
measures can be improved.
11.1. A critique of conventional welfare effort approaches.
Conventional measures of welfare effort have been questioned by a number 
of writers as an acceptable means of comparing welfare states on two main 
grounds. In the first instance, Esping-Andersen (1989:19) rejects the welfare 
effort approach entirely and argues that the measurement of social 
expenditure is irrelevant and/or misleading:
By scoring welfare states on spending we assume that all spending 
counts equally. But, some welfare states, the Austrian for example, 
spend a large share on benefits to privileged civil servants... Some 
nations spend enormous sums on fiscal welfare in the form of tax 
privileges... that mainly benefit the middle classes. In Britain, total 
social expenditure has grown during the Thatcher period; yet, this is 
almost exclusively a function of very high unemployment. Low 
expenditures on some programs may signify a welfare state more 
seriously committed to full employment.
In rejecting this approach Esping-Andersen goes on to argue in favour of a 
more 'qualitative' approach to distinguishing welfare states via the 
comparison of program characteristics, eligibility conditions, quality of 
services. This approach is considered in Chapter 12.
Other writers such as Gilbert and Moon (1988) do not reject the welfare effort 
approach in its entirety, but argue that considerable care should be exercised
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in using such a measure. Their first point, which is similar to Esping- 
Andersen's, is that there is an implicit judgement built-in to this approach ie 
that 'more is better7 and that welfare effort measures do not distinguish how 
funds are expended nor whom they benefit. More importantly, they argue 
that it should be recognised that the theoretical equation of effort with 
outcomes may not hold empirically (1988:339):
The measure of welfare effort should not be confused with that of 
welfare outcome. Theoretically we would expect higher welfare 
efforts ... to result in higher welfare outcome (e.g., reduction of 
poverty and improvement of other social conditions.) But that 
remains an empirical question, which among other things depends 
upon the actual distribution of welfare benefits, how efficiently 
they are delivered, and their unanticipated consequences for the 
well being of recipients.
Having established grounds for caution, Gilbert and Moon go on to suggest a 
number of ways in which the welfare effort approach can be improved - by 
taking account of taxation expenditures, constructing indices of 'need' which 
can be compared with the level of welfare expenditures and so on.
These writers raise several questions which the LIS data may help to answer. 
First, should the aggregate expenditures approach be rejected? While both 
Esping-Andersen's and Gilbert and Moon's comments on the inherent 
weaknesses of expenditures as a means of comparing welfare states provide 
strong a priori reasons for doing so, it may be that such measures remain a 
useful proxy for outcomes. As I have suggested above, one test of this would 
be to compare welfare effort with the outcomes observed in the LIS data. If 
there is no strong relationship between these measures we could reasonably 
conclude that expenditure is not a good indicator of the level of 'welfare' 
which is generated by the transfer systems in the LIS countries and, by 
extension, welfare states generally.
Alternatively, we could take Gilbert and Moon's approach and attempt to 
improve the welfare effort measure. However, even if such improvements 
could be made are there grounds for attempting such a task? Heidenheimer 
et al (1990:18) suggest one reason which is particularly important in regard to 
income transfer programs:
For a variety of reasons ... income maintenance and taxation policies 
are subject to more direct and exclusive government control than any 
of the other three policies ...
They argue that unlike other welfare state programs such as education, 
housing and health, income maintenance programs may be more sensitive
198
to short term policy shifts, for example, in respect of taxation schedules, 
eligibility criteria and generosity of benefits. It is therefore possible that the 
incidence of taxes and transfers evident in the microdata in any given year 
may shift substantially over a two to three year period, whereas aggregate 
expenditure itself may remain fairly constant. This observation is an 
important one when considering the weight which should be attached to 
findings and conclusions based on microdata estimates.
An additional point in favour of aggregate data is that it is more readily 
available than microdata, covers more countries on a comparable basis and 
is collected more frequently. So even though analysis of welfare outcomes 
using microdata may be the preferred option, data availability may restrict us 
to using aggregate data for some countries in some years. If so, we may wish 
to know how good a prediction of outcomes the aggregate data can be 
expected to give.
If we accept that there remains a place in the literature for aggregate 
expenditure analyses, how might we attempt to improve such measures? Is 
it possible to combine the findings from microdata studies with aggregate 
measures to give a more accurate estimate of the level of welfare outcomes?
11.2. Should we reject the welfare effort approach?
The conventional measure of welfare effort expresses direct government 
outlays for social programs as a percentage of a country's gross domestic 
product. Direct welfare expenditures for each country are compiled by the 
OECD (1985) and comprise expenditures on: health, education, income 
transfers and social services.
On the basis of this measure, countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands 
are said to be 'leaders' in social welfare effort while the US, Australia and 
Japan are considered as 'laggards/65
In this section I confine the welfare effort measure to social security outlays 
as this is the closest measure of welfare 'inputs' against which to compare 
the outcomes observed in the LIS data. Social security is a dominant element 
of welfare expenditures, Castles and Dowrick (1990) report that social security 
expenditures comprised, on average, 53% of welfare spending amongst these
65 The terms ’leaders’ and ’laggards’ were first coined by Harold Wilensky (1972) and continues to be 
used by writers in comparative studies of welfare states.
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countries in 1980. In Table 11.1 'social security effort' is shown in two ways, 
as a percentage of GDP and on a per capita basis. The data has been drawn 
from an OECD series prepared by Varley (1986) and reflects only direct 
outlays on pensions and benefits, ie it does not include administrative or 
program delivery costs. Appendix D shows the full derivation of these 
estimates. The year chosen for comparison is 1980, which represents the 
approximate mid-point for the period over which the data was collected for 
the LIS countries in the first wave. The table also shows the percentage of 
total welfare outlays which is expended on social security.
Table 11.1. Sorial security effort in the LIS countries, 1980.___________________________
Social
Security/
GDP®
%
Social 
Security 
per capita 
1980 $US #
Social security 
expenditure as a 
percentage of total 
welfare expenditure, 
1980*
Australia 6.9 624 43.5
Canada 7.4 838 45.3
France 16.8 1597 58.0
Germany 16.4 1638 62.2
Netherlands 19.0 1836 61.5
Norway 11.0 1136 53.1
Sweden 16.2 1926 52.8
Switzerland 9.0 984 45.5
UK 9.3 771 50.9
USA 8.1 906 53.6
@ Source: Varley (1986)
# Converted to $US using purchasing power parities
* Source: Castles and Dowrick (1990)
Table 11.2 shows the rankings of the countries based on the two alternative 
measures of 'social security effort'. We see that although the rankings 
change between each measure, these changes are 'within group' changes, 
that is those in the top/bottom half of the table on the SS/GDP measure are 
re-ranked but remain in the top/bottom  half of the table on the SS/per 
capita measure.
Table 11.2. Ranking of countries by social security effort, 1980.
Country rank on SS/GDP
Netherlands
France
Germany
Sweden
Norway
1
2
3 >10%
4
5
Country rank on SS/per capita 
Sweden 1 
Netherlands 2
Germany 3 >$US1000 
France 4
_____ Norway 5____________
UK
Switzerland
US
Canada
Australia
6
7
8 < 10%
9
10
Switzerland
US
Canada
UK
Australia
6
7
8 <$US1000
9
10
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Comparing the rankings of the countries with several of the outcomes 
measures derived in Part I, Table 11.3 shows that apart from Sweden, 
Germany and to a lesser extent Canada, using aggregate per capita 
expenditures to predict outcomes would be highly misleading. Several 
countries - the UK, Norway and Australia - do considerably better than their 
aggregate expenditures would predict; while France, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the US all have a lower level of outcome than countries 
with lower expenditures.
A fuller analysis of these relationships is presented in Table 11.4 which 
reports the simple regression results for the various effort and outcomes 
measures. In each case, the R2 statistic between the effort measure and the 
outcome measure is reported. The statistical significance of this summary 
measure is discussed in Appendix G. In the simple regressions reported 
here, with ten observations and one explanatory variable, the value of R2 
must be greater than 0.4 for the linear relationship between the two 
variables to be significant at the 5% level (in other words, to be 95% 
confident that the relationship is not spurious). The value of R2 must lie 
between zero and one. It can be interpreted loosely as a measure of how well 
the explanatory variable (welfare effort) explains or predicts the dependent 
variable (welfare outcome).
Table 113. Comparison of social security effort and outcome measures by rank, 1980.
Social security/ Post-transfer head- Post-transfer Post-transfer Gini
Rank GDP count# povertv gap# coefficient
1 Netherlands 4 9 7
2 France 5 6 8
3 Germany 3 4 3
4 Sweden 2 2 1
5 Norway 1 3 2
6 UK 6 1 4
7 Switzerland 8 7 10
8 USA 10 10 9
9 Canada 9 8 6
10 Australia 7 5 5
# 50% poverty interval using OECD equivalence scale.
Table 11.4. Simple regressions, OR.2) between social security effort and outcomes measures.
Outcome measure SS/GDP SS/per capita
Post-transfer head-count 0.43 (-) 0.37 (-)
Reduction in head-count 0.51 0.43
Post-transfer poverty gap 0.05 (-) 0.03 (-)
Reduction in poverty gap 0.22 0.16
Post-transfer Gini coefficient 0.11 (-) 0.18 (-)
Net redistribution 0.44 0.51
Figures with a minus sign in brackets indicate an inverse relationship.
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The reg ress io n  analysis tends to confirm  the poor to m odera te  
correspondence in rankings observed in Table 11.3. The signs of the 
relationships between effort and outcomes are as we might expect. Negative 
re la tionsh ips betw een effort and post-transfer poverty  or post-transfer 
inequality  im ply that, on average, the high spending  countries tend to 
achieve lower poverty and inequality rates. Positive relationships between 
effort and the reduction m easures im ply that, on average, high spending 
does lead to g reater reduction  in  poverty  and  inequality . But these 
relationships are generally fairly weak w ith the exception of the reduction in 
the head-count and SS/GDP (R2=0.51, p=0.02); and  net redistribution and 
S S /per capita (R2=0.51, p=0.02). Note that while an R2 of 0.51 indicates a 
statistically significant relationship, it also im plies that 49 percent of the 
cross-country variation in welfare outcomes is still unexplained.
Part of the explanation for the absence of a particularly strong correlation 
betw een  expenditures and outcom es m ay be a ttribu ted  to the role of 
taxation. As the analysis in Chapter 7 shows, N orw ay and Australia achieve 
substantial redistribution through their taxation system s, while France and 
the N etherlands achieve less redistribu tion  via this instrum ent. We see 
from Table 11.3 that welfare outcomes for Norw ay, the UK and Australia are 
indeed better than their social security expenditures w ould imply and also 
tha t France, Sw itzerland and the N etherlands under-achieve in relation 
their expenditures.
As the Hill and Bramley model indicates, the com bination of the incidence 
of transfers, taxation and efficiency may supply a fuller picture of the inputs- 
outcom es relationship. This issue has also been picked up by G ilbert and 
M oon (1988) whose w ork attem pts to capture sim ilar considerations. In the 
follow ing section I examine w ays in w hich these m ight be added  to the 
welfare effort m easure to improve its predictions of welfare outcomes.
11.3. Can we improve the income transfer component of welfare effort 
measures?
Gilbert and Moon (1988) have suggested a num ber of ways in which welfare 
effort m easures can be im proved. W hile their w ork  refers to the larger 
question of total welfare expenditures (ie including education, health  and 
social services expenditure), in this section I adapt some of their suggestions 
to the income transfer context. A fuller discussion of Gilbert and M oon's 
work in the context of welfare expenditures is set out in Appendix E where I
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critically examine their arguments and and use the LIS data to augment the 
improvements they suggest.
Gilbert and Moon (1988) nominate four factors which should be taken into 
consideration when assessing the relationship between expenditures and 
outcomes. These are taxes, the distribution (or incidence) of benefits, the 
efficiency of expenditure and the level of pre-transfer "need". 
Improvements to effort measures based on these factors are considered 
below separately, and together, in order to establish how the social security 
component of welfare effort measures may be improved.
Why might we want to use the microdata in this way? Comparable 
microdata from LIS is only available for roughly one year in five, whereas 
aggregate data is available for most years. Would it be possible to factor in 
some of the observations from the LIS data (eg: clawback, efficiency, 
distributional measures) in order to adjust the aggregate expenditures to 
give a more reliable picture of these countries in between the survey years? 
If so, which of these adjustments would best improve the correlation 
between social security effort and the outcomes of the transfer process?
11.3.1. Accounting for taxes.
As noted in the Introduction to this study the social security and taxation 
systems interact and overlap in a number of important ways - social security 
payments may be subject to taxation; tax reliefs can be used to implement 
government policies and may often be substitutes for direct social security 
expenditures; and revenue which is foregone in the taxation system may 
affect the amount of funds available to governments and ultimately social 
security spending.
To account for the role of taxation two approaches may be taken. The first, 
suggested by Gilbert and Moon, is to estimate the level of tax expenditures in 
each country and add these to welfare expenditure to give a compound 
expenditure estimate. Tax expenditures are so-called since they represent the 
taxation revenue foregone by governments through the operation of 
deductions, concessions and rebates and are thus retained in household 
disposable income in much the same way as a direct benefit.
The rationale for including tax expenditures is as follows: two countries may 
make allowance for the cost of raising children, in country A such 
allowances may be paid in the form of a direct child benefit; in country B a
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tax deduction/concession/rebate may serve exactly the same purpose. Thus, 
to exclude these tax expenditures is to underestimate the true level of 
support country B gives to the raising of children.
There are two sources of this data, the primary source is an OECD (1984) 
document which was prepared using data from a survey in which member 
countries were asked to provide estimates of tax expenditures following a set 
of consistent definitions and guidelines. Not all countries responded to the 
OECD request and a second source, McDaniel and Surrey (1985), has been 
used to supplement the OECD data. The McDaniel and Surrey survey 
employed similar guidelines to those of the OECD. Two of the countries in 
this analysis, Norway and Switzerland were in neither survey.
A major problem with this approach, identified by a number of member 
countries in response to the OECD request was the difficulty in 
distinguishing between expenditures which are a part of the normal 
structure of the tax system and those which are additional expenditures to 
serve certain purposes.
To illustrate this point consider the following difference between the 
Australian and UK responses. The UK included as an 'expenditure' the 
Married Man's, Single Person's and Working Wives' Allowances. In effect 
the majority of these allowances are akin to the tax exempt area of income 
which operates in the Australian system, ie the first $5,000 before tax begins 
to be deducted.66 On the other hand, Australia reported only the Dependent 
Spouse and allied rebates, which are in addition to the tax exempt area. 
Notionally, part of the Married Man's Tax Allowance ie the difference 
between the single and married allowances is similar to the Dependent 
Spouse Rebate.
There is no clear cut way of adjusting for these differences; one could take 
the view that tax exempt areas in all countries are a form of tax expenditure 
and should be counted as such.67 Alternatively, they could be counted as 
part of the normal structure and not sufficiently explicit enough as a welfare 
policy, and therefore not included. The question becomes more difficult 
when comparing countries which do not have a tax exempt area but low 
marginal rates at low income levels.
66 In 1989-90 tax year.
67 These exemptions tend to be an important part of the tax structure in English speaking countries.
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For the purposes of this discussion I have taken the approach of not 
counting tax exempt areas as an explicit anti-poverty device, and included 
those expenditures (or part expenditures) which were defined by the OECD 
survey as reflecting some welfare or equity aim.
These expenditures have been added to the direct transfer expenditures 
shown above in Table 11.1. The resulting compound transfer expenditure 
(CTE) is calculated by CTE = SS + TE. The compound estimates are shown in 
Table 11.5 where they are again expressed both as a percentage of GDP and on 
a per capita basis. Where the tax expenditure data was not collected for 1980 
the figures have been adjusted using the CPI estimates reported by the OECD 
(1989).
I suggest that an alternative way of accounting for taxation is to use the 
estimates of the clawback of social security transfers calculated in Chapter 5. 
Recalling the discussion of Chapter 5, the clawback represents the portion of 
direct transfers which is reclaimed by the government through the taxation 
system. It is important to note that many of the large-spending welfare states 
reclaim a considerable proportion of their expenditures through the tax 
system. Conversely, some - but not all - of the smaller spenders reclaim 
proportionately smaller amounts of expenditure this way.
Since the clawback has the effect of reducing the amount of social security 
which finally accrues to the population, the most appropriate way of 
adjusting for this is to reduce the aggregate expenditure by the size of the 
clawback to give a net expenditure (NE) estimate. Thus, NE = SS - (SS x 
Clawback). These estimates are also shown in Table 11.5.68
The comparison of these adjustments (reported only for the proportion of 
GDP measures) with the outcome measures are shown in Tables 11.6 and 
11.7. We see that there is not much improvement in the correspondence 
between the expenditure and outcome measures. The R2 statistics shown in 
Table 11.8 for the relationship between welfare effort, measured by 
CTE/GDP, and welfare outcomes can be compared with the statistics shown 
in Table 11.4 where the welfare effort measure (SS/GDP) did not include tax 
expenditures. In general, the addition of tax expenditures produces only 
marginal improvement in the prediction of outcomes in terms of either 
poverty headcounts or of income inequality.
68 Appendix D shows the calculations of these estimates.
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Table 11.5. Estimating social security effort after taxes, 1980.
CTE/GDP
%
CTE/per capita 
1980 $US
NE/GDP
%
N E/per capita 
1980 $US
A ustralia 8.5 765 5.1 458
Canada 9.6 1087 4.9 559
France 17.1 1625 14.8 1410
Germany 16.8 1684 13.2 1322
N etherlands 23.1 2226 10.8 1041
Norway * * 7.9 812
Sweden 20.6 2443 9.3 1100
Switzerland * * 6.8 742
UK 10.3 897 5.9 486
USA 10.2 1140 6.3 703
* Tax expenditure data not available.
Table 11.6. Comparison of Cl'fc/GDP and outcome measures by rank, 1980.*
CTE/GDP
Post-transfer head- 
count#
Post-transfer 
povertv eap#
Post-transfer Gini 
coefficient
1 N etherlands 3 6 7
2 Sweden 1 2 1
3 France 4 5 8
4 Germany 2 3 2
5 UK 5 1 3
6 USA 8 8 6
7 Canada 7 7 5
8 Australia 6 4 4
* Tax expenditure data not available for Norway and Switzerland.
# 50% poverty interval using OECD equivalence scale.
Table 11,7. Comparison of NE/GDP and outcome measures by rank, 1980.
Net expenditure/ Post-transfer head- Post-transfer Post-transfer Gini
GDP covnt# povertv gap# coefficient
1 France 5 (i 8
2 Germany 3 41 3
3 Netherlands 4 c) 7
4 Sweden 2 r> 1
5 Norway 1 r5 2
6 Switzerland 8 r7 10
7 USA 10 10 9
8 UK 6 1L 4
9 Australia 7 c> 5
10 Canada 9 8 6
# 50% poverty interval using OECD equivalence scale.
Table 11.8. Simple regression results - CTE/GDP, NE/GDP and outcome measures.
Outcome measure CTE/per capita N E/per capita
Post-transfer head-count 0.48 (-) 0.27 (-)
Reduction in head-count 0.52* 0.35
Post-transfer poverty gap 0.03 (-) 0.03 (-)
Reduction in poverty gap 0.16 0.18
Post-transfer Gini coefficient 0.15 (-) 0.02 (-)
Net redistribution 0.55* 0.22
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There is no significant relationship between effort and poverty gap 
outcomes. The net expenditure adjustment is not as good as the CTE 
adjustment for the purpose of predicting outcomes.
To conclude, adjusting for taxes only slightly improves the relationship 
between aggregate expenditure and outcomes. In Chapter 9 I noted that 
many tax reliefs are regressive and therefore may provide less financial 
assistance to the poor than to other income groups. This is partly supported 
by the regression results - for example, the relationship between CTE and the 
poverty gap measure is weaker. On the other hand, the relationship between 
the Gini measures and welfare effort is strengthened by the addition of tax 
expenditures. The explanation for this may lie with the fact that the Gini is 
biased towards the median income ranges and therefore "middle class" tax 
reliefs such as superannuation deductions will show up here as an 
improvement to the income distribution.
11.3.2. Accounting for the distribution of transfers.
A second factor which Gilbert and Moon identify in the translation of effort 
to outcomes is the distribution of benefits. In Part I of this study I have 
identified two measures which reflect distributional aspects of income 
transfers. The first is the vertical expenditure efficiency (VEE) measure 
discussed in Chapter 5. This measure estimates the proportion of direct 
transfers which accrue to the pre-transfer poor population. While this 
measure does not give a full picture of the distribution of transfers, it is 
closely related to the outcomes, especially in respect of the low income 
population, in which we are interested.
A second measure is the progressivity index of benefits which was discussed 
in Chapter 8. This index reflects the distribution of benefits across the total 
population, in particular the extent to which the poorest income units 
receive a proportionally greater percentage of benefits and conversely, the 
richest receive lesser proportions. Ideally, the latter measure would be best 
used to adjust the aggregate expenditure measure, however it is not clear 
how this summary index could be used. Although it is worth noting that 
there is a strong relationship between the progressivity of social security 
transfers and VEE (R2=0.89) as discussed in Chapter 9.
The VEE measure on the other hand, has a more obvious usage which is 
similar to the use of the clawback. That is, aggregate expenditures could be
reduced to only that proportion which accrues to the poor and which may be 
said to be effective expenditure. In Table 11.9 Effective social security 
expenditures (ESS) have been calculated by: ESS = (SS x VEE).
In addition this measure could be further refined by taking account of the 
clawback of aggregate expenditures (NE) and then adjusting for the amount 
of the net expenditure which accrues to the pre-transfer poor. These effective 
net expenditures are also shown in Table 11.9 and have been calculated by: 
ENE = (NE x VEE).
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Table 11.9. Accounting for incidence of social security expenditures on poor population,. 1980.
E ffe c t iv e
S S /G D P
%
E ffe c t iv e  
S S /p e r  cap ita  
1980 $U S
E ffe c t iv e
N E /G D P
%
E ffe c t iv e  
N E /p e r  cap ita  
1980 $U S
A u s tr a l ia 4 .7 427 4 .6 414
C a n a d a 3.8 433 3 .7 417
France 11.6 1108 11.2 1066
G erm any 10.7 1067 10.4 1043
N e th e r la n d s 12.2 1175 9.3 899
N o r w a y 7.4 761 6 .8 703
S w ed en 10.0 1184 7.8 926
S w itz e r la n d 5 .7 622 5 .2 568
U K 4.1 341 4 .0 329
U S A 4.9 542 4 .7 528
Tables 11.10 and 11.11 compare the rankings of these two measures with the 
outcome measures. Again there is a poor correspondence between the ranks 
and this is confirmed by the regression measures shown in Table 11.12. The 
evidence from the regression results indicate that these adjusted measures 
of social security effort are even closely less related to outcomes than the 
unadjusted measures.
Table 11.10. Comparison of effective SS/GPP and outcome measures by rank, 1980.
E ffectiv e  so c ia l sec u r ity P ost-tran sfer  h ea d - P ost-tran sfer P ost-tran sfer  G in i
e x p e n d itu r e / G DP CQynt# p o v ertv  gap # c o e ff ic ie n t
1 N e th e r la n d s 4 9 7
2 France 5 6 8
3 G erm any 3 4 3
4 S w ed en 2 2 1
5 N o r w a y 1 3 2
6 S w itz e r la n d 8 7 10
7 U S A 10 10 9
8 A u str a lia 7 5 5
9 U K 6 1 4
10 C an ad a 9 8 6
# 50% p o v e r ty  in terva l u s in g  O E C D  eq u iv a len ce  sca le.
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Table 11.11. Comparison of effective NE/GDP and outcome measures by rank, 1980.
Effective net Post-transfer head- Post-transfer Post-transfer Gini
expenditure /GDP count# povertv gap# coefficient
1 France 5 6 8
2 Germany 3 4 3
3 N etherlands 4 9 7
4 Sweden 2 2 1
5 Norway 1 3 2
6 Switzerland 8 7 10
7 USA 10 10 9
8 Australia 7 5 5
9 UK 6 1 4
10 Canada 9 8 6
# 50% poverty interval using OECD equivalence scale.
Table 11.12. Simple regression results: R2 between effective SS/GDP or NE/GDP and outcome
measures.
Outcome m ^ p r ? Effective SS/GDP Effective ^ F ./G D P
Post-transfer head-count 039 (-) 0.34 (-)
Reduction in head-count 0.47 0.43
Post-transfer poverty gap 0.02 (-) 0.03 (-)
Reduction in poverty gap 0.17 0.19
Post-transfer Gini coefficient 0.07 (-) 0.04 (-)
Net redistribution 0.39 0.29
Figures with a minus sign in brackets indicate an inverse relationship.
11.3.3. Accounting for the efficiency of transfers.
The efficiency of transfers has been measured in two ways in Part I of the 
study. First in relation to the proportion of transfers which reduces the 
poverty gap, poverty reduction efficiency (PRE), and second in the loss to 
redistribution through re-ranking (H). Like the progressivity index the re­
ranking index is difficult to use in adjusting expenditures to reflect this 
aspect of efficiency. Therefore I use the PRE measure to adjust aggregate 
expenditures to reflect only that proportion which closes the poverty gap. 
Thus "efficient" social security expenditure is calculated by: Eff SS = (SS x 
PRE). These estimates are shown in Table 11.13.
In addition, I have also included taxation expenditures and estimated the 
efficiency of compound transfer expenditure (CTE), by adjusting CTE by the 
net PRE (ie post-tax). These estimates are also shown in Table 11.13.
The comparison of these measures and the outcomes are shown in Tables 
11.14 and 11.15. Again there is not any strong correspondence between the 
effort and outcome measures. However, it is worth noting that when 
efficiency is taken into consideration, the inter-country differences in
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Table 11.13. Accounting for the efficiency of social security expenditures, 1980.
Efficient
SS/GDP
%
Efficient 
SS/per capita 
1980 $US
Efficient
CTE/GDP
%
Efficient 
CTE/per capita 
1980 $US
A ustralia 3.6 323 5.9 534
Canada 2.9 324 5.5 620
France 5.7 548 6.6 629
Germany 5.9 593 7.5 749
N etherlands 5.2 501 10.9 1055
N orway 4.1 420 * *
Sweden 3.9 460 8.5 1011
Switzerland 3.7 402 * *
UK 3.0 247 5.6 452
USA 3.4 375 5.4 600
Tax expenditure data not available for Norway and Switzerland.
Table 11.14. Comparison of efficient SS/GDP and outcome measures by rank, 1980.
Efficient social security Post-transfer head- Post-transfer Post-transfer Gini
expenditure/ QDP count# povertv gap# coefficient
1 Germany 3 4 3
2 France 5 6 8
3 Netherlands 4 9 7
4 Norway 1 3 2
5 Sweden 2 2 1
6 Switzerland 8 7 10
7 Australia 7 5 5
8 USA 10 10 9
9 UK 6 1 4
10 Canada 9 8 6
# 50% poverty interval using OECD equivalence scale.
Table 11.15. Comparison of efficient CTE/GDP and outcome measures by rank, 1980.
Efficient CTE/ Post-transfer head- Post-transfer Post-transfer Gini
GDP <;ount# povertv eap# coefficient
1 Netherlands 3 6 7
2 Sweden 1 2 1
3 Germany 2 3 2
4 France 4 5 8
5 Australia 6 4 4
6 UK 5 1 3
7 Canada 7 7 5
8 USA 8 8 6
# 50% poverty interval using OECD equivalence scale.
Table 11.16. Simple regression results efficient SS and CTE/GDP and outcome measures.
Outcome measure Efficient SS/GDP Efficient CTE/GDP
Post-transfer head-count 0.25 (-) 0.39 (-)
Reduction in head-count 0.31 0.39
Post-transfer poverty gap 0.01 (-) 0.01 (-)
Reduction in poverty gap 0.13 0.09
Post-transfer Gini coefficient 0.01 (-) 0.10 (-)
Net redistribution 0.14 0.39
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expenditure are considerably compressed. For example in Table 11.1 the 
range for the unadjusted SS/per capita expenditure between Sweden and 
Australia is US $1302; adjusting for efficiency (ie the level of transfers 
accruing to the pre-transfer poor) the range between Germany and the UK in 
Table 11.13 is US $346.
The regression results shown in Table 11.16 indicate that the relationship 
between the efficiency adjusted expenditures and outcomes is weaker than 
that obtained with the original unadjusted expenditure measures. This 
evidence appears to suggest, rather surprisingly, that adjustment for 
efficiency criteria does not improve the predictability of welfare outcomes; 
but we shall see later that this apparent anomaly can be explained once we 
also take account of welfare need.
11.3.4. The relationship between aggregate expenditure and the level of pre-transfer "need".
A further refinement to the welfare effort measure suggested by Gilbert and 
Moon is one which takes into account the level of "need" to which the 
social welfare expenditure by governments is responding. They argue that 
current welfare effort measures may be misleading for a number of reasons - 
for example, they exclude demographic differences and wages and labour 
market policies which may act as alternatives to welfare policies. They cite 
the following example (Gilbert and Moon,1988:327):
Should a country with a relatively small elderly population be 
regarded as making an inferior welfare effort if they spend a lower 
proportion of their GDP on social security pensions than a country 
with substantially more elderly persons? What if the first country 
spent less as an overall percent of their GDP, but more per capita on 
the elderly?
In addition they argue that to compare expenditures without some 
adjustment for need assumes that the level of need is either equal among 
the countries being compared or irrelevant (Gilbert and Moon,1988:331):
... a meaningful analysis of differential welfare effort requires some 
fundamental estimate of need against which levels of expenditure 
can be assessed. To the extent that welfare effort implies an attempt 
to meet human needs through social provisions allocated outside of 
the market economy, a country with greater need would have to 
allocate a larger proportion of its resources to achieve a level of 
welfare equivalent to a country with a lesser magnitude of need.
If welfare efforts are made to achieve a desirable social condition, 
then to compare these efforts without reference to needs would 
convey the impression that needs are either equal among countries 
under comparison or are irrelevant to the social condition being 
sought.
The major difficulty for Gilbert and Moon is locating a variable which 
captures "need" for comparative purposes. Their preferred measure is pre­
transfer poverty rates, however, at the time of publication such measures 
were not available on a cross-national basis and they use instead a composite 
index of the demographic groups they considered most likely to be in need ie 
the aged, sole parents, number of dependent children.
In this section I adapt Gilbert and Moon's approach to the social security 
effort measures, using the pre-transfer head-count, poverty gap and Gini 
coefficient as proxies for the level of need being addressed by transfer 
expenditure. There is no immediately apparent way of adjusting 
expenditure for these measures of "need". I have therefore used multiple 
regression to analyse whether there is any relationship between aggregate 
expenditure and need on the one hand, and outcomes on the other. Later in 
the section I also incorporate some of the incidence and efficiency measures 
into the regressions.
Table 11.17. Simple regressions (R2) for expenditure and need, 1980.
Need measure SS/GDP
Pre-transfer head-count 0.66
Pre-transfer gap 0.40
Pre-transfer Gini coefficient 0.41
SS/per capita 
0.62 
0.30 
0.31
The simple regression shows that there is a positive relationship between 
the degree of pre-transfer need and levels of expenditure. This is most 
strongly evident in the relationship between the pre-transfer head-count 
and the level of expenditure.
If we incorporate the level of pre-transfer need into the relationship between 
expenditure and outcomes does a stronger picture emerge? Table 11.18 
reports the R2 statistics from multiple regressions where the dependent 
variable, an outcome measure, is regressed on social security expenditures 
plus the appropriate pre-transfer need measure (ie pre-transfer head-count, 
poverty gap and Gini coefficient).
The explanatory power of each regression is much improved by the addition 
of pre-transfer indicators of the level of need. Most of the regressions with
SS/GDP and pre-transfer need as explanatory variables are now statistically 
significant (with two explanatory variables and ten observations, the value 
of R2 must be at least 0.57 for the overall regression to be considered 
statistically significant at the 5% level - see appendix G). Comparing Table 
11.18 with Table 11.4 we can see that the addition of measures of need 
increases the explanatory power of the regressions by anywhere between ten 
percentage points, in the case of the head-count measures, and 50 percentage 
points in the regressions explaining post-transfer poverty gaps and post­
transfer Gini coefficients.
Table 11.18. Multiple regression of welfare outcomes on pre-transfer need and expenditure.
Post-transfer SS/per capita, SS/G DP,
outcome measure need (R2) need (R2)
Head-count 0.48 0.50
Head-count reduction 0.64 0.64
Poverty gap 0.41 05 7
Reduction in gap 0.37 0.57
Gini coefficient 0.67 0.67
Net redistribution 0.62 0.60
This evidence certainly supports the Gilbert and Moon argument that it is 
important to adjust welfare effort for the level of need. The regressions still 
leave unexplained, however, at least one third of the variation in the 
poverty and inequality related outcomes. These "unexplained" variations 
are, by definition, related to the relative efficiency of the various transfer 
systems. Roughly speaking, one can conclude from this analysis that 
efficiency considerations account for around 40% of the variation in welfare 
outcomes in the LIS countries; cross-country differences in welfare 
expenditures account for most of the remaining variation in the numbers of 
families in poverty and cross-country differences in pre-transfer inequality 
account for most of the variation in post-transfer inequality.
The contribution of efficiency considerations can be illustrated most clearly 
in the case of the poverty gap. We have seen from Table 11.18 that in a 
multiple regression social security expenditure and pre-transfer poverty 
together explain 57% of the post-transfer gap and also 57% of the reduction 
in the gap. Table 11.19 gives the full regression results when social security 
expenditures are adjusted for poverty reduction efficiency (to give efficient 
social security expenditure).
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Table 11.19. Multiple regression of the post-transfer poverty gap or poverty reduction on the 
pre-transfer gap and efficient social security expenditure.
Gap = -0.09 + 1.02 Pre-trans Gap - 0.99 Eff.SS/GDP R2=0.984
(t=20.3) (t=18.5) adjR2=0379 p<0.0001
Reduction = 87.3 - 16.5 Pre-trans Gap + 18.8 Eff.SS/GDP R2=0.964
0=12.8) (t=13.6) adjR2=0.954 p<0.0001
These regression results demonstrate that the efficiency adjustment to social 
security expenditures does indeed explain almost all of the residual 
variation in poverty gap reduction and outcomes. Whilst not claiming that 
efficiency measures are necessarily the most important in explaining welfare 
outcomes, this evidence certainly suggests that efficiency considerations are 
at least as important as either welfare expenditure or pre-transfer need.
A similarly high level of explanatory power in relation to inequality 
outcomes can be obtained by adding to the multiple regressions additional 
explanatory variables capturing the size of tax effort, the progressivity of 
social security and taxation respectively, and the degree of irineficient re­
ranking. These results are not reported here because the loss of degrees of 
freedom in such a small sample and the presence of collinearity between the 
explanatory variables obscures analysis of the detailed regression results. The 
same general point does, however, remain. Efficiency considerations are 
very important in explaining the inequality outcomes.
In conclusion, in addition to the theoretical objections raised by several 
writers, there appears to be only qualified empirical support for the use of 
aggregate expenditure approaches as an indicator of the welfare levels which 
transfer systems produce. There seems little doubt that in the LIS sample of 
countries welfare effort is not correlated very strongly with welfare outcome. 
Adjusting expenditures for either tax expenditures, tax clawback or targeting 
efficiency makes the income transfer effort of the LIS countries much more 
homogeneous, but on their own, none of these adjustments is sufficient to 
significantly improve the ability to predict welfare outcomes.69 On the other 
hand, adjusting for pre-transfer need (poverty or inequality) does improve 
the predictive power of these measures. But even effort adjusted for need
69 With the exception of tax expenditures which does improve the prediction of the net redistributive 
effects of transfers.
leaves unexplained around 40 percent of the variation amongst LIS 
countries in post-transfer poverty rates and inequality.
I noted at the outset that one reason why we might seek to improve these 
measures is that the availability of aggregate data, particularly on a cross­
national basis and in time series, is much greater than that of microdata. I 
have shown that adjusting social security effort by any one of the taxation, 
incidence or efficiency measures does very little to improve the correlations 
with transfer outcomes. It appears that the best approach to predicting the 
outcomes of expenditure would be to adjust for need. In general, this 
requires microdata however Gilbert and Moon (1988:331) suggest as a proxy, 
a composite index of unemployment levels, dependency ratios (ie the 
number of children and aged persons as a percentage of the workforce) and 
the percentage of sole parents as a means of reflecting the level of need in 
each country. The advantage of such an index is that the data can be obtained 
from a number of OECD publications and is available for most years.
The analysis presented here strongly supports the principles of Gilbert and 
Moon's work from the perspective of social security expenditure but it also 
indicates that even these 'need adjusted' measures of welfare effort are likely 
to be only moderately good predictors of welfare outcomes. In order to gain a 
complete picture of the production of welfare outcomes, we do need to 
analyse the efficiency with which transfer instruments translate welfare 
inputs into outputs.
In the following section I present summary case studies to illustrate the 
importance of combining analysis of efficiency considerations with analysis 
of both welfare expenditures and need in order to understand the welfare 
outcomes in the LIS countries.
11.4. Using the microdata to explain the gap between inputs and outcomes.
Of the countries examined here, only Sweden, Germany and Canada appear 
to have outcomes commensurate with their levels of expenditure. Below I 
examine some of the reasons why aggregate expenditures are poor predictors 
of the outcomes in the remaining countries.
11.4.1. Countries where expenditures under-estimate outcomes.
Australia spends the least of this group of countries, either in GDP or per 
capita terms, on social security. The level of pre-transfer need being 
addressed by this expenditure is close to, or slightly less than, some of the
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bigger spenders. Australia is ranked fourth lowest in terms of the pre- 
transfer head-count and gap and fifth in terms of pre-transfer inequality. 
While this level of expenditure is not commensurate with need, Australia's 
very high levels of transfer efficiency mean that it has an outcome some 
where in the middle to lower middle ranks. Target efficiency is the strongest 
explanation for its better than expected outcome. Australia is ranked the 
highest in terms of its poverty reduction efficiency (Chapter 5) and in terms 
of the progressivity of its social security system; it has the least loss to 
redistribution through re-ranking in social security transfers; and is ranked 
second to France in terms of progressivity of taxes and re-ranking losses 
through taxes.
The United Kingdom, like Australia, is at the bottom of this group in terms 
of expenditure (at least in per capita terms). Again, the UK has a much better 
than expected outcome. Here there are two explanations. First it is important 
to note that the UK starts from a much lower level of need than many 
countries. In terms of the pre-transfer Gini, the UK is ranked third lowest; it 
has the fourth lowest poverty head-count and the lowest aggregate poverty 
gap. Thus the initial level of need which its transfer expenditure must 
address is much lower than many other countries. In addition, the UK is in 
the middle of this group in terms of efficiency. Together, these factors 
produce the following outcomes - the UK is ranked sixth in terms of the 
head-count, first or second in terms of the poverty gap and fourth in terms 
of income inequality. Overall, it is the UKs starting position of a relatively 
more equal income distribution and low relative poverty which appears the 
most influential factor.
Norway is probably the country which aggregate expenditures most under­
estimate in terms of outcomes. It is ranked fifth in terms of expenditure, but 
the level of need which this expenditure addresses is much lower than 
many of the larger welfare states. It is has the lowest level of pre-transfer 
inequality, its is fifth in terms of its pre-transfer poverty gap, and fifth in 
terms of the head-count. Overall it has a level of expenditure commensurate 
with its level of need. However, its final outcomes (usually in the top two 
on most measures) are strongly influenced by its comparative efficiency for 
the level of expenditure, and the high degree of progressivity in its tax and 
social security systems both of which result in very little re-ranking. The 
other important point to note about Norway is that it achieves considerable 
amount of redistribution through its tax system.
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11.4.2. Countries where expenditures over-estimate outcomes.
While France is one of the highest spenders in this group, its level of need is 
the greatest among all these countries. On all pre-transfer measures, France 
is at the bottom of the table. Its level of expenditure in GDP terms appears 
appropriate (ranked second) to the size of the need being addressed; however 
converting to a per capita basis, France falls to fourth and this is clearly one 
factor in explaining its poor performance in comparison with lower 
spending countries. On an outcomes basis France ranks fifth in terms of the 
head-count, sixth in terms of the gap and eighth in terms of inequality. In 
addition to the inappropriate level of expenditure in relation to the size of 
need, there are other factors which worsen France's performance. I noted in 
Chapter 8 that there is considerable inefficiency in the French social security 
system with a large loss to potential redistribution occurring through re­
ranking (12%). This is particularly critical in the case of France (as opposed to 
Sweden for example) because it relies on the social security system to 
achieve 80% of its redistribution. The poor efficiency of the French system is 
also reflected in its overall poverty reduction efficiency which is the lowest 
of all these countries. The combination of the low starting point and poor 
efficiency of expenditure, means that France's apparently high level of 
welfare effort grossly over-estimates its outcomes.
The Netherlands, like France, starts from a position of great need, ranking 
ninth on all pre-transfer measures. Unlike France its expenditures are 
commensurate with this level of need, ranking first in SS/GDP terms and 
second in per capita terms. In outcome terms the Netherlands does well in 
terms of the head-count, but poorly in terms of the gap and inequality 
measures. A first point to note is that there are a significant number of 
persons reporting zero disposable incomes in this data. There may be some 
concern whether under-reporting of incomes may have biased the results 
for the Netherlands however, even if these persons are excluded from the 
head-count it does not change the rankings significantly. How do we explain 
the Netherlands position? While the Netherlands is a big spender it is also a 
big taxer. Of all the LIS countries, the Netherlands claws-back the highest 
amount of social security expenditure from recipients (43%) thus the size of 
the welfare effort being made which is apparent in the aggregate measures is 
considerably reduced once taxes are taken into account. A critical point to 
remember is that this is for a country which starts with a high level of need. 
This is also not helped by poor efficiency, the Netherlands is ranked 7th in
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terms of poverty reduction efficiency and loses the third highest amount of 
redistribution accruing to social security to re-ranking effects. The most 
important factor in explaining the disparity between expenditure and 
outcomes for the Netherlands appears to be the size of the tax clawback.
The level of need which Swiss income transfers address is about 
commensurate with its effort. It is ranked 6th or 7th in terms of effort and 
while it starts with the lowest pre-transfer head-count, it is ranked, 
respectively, 6th and 5th on the gap and Gini. In outcome terms Switzerland 
is in 8th place on the head-count; 7th on the gap and last on the Gini. The 
explanation for the poor welfare outcome appears to be a combination of 
poor targeting, where expenditures are concentrated on the aged to the 
detriment of other pre-transfer poor groups; and a high concentration of 
transfers to the non-poor. Switzerland has the second highest level of 
spillover of social security transfers (85% of transfers which spillover do so 
at a level greater than 30% above the poverty line). In addition as Diagram 
5.5 illustrated, around 30% of all transfers accrue to just 10% of the pre- 
transfer non-poor population. In many countries, these inefficient transfers 
are partially corrected by sizeable tax clawbacks, but this is not the case for 
Switzerland which has the third lowest clawback rate.
The United States has an expenditure level which is commensurate with its 
level of pre-transfer need. With Switzerland, it ranks 6th or 7th in 
expenditure terms and in terms of need, it is 3rd on the head-count, 7th on 
the gap and 8th on the Gini. However, its outcomes are consistently the 
lowest of this group, ranking 10th on the head-count and gap and 9th on 
income inequality. The explanation for this is fairly similar to that of 
Switzerland. Poor efficiency of expenditures is indicated by high levels of 
spillover; even after tax clawback, 60% of pre-transfer poor recipients whose 
expenditures spillover are more than 30% above the poverty line - a level 
greater than that estimated for Sweden. Similar to Switzerland there is also a 
high degree of concentration of transfers to the non-poor. Third, the net 
redistribution achieved by transfers is evenly split between the social 
security and taxation systems. As noted earlier, transfers through the 
taxation system generally favour middle income earners, and this is possibly 
more true in the US than in any other country; for example, 80% of taxation 
expenditures in the US are superannuation related expenditures.70 Overall, 
the US appears to devote a level of expenditure to social security which is
70 See Table Dl, Appendix D.
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appropriate to its needs, however a great deal of this expenditure is poorly 
targeted and, in the case of taxation transfers, probably regressive.
These country-specific analyses indicate that in order to understand the 
generation of welfare outcomes we really do need to examine the full 
picture: pre-transfer need, social security effort, the target efficiency and 
progressivity of that effort and the level and progressivity of taxation. Any 
one part of the transfer process will not necessarily bear a consistent 
relationship to outcomes. Nevertheless, I have shown that if one is limited 
by data availability to using aggregate data which does not contain estimates 
of efficiency measures, a reasonably consistent proxy for outcomes would 
appear to be a measure of welfare effort adjusted for pre-transfer need.
Chapter Twelve
Welfare states and welfare outcomes.
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In this chapter I examine the contribution which microdata based studies 
may potentially make to our understanding of the welfare state. It is 
important to again stress that in using the empirical findings set out in Part I 
I am referring to only one component of the welfare state, ie the income 
transfer system.
My comments in this chapter deal with only a small part of the welfare state 
literature, that which I identified in Chapter 10 as being concerned with the 
nature of the instruments which 'produce' welfare. In Section 12.1 I take this 
characterisation further and discuss how this literature relates to the Hill 
and Bramley model.
In Section 12.2 several models of the welfare state are considered in terms of 
their usage of the characteristics of the production instruments to 
distinguish different welfare state types. These models are critically assessed 
and a preferred typology is selected for analysis using the results of Part I.
Using the preferred typology, Section 12.3 compares the outcomes of the 
income transfer process with the types of welfare states which have been 
distinguished in order to assess whether various welfare state types are 
associated with particular outcomes. The section also considers why we 
might be interested in observing the relationship between outcomes and 
welfare state types.
In Section 12.4 I consider the drawbacks of relying entirely on outcomes 
without tempering such judgements by the means by which these are 
achieved.
In Section 12.5 I consider how microdata based studies may 'inform' welfare 
state typologies and consider several critical aspects of transfer systems 
which current models may need to take into consideration in formulating 
such typologies. These particular aspects include: the role of taxation, which 
goes virtually unheeded in the analysis of welfare state types; the extent to 
which the characteristics of various instruments should be relied upon as a 
means of distinguishing different welfare state types; the extent to which the 
needs of different groups are met by various welfare state types; and finally 
efficiency issues.
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12.1 The division of welfare states based on production characteristics.
In my division of the literature in Chapter 10, I argued that a number of 
writers have focused on the characteristics of the instruments which 
produce welfare - or in this study, which transfer income - as a means of 
distinguishing different welfare state types.
The welfare state typology approach differs substantially from that of writers 
who focus on inputs or aggregate expenditures. The limitations of the inputs 
based approaches have been highlighted in Chapter 11. A further set of 
constraints on this type of approach - particularly when we come to consider 
generalisations about the welfare state from this one part of the process - are 
the limited connection between inputs and other parts of the welfare 
producing process. Most obviously, inputs are closely linked with policy 
decisions relating to how much is to be expended and on which sectors of 
the welfare state. This has an indirect connection with 'need'. Apart from 
these links, aggregate expenditures reflect nothing of how the expenditures 
are to be utilised and very little of what the outputs or outcomes will be.
In contrast to this are approaches to the welfare state which take their cues 
from the instruments of welfare production. By the 'instruments of 
production' I mean both the type and quality of welfare services provided by 
the state. For example, "types" of services refers to the education and health 
systems or the means by which income is transferred (eg: through social 
security or taxation). These instruments also have qualitative characteristics: 
whether they are universal or selective; the nature of the 'rules' which 
govern access, entry and exit to programs, services or benefits; whether they 
act to integrate, or isolate, users/recipients from non- users/recipients.
We see that the instruments of production have a very strong connection 
with the goals of policy. Thus the rules of access spell out quite clearly who 
the government intends should benefit from its welfare programs, while the 
level of taxes, service fees or means tests determine the extent to which 
different groups are subsidised.
Another aspect of 'production' characteristics is the attention it pays to how 
programs are financed. In this way the question of how the welfare state 
operates is expanded to include "who pays?" as well as the traditional "who 
benefits?"
222
It is these qualitative connections with policy which may provide a stronger 
basis for "production" based studies of welfare states as compared with those 
based solely on expenditure.
12.2 Three welfare state typologies compared.
From the brief description in the previous section it will be clear that there 
are numerous production characteristics which could potentially be used to 
compare welfare states. For example, the rules of access to welfare services or 
benefits; the means by which these services and benefits are financed; the 
balance of choice between types of instruments which can achieve similar 
ends - such as direct transfers through the social security system versus 
indirect transfer through the taxation system; whether responsibility for 
income maintenance rests predominantly with the market, state or family. I 
examine below three welfare state typologies which use differing 
characteristics to distinguish various welfare state 'types'.
12.2.1 Institutional, industrial achievement and residual welfare states.
One of the earliest typologies of the welfare state was that developed by 
Titmuss (1974:30-31). While not referring directly to his models as those of 
welfare states - he used instead the term 'model of social policy' - Titmuss 
made a division between three models based essentially on the extent to 
which welfare policy is distanced from the market.
In the 'residual' model, needs are met either through the market or the 
family. Only when these break down should the social security net come 
into play and then, most crucially for this model, only temporarily.
His second model is the 'industrial achievement-performance' model where 
there is a significant role for social security as an adjunct to economic 
requirements. In this model social needs are met on the basis of merit, work 
performance and productivity. Titmuss noted that an important product of 
this model was 'the formation of class and group loyalties.'
The third model is the institutional redistributive model in which Titmuss 
(1974:31) describes social welfare policy as:
... a major integrated institution in society, providing universalistic 
services operating outside the market system on the principle of 
need... It is basically a model incorporating systems of redistribution 
in command-over-resources through time.
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In discussing these m odels, Titmuss (1974) assigns the US to the residual 
model, appears to argue that the UK is a combination of the residual and 
in d u s tria l ach ievem ent m odels, and  im plies th a t the Scandinavian  
countries are examples of the institutional model.71
12.2.2 Social welfare, social security and positive states.
Furniss and Tilton (1977) identify three types of welfare states. They argue 
that while m ost m odern  democratic states do address difficulties arising 
from  the opera tion  of the m arket, the extent of in te rven tion  varies 
significantly:
... the major issue is not that all states have a policy of intervention, 
but that different states employ different policies for different 
purposes. Abstracting from the historical record, we can aggregate 
these different forms of intervention in three 'models': the positive 
state, the social security state, and the social welfare state.72
In their typology the positive state is identified  by the lim ita tion  of 
governm ent in te rven tion  to w ha t is necessary  to enhance econom ic 
efficiency - for exam ple, the m aintenance of em ploym ent levels w hich 
ensure a high level of consum ption - and to protect property holders both 
from the difficulties arising from unregulated m arkets and from potential 
redistributive demands. In the field of welfare, there is a disinclination to do 
anything which is inconsistent w ith  such efficiency concerns. So we find 
w elfare states w hose program s are strongly shaped by concerns w ith 
d isincen tive  effects and  w here  the em phasis is on  social insurance 
p rogram s, w hether p rivate ly  or publicly  funded . This m odel partly  
corresponds to Titm uss' residual welfare model in term s of its 'safety net' 
attributes, but differs in respect of the location of social insurance schemes.
The social security state has similar characteristics as the positive state but 
makes sharper distinctions betw een economic and social policy concerns, for 
exam ple, social policy is no t entirely conditional on efficiency concerns. 
M ost im portan tly , Furniss and  Tilton argue, it is the adop tion  of a 
guaranteed national m inim um  - w hether in term s of income, access to 
educational or health services - which distinguishes these two types of states.
Social welfare states present a radical alternative to the former approaches by 
placing social goals before economic goals. Such a state, they argue, uses its
7  ^ The assignment of these countries is scattered throughout the essays in the volume. 
72 Furniss and Tilton (1977:15), original emphasis.
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power in more radical ways to ensure equality. Here economic and wages 
policies are employed in concert with social policy to achieve this end; and 
public services remove important sectors of social life from the influence of 
market forces.
12.2.3 Social democratic, corporativist and liberal welfare states.
Esping-Andersen (1989,1990) describes three clusters of welfare 'regime-types' 
which he distinguishes by their different arrangements between the state, 
the market and the family.
In the first cluster, he defines the liberal welfare state:
... in which means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or 
modest social insurance plans predominate. These cater mainly to a 
clientele of low income, usually working class, state dependents.73
Like the residual and positive categories described above, Esping-Andersen 
notes the strong policy concerns of liberal states with disincentive effects and 
its encouragement of private insurance.
The second regime-type he identifies as corporativist states where:
... the liberal obsession with market efficiency and commodification 
was never pre-eminent and, as such, the granting of social rights was 
hardly ever a seriously contested issue. What predominated was the 
preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached 
to class and status.74
In addition these regimes have a strong commitment to maintaining 
traditional family patterns. This aspect, which Esping-Andersen considers as 
a strong characteristic of these welfare states, Titmuss treats as marginal and 
a characteristic of the residual model, and Fumiss and Tilton ignore. Esping- 
Andersen (1989:25) notes two examples where family patterns play a role in 
the shape of such welfare states. The first is connected with patterns of 
assumed female dependency and traditional roles hence 'day care and 
similar family services remain conspicuously underdeveloped/ The second 
is the case of German unem ployment assistance, in which, once 
entitlements to normal insurance benefits are exhausted, continued 
eligibility depends on the resources of the immediate family, irrespective of 
age or residency.
73 Esping-Andersen (1989:25), this framework is mainatained in his latter publication.
74 Ibid.
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Social democratic regimes are identified by the 'emancipation7 of policy from 
both the market and the family. So that on the one hand, the individual has 
to rely on neither the market nor the family for income support; while on 
the other, the state ensures that the individual has the guarantee of 
employment, thereby obviating the need for such support:
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the social democratic 
regime is its fusion of welfare and work. It is ... a welfare state 
genuinely committed to a full employment guarantee... and entirely 
dependent on its attainment. On the one side, it is a model in which 
the right to work has equal status to the right of income protection.
On the other side, the enormous costs of maintaining ...[the] welfare 
system means that it must minimize social problems and and 
maximize revenue income. This is obviously best done with most 
people working, and the fewest possible living off social transfers.75
12.2.4. The correspondence between typologies.
In Table 12.1, I use the central characteristics of the welfare state types 
distinguished by these authors, to nominate the group to which each of the 
LIS countries belongs. In the case of Esping-Andersen this classification is 
based on the assignment of countries reported by him in his recent work 
(1990:52). In the other two cases the assignment is approximate, based on the 
key characteristics of the systems described by the authors combined with 
any published assignment of countries. In the case of Fumiss and Tilton, 
their work identified only Sweden, the UK and the US as archetypal 
examples of respectively social welfare, social security and positive states.
Table 12.1. The classification of the LIS countries according to the three typologies._______
Titmuss Fumiss and Tilton Esping-Andersen
Sweden Social Sweden Social Sweden
Institutional Norway
N etherlands
welfare Norway
N etherlands
democratic Norway
N etherlands
Industrial
achievement
Germany
France
Switzerland
Social
security
Germany
France
Switzerland
Corporativist
Switzerland
Germany
France
? UK UK UK
7 A ustralia A ustralia Australia
Residual Canada Positive Canada Liberal Canada
USA USA USA
Comparing these typologies we see that, at the extremes, these authors are in 
agreement with respect to Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands as
75 Ibid,26.
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countries in which the welfare state is entrenched and pursuing policy goals 
with a strong egalitarian emphasis. At the other extreme the US and Canada 
are considered by the authors as having minimalist welfare states, where 
programs have a precarious existence, fill the gaps left by the market, and are 
strongly oriented towards individual rather than collective responsibility for 
welfare.
In between these extremes, the picture is not so clear. Partly this may reflect 
incorrect assignment of the countries on my part, but it may also reflect 
some fundamental difficulties in operationalising these concepts. For 
example Ringen (1987:13) questions whether the degree of institutionalism 
present in welfare states can be demonstrated:
The degree of institutionalism in welfare states needs to be 
demonstrated empirically but has hitherto for the most part been 
postulated as a property of particular welfare states. Such empirical 
inquiries as have been made suggest that the distinction in the use of 
means between marginal and institutional types may not be 
tenable.76
Looking at some cases where typologies are unclear we see that Switzerland 
and the UK pose great difficulties for these authors. In the case of the UK it is 
clear that Furniss and Tilton and to some extent Titmuss would not 
consider it a positive or residual state in the same way as the US. Like the 
'institutional' states, there is a safety net of programs available to all, 
irrespective of past contributions. Unlike the 'institutional' states, benefit 
levels are not generous and programs aim for a minimum guarantee rather 
than income replacement, and using this characteristic, Esping-Andersen 
does group the UK with the US.
In the case of Switzerland a great deal of ambiguity is also present. This may 
be best illustrated by Esping-Andersen's development of his typology. 
Writing in 1989 (p.25), he argued that Switzerland approximates the liberal 
model. In 1990 (p.52) using his de-commodification scale, Switzerland is 
placed clearly in the corporativist model.77
For both Titmuss and Esping-Andersen, Australia is identified along with 
Canada and the US as a residual or liberal welfare state type. On the other 
hand, Furniss and Tilton's classification would place Australia more closely
76 Ringen (1987:13). Unfortunately, Ringen does not reference these 'empirical inquiries'.
77 See the description of the de-commodification index in the following footnote.
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to the UK and its flat-rate, means-tested transfer system part of the social 
security model, by virtue of its guaranteed minimum.
The purpose in comparing the differences between these typologies is not to 
demonstrate any fundamental confusion in the literature. Rather that, 
depending on the characteristics of production in which one is most 
interested, one can be lead to quite different groupings of countries.
There is one critical difference between the authors discussed above. That is 
that the first two, Titmuss and Fumiss and Tilton, are largely ahistorical in 
their approach to welfare state types. Their division of welfare states into 
different types depends on a 'snapshot' of the welfare state instruments in 
place at a particular point in time as a basis on which to assign countries to 
different models. By contrast, Esping-Andersen brings not only an historical 
understanding of the development of these systems to his classification but 
also the political and social contexts which maintain their character. This is a 
strength of the Esping-Andersen model to which I will return later in this 
chapter. For the present I have chosen the Esping-Andersen model to 
consider whether there is a relationship between welfare state types and 
outcomes.
This choice has been made for two reasons: first, the assignment of the LIS 
countries to Esping-Andersen's regime-types is unambiguous, based on his 
assignment through the de-commodification index (1990:52); second, the 
historical perspective which Esping-Andersen brings to his typology 
increases the explanatory power of his typology since it describes not only 
what different states "look like" in the present, but how they got there.
Before moving on to the question of the relationship between welfare state 
types and outcomes, I flag here several issues arising from the foregoing 
discussion for later consideration. If the validity of these typologies rests on 
the characteristics of the instruments of production, are the selected 
characteristics the most appropriate? Are there key characteristics missing 
from these typologies? More fundamentally, are typologies which are based 
on the characteristics of the production instruments empirically sustainable?
12.3. Comparing Esping-Andersen's typology with outcomes.
Are different welfare state types consistently associated with particular 
outcomes? At first sight this question may appear as a somewhat 
mechanistic, or even tangential, concern to the higher aim of sketching out 
more qualitative aspects of the welfare state. In defence, I would argue that
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there is a tendency in the comparative literature to divorce the outcomes of 
different welfare states from their production characteristics and use the 
latter to make judgements about what a "good" welfare state does and how it 
operates as opposed to a "bad" welfare state. Such judgements may only be 
justified to a large extent on the basis of what outcomes these "good" and 
"bad" states produce. As Ringen (1987:26) notes:
Now, finally, the welfare state can be said to work if the strategy of
redistribution is successful.
While this study would not claim that outcomes are the entire basis for 
making judgement about different welfare states - and in the following 
sections I examine some other aspects - they should count for a substantial 
part of such judgements. To this end, Table 12.2 shows the characterisation 
of countries in this study based on Esping-Andersen's typology and his 
rankings based on his de-commodification scores.75 The table also shows 
country ranks for the outcome measures derived in Part I of this study.
Table 12.2. A comparison of Esping-Andersen's regime-types with post-transfer outcomes.
Esping-Andersen typology Outcomes rankings post-transfer
W elfare H ead- Red'nin Poverty Red'n in Gini N et
state tvpe Rank count count coeff. Redist.
Sweden 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
Norway S o c i a l 2 1 2 3 4 2 2
N etherlands d e m o c r a t ic 3 4 5 9 7 7 4
Switzerland 4 8 8 7 8 10 10
Germany C o r p o r a t - 5 3 3 4 3 3 3
France iv ist 6 5 4 6 5 8 5
UK 7 6 6 1 1 4 6
Canada 8 9 9 8 9 6 8
USA L ib e r a l 9 10 10 10 10 9 9
A ustralia 10 7 7 5 6 5 7
An important point to make at the outset is that the outcomes observed 
here relate to the transfer systems in place in the early 1980s, fortunately this 
is also the period for which Esping-Andersen has constructed his de­
commodification index. Thus the two frameworks of analysis coincide quite 
closely, with the exception of the Netherlands. For the reasons discussed in 
Chapter 2 - concerning the macro-economic business cycle - this difference in 
timing for the Netherlands may be of critical importance. Therefore I
75 Esping-Andersen (1990: 49-54). In his work de-commodification for age pensions is measured by an 
additive index based on: the minimum replacement rates of pensions; standard pension rates; the 
contribution period required to qualify for a standard pension; and the share of financing by the 
individual. For sickness and unemployment benefits de-commodification is measured in terms of: 
replacement rates; contribution period to qualify; number of waiting days before benefits are paid; 
number of weeks for which a benefit is maintained.
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exclude the Netherlands from the ensuing analysis, noting only that it 
appears to be one of the cases in which Esping-Andersen's typology does not 
coincide with the pattern of outcomes.
Examining Table 12.2 we see that in general there is a reasonable degree of 
clustering of outcomes which sits well with Esping-Andersen's typology. 
However, there are three countries which consistently have de­
commodification scores that are not closely linked with outcomes, 
suggesting that they may well be miscast and that there may be some 
fundamental problems with the de-commodification index. I will discuss 
these weaknesses in the latter part of this section.
To begin with, the Swiss welfare state clearly does not produce outcomes 
commensurate with the other corporativist states in this study. Indeed the 
outcomes would clearly indicate that Switzerland might be more 
appropriately grouped with Canada and the US. Recalling the discussion of 
Chapter 11,1 noted that the distribution of transfers in Switzerland is highly 
skewed, concentrated on some groups, particularly the aged, to the exclusion 
of others. This is one aspect of the operation of the welfare state which 
typologies based on legalistic rules of entitlement cannot capture. In 
addition, as the spillover estimates for Switzerland show, the Swiss pension 
system is indeed generous, thus scoring highly on Esping-Andersen's index. 
But in outcome terms this generosity may well be to the detriment of others 
who are in need. It would seem that Esping-Andersen's first approximation 
of Switzerland as belonging to the liberal group of countries (1989:25) was 
more appropriate than that suggested by the de-commodification index.
The next country which appears to be seriously miscast by this index is the 
UK. In terms of the poverty gap and the level of income inequality, the 
outcomes of the UK system are closer to the corporativist group of countries. 
In a similar vein, but to a lesser extent, this is also true of of Australia. This 
is not to suggest that these countries in any way resemble the corporativist 
countries in terms of the institutional features of their welfare states, but 
rather, via other routes, these countries have achieved a level of outcome 
similar to the corporativist states.
A key aspect of these "other routes" - and one which deeply influences the 
outcomes in these countries - is the extensive use of means-tested, flat-rate 
benefits which effectively fill the gaps left after the operation of the market. 
One could argue that this appears on paper not to be so very different from
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the situation obtaining in say the US and Canada.79 However, there are 
some quite important distinctions to be made here. First, there is no time 
limit on these benefits (especially unemployment benefits) in Australia and 
the UK; nor are there rules which disqualify the unemployed from benefit 
receipt because of the circumstances under which employment was lost. 
Sinfield (1978:132) also draws these distinctions when comparing 
unemployment benefits in the UK and US.
Second, the Esping-Andersen de-commodification index includes a score for 
the contribution period required to qualify for a pension (Esping-Andersen, 
1990:54). However, such a weighting is not possible for Australia as all 
pensions and benefits are financed from general revenue.50 Esping- 
Andersen' s solution is to give a score of zero for me ans-tested payments, yet 
this seems contradictory in terms of de-commodification. The very fact that 
pensions and benefits are not premised on labour force attachment suggests 
that these might be given the top score. This observation is supported 
historically by the fact that that the British Fabians and the social reformers 
in Australia at the turn of the century held the view that means-testing was 
an evident principle of social justice (Castles,1985:15,102). In Australia this 
was partly held to be so because general revenue financing -ie through 
progressive taxation - implied a cross-subsidisation from the better-off to the 
less well-off over the life-cycle (Castles,1985:22).
This problem is further compounded by the arbitrary weighting attached to 
this score (0.5) which is intended to reflect level of coverage. Potentially all 
of the aged population in Australia are covered. In fact, over the period 1975- 
1985, only around fifteen percent of the aged did not receive a pension (or 
part-pension) on income grounds (Department of Social Security,1988c: 14).
Together these characteristics would suggest that these guaranteed 
minimum benefits are more highly de-commodified than the Esping- 
Andersen index would lead us to believe.
79 The UK system of benefits to the unemployed is somewhat complicated and potentially misleading 
in that there is a contribution-based and time-limited "unemployment benefit"; but this defaults to the 
generic social security benefit when entitlement runs out, or if there is no entitlement, and for most 
beneficiaries there is little or no difference in the level of payments - indeed "unemployment benefits" 
are often topped-up by social security payments.
50 In the case of the UK the mix of general revenue financing and social insurance contributions varies 
with pension and benefit type. The critical point (see previous footnote) is that when benefits based on 
contributions run out or is insufficient, payments either default to, or are supplemented by, payments 
from general revenue .
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One last aspect of this index, which is also a general point about what should 
be measured, concerns the generosity of benefits. Low replacement rates, 
particularly for age pensions, in the Anglo-Saxon countries should be offset 
by other considerations. For example, the LIS data shows (circa 1980) that in 
Australia around 80% of aged families owned - or were buying - their own 
home. Conversely, in Sweden home ownership amongst the aged was 
around 20%. The income needs of the aged in these two countries are 
therefore likely to be very different. In Australia, policy analysts use an 
estimate of 25% of gross income to reflect housing costs. Thus for a large 
percentage of the aged population the need for more generous pensions to 
cover housing costs may not be as imperative as in other welfare states. One 
could argue that the two systems simply provide alternative means for 
financing housing costs for the aged - Australia through private saving and 
investment, Sweden through state saving and provision. For this reason 
replacement rates should be carefully considered against other aspects of 
social policy.
To return to Esping-Andersen's model, Castles and Mitchell (1990) propose 
that a fourth type of welfare state can be identified by separating from 
Esping-Andersen's 'liberal' category those countries with a labourite 
tradition. Countries in this category would include the UK, Australia, New 
Zealand and Ireland. While labour party power in these countries has been 
weaker than in the Scandinavian countries it is important to note that many 
of the reforms which have shaped present day transfer policies have been 
either initiated by, or enacted with, labour party support.51
Apart from historical and political arguments which can be mustered from 
the literature, there is strong support for this fourth grouping from the 
empirical evidence presented in Part I. If we examine Diagrams 4.6, 4.11 and 
7.3 which map out, respectively, the reduction in the poverty head-count 
against the post-transfer head-count; the reduction in the poverty gap 
against the post-transfer gap; and the net redistribution against the post­
transfer Gini index of inequality; we see that the UK and Australia are quite 
distinctly separated from Canada and the US.
If this fourth category is added to the Esping-Andersen model, it does indeed 
provide a very persuasive view of the variation in the welfare state. In 
addition to its clear distinctions based on institutional and historical
81 Castles, 1985: Chapter 2 passim.
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features, such a model clearly associates particular welfare state types with 
particular outcomes.
12.4. Outcomes: does it really matter how you get there?
In the previous section I stressed that outcomes from welfare producing 
processes - and in this instance from income transfers - should be a major 
concern of welfare state analysts, particularly if they wish to move from 
simple type-casting exercises to normative and prescriptive judgements.
In emphasising the outcomes of these processes in terms of the distribution 
of disposable incomes, the aim is not to exclude qualitative considerations 
concerning the 'means' of welfare production. Quite clearly, as many writers 
have insisted, welfare state instruments which stigmatise recipients, confer 
unequal status or are otherwise socially divisive must be questioned as to 
their appropriateness as a welfare producing instrument, independently of 
these outcomes. Unfortunately the tendency of the welfare state literature 
has been to assert that certain types of instruments are associated with social 
division and stigma, and these writers can do little else since very few 
empirical studies have been conducted to discover the exact extent of such 
divisiveness. In reality we have very little comparative evidence about 
whether recipients feel more or less stigmatised by different transfer 
regimes; whether this has prevented them from taking up benefits to which 
they are entitled; or whether society wants changes in the form or structure 
of its transfer systems.
Taking the case of Australia as an example of what many writers consider as 
a highly stigmatised system by virtue of its extensive income-testing 
arrangements, what evidence is there for the existence of dissatisfaction with 
its welfare system?
One recent study in Australia has attempted to gauge the satisfaction of the 
population toward the current form of provision (ie the characteristics of the 
pension system rather than payment levels) of age pensions and private 
superannuation. The study showed that 90% of respondents felt that it was 
'very' or 'fairly' important that the present provisions continue in their 
current form (Papadakis,1990).
But mostly the evidence we do have is largely indirect. For example, the 
Department of Social Security (1989:25) has estimated that take-up rates for 
most basic pension and benefit programs is in excess of 95% of the eligible 
population. This is confirmed in the LIS data in two ways: the number of
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families reporting zero disposable income is extremely low (Table 2.6), as is 
the percentage of pre-transfer poor families who do not receive any form of 
social security transfer (Table 5.9). Admittedly this evidence is lacking in 
respect of families who do not take up assistance which is supplemental to 
market incomes.
While this evidence is unavoidably scant, it does suggest that commonly 
held beliefs regarding different transfer instruments may be out-dated and 
empirically dubious.52 The question of the importance which should be 
attached to "how you get there" should not to be left to mere assumption, 
particularly if welfare state types are to be partially identified on this basis. 
However, we need substantially more empirical research, along the lines 
suggested earlier, before making judgements in favour of or against different 
transfer instruments or, by extension, ascribing deleterious effects to the 
operation of particular instruments.
12.5. Using microdata studies to 'inform' welfare state typologies: some 
conclusions.
In Chapter 10 I argued that, at a superficial level, microdata based studies 
"complete" the picture of the outcomes of welfare production processes. I 
also noted that microdata has potentially a much more powerful role in 
linking together the various stages of this production process. Using the 
example of income transfers, we see from the empirical analysis in Part I 
that microdata has much to say about questions of efficiency, distribution 
and incidence of income transfers.
Utilising these findings it may be possible to clear up some of the differences 
in the categorisation of welfare state types evident in the literature. This 
argument may be pursued in two ways. First, there is a vast difference 
between the stated intentions of various programs and their actual 
operation. As Section 12.3 noted, in theory the rules of entitlement and 
eligibility of various transfer systems may convey a quite different picture to 
that which is presented by the actual incidence of transfers within the 
population. If microdata are used to the fullest extent it may be possible to
52 Theoretically, it is also possible to counter some of these assertions - at least from the Australian 
perspective - by observing that the Australian system since 1986 is totally income-tested and therefore 
no distinction is made between beneficiary categories. If one source of stigma lies in the realm of 
perceptions of differences in treatment between ostensibly identical claimants, then it is the status­
preserving systems which may be more likely to engender stigmatisation.
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overcome, for example, some of the blurred distinction between residual or 
positive states and institutional or social security states.
A second way of using microdata may be to introduce into welfare state 
analyses a greater tolerance of alternative policies or instruments and the 
way welfare states are viewed and categorised.53 There is no doubt that the 
welfare literature is permeated by normative judgements concerning "good" 
and "bad" welfare producing processes. Consider the following examples. In 
discussing the Australian welfare state Heidenheimer et al (1990:241) note:
The results were those typical of all means-tested public assistance 
programs. The examination of personal financial resources required 
by such state charity continued to arouse resentment and shame.
Or Esping-Andersen's assertion (1990:48):
One type of system, historically most pronounced in the Anglo-Saxon 
nations, builds entitlement around demonstrable and abject need.
Such characterisations may lead to unwarranted judgements about what 
type of programs qualify as "legitimate" welfare state instruments. Nowhere 
is this more clear than Esping-Andersen's recent observation (1989:19):
Others spend disproportionally on means-tested social assistance.
Few contemporary analysts would agree that a reformed poor relief 
tradition qualifies as a welfare state commitment.
How can the use of microdata help to assess the validity of such assertions? 
While it is difficult to counter the views expressed above without the 
evidence from the type of surveys discussed in the previous section, the LIS 
data for example, shows that income-tested systems in Australia and the UK, 
circa 1980, had a significant impact on poverty and inequality.
Set in a broader context, there are two ways in which microdata may assist in 
determining the importance of alternative policy instruments. The first is 
highlighted by Heidenheimer et al (1990: 11):
Similar outcomes may be achieved through a range of policy 
instruments, while ostensibly similar policies may w ell be 
associated with quite different outcomes.
Here Heidenheimer is re-focusing arguments about different policy 
instruments and approaches by emphasising that outcomes may be
53 A useful analogy here may be Esping-Andersen's comments on the Swedocentrism which the class- 
mobilisation thesis reflects (1990:17). In the same way that this thesis is informed by the Swedish 
experience, so too taking Swedish income transfer systems as a norm may divert us from a more 
informed view of the alternative routes to successful redistributive strategies.
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independent of the policy instrument. This implies that there may be some 
doubt whether production characteristics are an accurate guide to 
distinguishing welfare states.
Secondly, at a more fundamental level Ringen (1987:12) questions whether 
the conventional characterisation of different policy approaches is tenable:
... truly universal programs are, in fact, very rare. Even large welfare 
states commonly have a number of income-tested benefits, such as 
social assistance, housing support and family support for child care.
... A search for selectivity in the Swedish welfare state, presumably 
the model institutional type, has revealed that, although 
selectivity by income is not widespread, the system is thoroughly 
selective by occupational experience so that clients with different 
careers in gainful employment have different rights to benefits.
Ringen therefore introduces another element into this debate: are we sure 
that the conventional labels which are attached to different policy 
instruments, and the assumptions we make about the usage of such 
instruments in different countries, appropriate or accurate? This study 
cannot, of course, give detailed answers to such intriguing questions. 
However, I feel that the evidence presented in Part I suggests that there may 
be room for doubting these "conventional wisdoms' of the literature.
In the following sections I use the microdata to comment on which policy 
instruments, and which characteristics of these instruments, appear to be. the 
most critical in determining how the LIS countries depart from existing 
typologies.
12.5.1. Which characteristics are important?
Using the evidence from Part I it is reasonable to conclude that one of the 
weakest aspects of the current comparative welfare state literature is its lack 
of attention to the operation and characteristics of taxation instruments. 
This seems a curious omission from present-day analysis, since Titmuss 
(1974) and subsequent writers, stressed the importance of fiscal welfare and 
its growth alongside of the more apparent manifestations of the welfare 
state.
There are four issues which I wish to consider here: the fundamental 
influence which taxation has on outcomes; the differential use of the 
taxation system for redistribution in different welfare states; the seemingly 
contradictory stance taken in the literature on state intrusiveness in 
administering means-tests with respect to welfare benefits in comparison
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with the administration and enforcement of taxation; and the absence of any 
characterisation of the taxation system as part of the general characterisation 
of welfare state types.
The influence of taxation on transfer outcomes has been demonstrated at 
several levels in this study. First, at the aggregate level, Table 5.11 shows that 
in some countries there is an extremely large gap between social security 
expenditure and the amount of that expenditure which is actually retained 
in family disposable income. My estimates of the proportion of clawback 
through the tax system range from 43% in the Netherlands to 11% in France.
Secondly, disaggregating the clawback by family type, Table 5.14 shows that 
the taxation systems in the social democratic countries achieve precisely the 
same effect as income-tests in some of the 'liberal' states: that is they do 
distinguish on the basis of income the level of income transfers which 
should be retained in household disposable income. Consider this 
description by Heidenheimer et al (1990:246):
Sweden's approach is dominated by a strategy of common 
entitlement whereby all citizens participate in the same programs 
(while benefit taxation, income-related fees, contributions and so on 
vary the extent to which people are subsidized.)
A counter point to this which is frequently made in the literature (see 
Heidenheimer et al, 1990:241) is that the disadvantage of income-testing 
benefits at point of receipt is the intrusiveness of the state in its 
'examination of personal financial resources'. Yet in the same volume, the 
intrusiveness of the state in collecting taxes, passes without comment on 
what would appear to be a similar level of scrutiny. For example:
In Sweden inspectors can refer cases for scrutiny by local tax boards - 
one for each area of 2,000 inhabitants - whose members will be 
knowledgeable about their neighbors' lifestyles.54
Among small business people in Germany the more frequent 
confrontation with tax officials have fed an undercurrent of 
hostility, with the officials themselves complaining about the 
difficulty of enforcing overly detailed regulations ... Moreover, 
prosecutions there are relentless.5^
These examples expose a good deal of uncertainty on the part of comparative 
theorists in approaching the taxation side of the transfer process. There 
appears to be a reluctance to apply the same analytical frameworks to
54 Heidenheimer et al (1990:201).
55 Ibid.
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indirect transfers iie taxes) as those applied to direct transfers. In part, this 
may be due to the traditional separation of taxation from welfare concerns 
on the grounds that taxation does have other functions, and revenues are 
raised from sources other than income-earners.
Counter to this, is Titmuss' (1974) observations concerning the role of fiscal 
welfare and the more obvious fact that taxation cannot be passed off as being 
unrelated to the operation of the welfare state, if for no other reason than 
the intimate connection between taxation and the levels of funds available 
for social welfare expenditure (Sinfield;1978:152). Moreover, there is little 
room for doubt that taxation systems are designed to interact with social 
security systems in quite specific ways. We have only to look at the evidence 
(presented in Chapter 5) on the clawback of benefits to infer intentionality in 
all systems to clawback transfers from the non-poor and most strikingly in 
the social democratic states to clawback the generous payments which 
spillover the poverty line.
Additionally, this study has shown that the taxation system plays a vital role 
by virtue of the extent of its progressivity in achieving not just 
redistribution between the economically active and passive population but 
also amongst the economically active population itself. Evidence for this can 
be found in Table 7.6 which shows the percentage of net redistribution 
which accrues to social security and to taxation. If the redistribution of the 
tax system was limited only to that from the economically active to the 
economically passive population, then the social security system would 
account for 100% of net redistribution. In fact, the level of redistribution 
accruing to social security is at a maximum of 80% in Sweden and is as low 
as 50% in the US. This suggests that taxation is itself a transfer instrument 
whose characteristics should be considered in any typology of the welfare 
state. Whether taxation is an effective instrument, and who benefits from its 
transfers, is a matter of considerable import for all these welfare states.
How might we take account of the characteristics of the taxation instrument 
in distinguishing different welfare state types? This study offers some initial 
possibilities: the degree of progressivity; the level of reliance on taxation to 
redistribute income; and the size of the clawback. Other writers such as 
Heidenheimer et al (1990:200-216) distinguish more qualitative aspects such 
as degrees of self-assessment in taxation returns, the growth of tax 
expenditures, and the level of detail in taxation codes.
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12.5.2. The incidence of transfers.
It is in the area of incidence of transfers which microdata studies have 
potentially the most to offer to the study of the welfare state. While 
questions of incidence have been an underlying theme of much of this 
chapter, this issue requires some separate treatment.
A first consideration is one on which I touched earlier with regard to the gap 
between the statements of legal rules of entitlement, instrument 
characteristics and so on and how these are played out in terms of actual 
incidence and final outcomes. I have indicated that there are a number of 
intervening factors which can be concretely established from the microdata 
(eg: taxation, efficiency and distributional intentions) which affect the 
incidence of transfers. However, there are also less tangible blocks to the 
translation of instrument characteristics into outcomes. Thus for example, 
administrative tactics may be employed to discourage, deny or delay benefit 
entitlement.
Secondly, Part I of this study examined the impact of transfers, not from a 
beneficiary type perspective but using broader family type characteristics. A 
distinct advantage of this approach is that we are not confined to examining 
those groups which are expected to benefit from income transfers but rather 
we can examine the level of need from an income perspective, regardless of 
status. To spell this out more clearly, consider the example of Esping- 
Andersen's decommodification index which is based on a series of 
judgements comparing three types of benefits: age pensions, unemployment 
and sickness benefits. I noted earlier that there was a considerable gap 
between Switzerland's de-commodification score (and ranking) and the 
outcomes of the transfer process evident in the LIS data. One possible 
explanation for this is that much of the Swiss welfare state is concerned with 
provision for the aged, and less with other needy groups such as lone 
parents and working families with children. The Swiss welfare state, like 
Australia, the US and to a lesser extent Germany, is quite 'unbalanced' in its 
poverty alleviation efforts. This observation is confirmed by examination of 
the size of the post-transfer poverty gap for different family types (Table 4.30) 
and the reduction in the poverty gap (Table 4.31) which are at levels closer to 
those in the US and Canada rather than those of Germany and France.
This may indicate that another characteristic which typologies of welfare 
state types should take into consideration is the extent to which different 
systems address a range of needs rather than confining analysis to a few
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selected benefit types. Here we may look to an index which incorporates 
some notion of balance, such as that discussed in Section 4.6.2.
A last issue concerns the extent to which income transfers accrue to the non­
poor while at the same time considerable numbers of families remain poor, 
and sizeable poverty gaps exist, post-transfer. There seems little point in 
proclaiming any type of welfare state regime "successful" or "more 
successful" when, after sizeable amounts of expenditure have been pushed 
through the transfer system, between 4% and 16% of families in this sample 
of countries remain poor.
This point is even more telling when we consider that all of the LIS 
countries devote a level of resources to income transfers (measured in GDP 
terms) which is more than sufficient to close the pre-transfer poverty gap in 
each country.36 Here I suggest that efficiency issues must receive more than a 
cursory glance in welfare state typologies and that such issues should not be 
necessarily considered in a negative fashion (see for example Heidenheimer 
et al, 1990: 250). As Chapter 11 demonstrated, efficiency is a central element 
in explaining the outcomes observed in the LIS countries.
36 Compare Tables 4.7 to 4.9 (aggregate pre-transfer poverty gap as a percentage of GDP) with 11.1. 
(social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP).
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France 4.9 4.5 7.7 8.9 14.8 15.7
Germany 2.5 3.1 5.3 6.1 8.9 10.1
N eth erlan d s 5.1 5.0 . 5.8 5.7 6.7 6.5
N orw ay 3.2 3.4 4.6 4.8 6.7 13.3
Sweden 2.7 2.7 3.6 3.7 5.4 6.1
S w itzerland 5.3 6.1 9.0 9.9 14.3 15.3
UK 1.4 2.4 7.3 10.4 16.2 19.7
USA 10.4 11.2 15.9 163 20.8 21.5
[c] Income after taxes
Country:
40%
OECD W hitefo rd
50%
OECD W hitefo rd
60%
OECD W hitefo rd
A u stra lia 5.9 6.1 10.3 10.9 19.2 22.7
C anada 7.6 8.1 12.5 13.6 19.4 20.9
France 4.9 4.6 7.9 9.0 15.2 16.0
Germany 3.3 3.8 6.8 7.2 12.7 13.0
N eth erlan d s 5.6 5.5 7.0 6.7 10.6 9.1
N orw ay 3.5 3.8 5.3 5.6 8.8 15.3
Sweden 3.8 4.0 5.6 5.5 9.2 9.5
S w itzerland 6.1 6.8 11.0 11.3 17.8 18.0
UK 1.7 2.7 8.2 11.2 18.2 21.4
USA 11.0 11.7 17.0 17.5 23.2 23.5
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Table B2. Summary of poverty rates at the 40,50 and 60% poverty intervals, poverty 
intersection.
[a] Income before social security transfers
40% 50% 60%
Country: Poverty intersection Poverty intersection Poverty intersection
A ustralia 25.7 28.0 30.6
Canada 21.2 24.9 28.7
France 31.6 36.4 41.2
Germany 29.5 31.0 33.6
N etherlands 31.1 32.5 33.9
Norway 28.7 30.6 32.9
Sweden 33.8 36.5 39.5
Switzerland 21.1 24.3 28.1
UK 27.2 30.0 33.7
USA 23.4 27.1 30.8
[b] Income after social security transfers
40% 50% 60%
Country: Poverty intersection Poverty intersection Poverty intersection
A ustralia 5.7 9.6 17.7
Canada 7.3 11.8 18.0
France 4.9 7.7 14.8
Germany 2.5 5.3 8.9
N etherlands 5.1 5.8 6.7
Norway 3.2 4.6 6.7
Sweden 2.7 3.6 5.4
Switzerland 53 9.0 14.3
UK 1.4 7.3 16.2
USA 10.4 15.9 20.8
[c] Income after taxes
40% 50% 60%
Country: Poverty intersection Poverty intersection Poverty intersection
A ustralia 5.9 10.3 19.2
Canada 7.6 12.5 19.4
France 4.9 7.9 15.2
Germany 3.3 6.8 12.7
N etherlands 5.6 7.0 10.6
Norway 3.5 5.3 8.8
Sweden 3.8 5.6 9.2
Switzerland 6.1 11.0 17.8
UK 1.7 8.2 18.2
USA 11.0 17.0 23.2
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Table B3. Composition of poverty population by family type before social security transfers at 
40,50 and 60% poverty intervals adjusted using OECD equivalence scale, circa 1980.
[a] 40% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 23.9 21.4 19.8 8.4 11.4 11.9 3.3 100
Canada 25.1 18.1 19.5 5.9 11.9 15.1 4.4 100
France 33.3 26.4 7.1 10.3 2.9 15.9 4.0 100
Germany 44.8 26.2 14.9 6.6 2.0 2.6 2.8 100
Netherlands 21.9 18.8 17.7 14.6 7.9 14.5 4.6 100
Norway 47.1 20.7 15.7 2.9 9.6 4.0 * 100
Sweden 43.0 21.8 25.6 3.4 3.5 2.8 * 100
Switzerland 45.3 19.1 27.0 3.1 3.6 1.8 ♦ 100
UK 38.4 26.6 11.3 3.9 7.8 6.5 5.3 100
USA 27.3 18.5 17.0 5.0 17.0 9.6 5.6 100
[b] 50% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 22.7 20.3 19.5 8.7 11.2 14.3 3.3 100
Canada 22.5 17.6 19.1 6.5 11.4 18.5 4.5 100
France 29.4 24.1 6.9 10.6 3.1 21.6 4.3 100
Germany 43.3 25.8 14.6 7.1 2.1 4.3 2.7 100
Netherlands 22.2 19.0 17.2 14.3 7.6 15.0 4.7 100
Norway 45.3 21.1 15.7 2.8 9.9 5.2 * 100
Sweden 41.1 20.9 26.5 3.9 4.0 3.6 * 100
Switzerland 42.6 19.9 273 3.3 3.9 3.0 * 100
UK 35.9 26.1 10.9 4.3 7.8 9.6 5.4 100
USA 24.8 18.3 16.9 5.5 16.3 12.5 5.7 100
[c] 60% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 21.2 19.3 19.1 8.8 11.0 17.2 3.5 100
Canada 20.4 17.0 18.5 7.2 10.4 21.8 4.7 100
France 26.4 22.3 6.5 11.5 3.2 25.8 4.4 100
Germany 40.9 25.0 14.5 7.6 2.5 6.4 3.1 100
Netherlands 21.7 19.2 16.7 14.5 7.5 15.5 4.8 100
Norway 43.3 20.9 15.6 3.0 10.2 7.0 * 100
Sweden 38.7 20.3 27.0 4.3 4.5 5.2 * 100
Switzerland 39.8 19.5 27.0 3.4 3.7 6.5 * 100
UK 32.9 24.8 10.7 4.5 7.7 14.0 5.4 100
USA 23.0 17.4 17.3 5.8 15.9 15.1 5.4 100
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Table B4. Com position of poverty population by fam ily type after social security transfers at 
40pO and 60% poverty intervals adjusted using OECD equivalence scale, circa 1980.
[a] 40% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther Total
A ustra lia 2.2 5.1 33.0 9.3 18.7 30.2 1.6 100
C anada 5.3 3.1 31.7 8.6 21.4 25.5 4.2 100
France 1.3 3.6 18.6 24.7 7.7 36.7 7.4 100
Germany 27.2 17.1 29.7 6.5 4.0 5.2 10.3 100
N etherlands 8.5 2.9 33.2 18.5 1.7 30.8 4.1 100
N orw ay 29.4 3.5 37.3 6.3 9.8 13.7 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.0 84.0 4.2 5.9 5.9 * 100
Sw itzerland 19.2 3.2 64.1 2.2 7.8 3.6 * 100
UK 6.1 1.0 30.3 5.1 15.2 38.4 4.0 100
USA 14.6 7.7 24.7 5.5 26.2 15.9 5.5 100
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single Couple 
(NC) (NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther Total
A ustra lia 3.1 5.6 29.6 8.0 19.9 31.9 1.8 100.0
C anada 7.5 5.8 29.2 8.6 18.1 26.4 4.3 100.0
France 2.0 4.7 14.8 20.2 7.1 43.7 7.4 100.0
Germany 30.7 18.1 26.4 6.2 3.4 7.7 7.4 100.0
N etherlands 8.3 3.2 29.5 20.1 1.5 32.2 5.3 100.0
N orw ay 25.3 5.3 32.0 5.3 14.7 17.3 * 100.0
Sweden 0.0 0.0 80.5 3.8 6.9 8.8 * 100.0
Sw itzerland 26.7 7.8 50.5 2.5 6.4 6.0 * 100.0
UK 25.5 26.0 13.5 6.1 11.0 15.3 2.6 100.0
USA 18.5 8.9 21.4 5.8 22.9 17.6 5.0 100.0
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) O ther Total
A ustra lia 14.6 13.1 23.2 8.5 15.6 23.5 1.4 100.0
C anada 15.5 8.9 23.9 7.7 13.9 25.5 4.4 100.0
France 15.5 6.3 9.7 15.9 5.2 42.0 5.4 100.0
Germany 32.4 20.6 21.7 4.8 2.8 11.9 5.7 100.0
N etherlands 7.2 5.4 26.1 20.2 2.0 32.0 7.2 100.0
N orw ay 19.8 9.9 25.2 5.4 20.7 18.9 * 100.0
Sweden 16.5 0.8 62.4 4.6 6.8 8.9 * 100.0
Sw itzerland 30.1 12.7 38.6 2.5 4.9 11.2 * 100.0
UK 31.6 27.7 11.6 4.4 8.1 12.4 4.2 100.0
USA 19.3 9.8 20.8 5.7 20.4 19.2 4.7 100.0
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Table B5. Composition of poverty population by family type after income taxes at 40,50 and 
60% poverty intervals adjusted using OECD equivalence scale, circa 1980.
Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
(S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other Total
Australia 2.1 4.9 32.1 9.1 18.6 31.5 1.8 100
Canada 5.2 3.1 31.1 8.4 21.2 26.7 4.3 100
France 1.4 4.0 18.6 24.9 7.6 36.2 7.3 100
Germany 20.7 14.3 273 11.4 3.1 15.3 7.9 100
Netherlands 8.6 2.9 30.7 19.5 1.5 31.6 5.2 100
Norway 26.3 4.3 35.1 6.4 10.5 17.5 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.0 73.0 6.7 4.9 15.3 * 100
Switzerland 17.8 4.2 61.3 3.1 7.3 6.3 * 100
UK 6.8 1.0 28.0 7.5 12.7 39.8 4.2 100
USA 13.8 7.4 24.1 5.7 25.6 17.9 5.6 100
[b] 50% poverty interval
Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
(S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other Total
Australia 2.9 5.3 28.0 7.5 20.4 34.0 1.9 100
Canada 7.1 5.6 28.1 8.3 17.4 29.0 4.6 100
France 2.1 4.8 14.8 20.5 7.2 43.4 7.3 100
Germany 23.8 14.6 21.7 11.0 3.9 20.3 6.2 100
Netherlands 6.9 4.2 25.9 19.4 3.0 34.7 5.9 100
Norway 21.8 3.7 31.0 4.6 14.9 21.8 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.8 66.7 8.2 5.8 18.5 * 100<
Switzerland 24.1 8.7 45.6 3.2 6.1 12.2 * 100
UK 23.7 24.2 13.5 6.3 9.9 20.2 2.3 100
USA 17.3 8.4 213 5.8 22.2 20.2 4.7 100
[c] 60% poverty interval
Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
(S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other Total
Australia 13.5 12.1 21.5 7.9 14.9 28.6 1.4 100
Canada 14.5 13.1 22.3 11.9 13.4 29.2 4.5 100
France 15.1 6.8 9.5 16.2 5.1 41.8 5.5 100
Germany 22.8 16.1 16.7 6.4 3.5 30.0 4.4 100
Netherlands 4.5 4.9 17.9 17.8 5.8 41.7 7.3 100
Norway 15.9 9.1 23.4 6.0 18.6 26.9 * 100
Sweden 11.2 3.7 50.5 8.0 6.0 20.6 * 100
Switzerland 26.7 12.5 33.7 2.9 4.8 19.4 * 100
UK 29.1 25.7 11.0 4.8 7.4 18.2 3.9 100
USA 17.3 9.1 19.9 5.8 20.0 23.3 4.5 100
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Table B6. Composition of poverty population by family type before social security transfers at 
40,50 and 60% poverty intervals adjusted using Whiteford equivalence scale, drca 1980.
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 24.2 21.3 20.4 8.5 11.3 11.0 3.3 100
Canada 25.4 18.3 21.0 6.2 11.4 13.2 4.5 100
France 34.4 27.2 7.9 10.8 2.4 13.2 4.1 100
Germany 45.0 26.6 15.0 6.6 2.0 2.0 2.8 100
Netherlands 22.5 18.8 17.9 14.4 7.7 14.0 4.6 100
Norway 47.5 20.8 16.2 2.9 9.2 3.4 * 100
Sweden 42.9 21.7 26.7 3.4 3.1 2.2 * 100
Switzerland 45.8 18.7 28.1 3.1 3.3 1.0 * 100
UK 38.9 26.9 11.6 4.0 7.6 5.6 5.3 100
USA 27.8 18.6 18.3 5.0 16.2 8.3 5.7 100
[b] 50% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 22.9 20.4 20.4 8.8 11.1 13.0 3.4 100
Canada 23.2 17.8 20.7 6.7 11.0 15.7 4.7 100
France 30.6 24.9 7.4 11.1 3.0 18.4 4.5 100
Germany 43.7 25.7 15.6 7.2 2.1 3.1 2.7 100
Netherlands 22.5 19.1 17.3 14.4 7.5 14.5 4.7 100
Norway 45.6 21.1 16.2 2.9 9.6 4.5 * 100
Sweden 41.3 20.8 27.8 3.9 3.4 2.8 * 100
Switzerland 43.0 19.6 28.8 3.2 3.6 1.8 * 100
UK 36.5 26.6 11.7 4.3 7.7 7.7 5.4 100
USA 25.6 18.7 18.1 5.6 15.7 10.4 5.8 100
[c] 60% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 21.6 19.4 20.2 9.1 10.9 15.2 3.5 100
Canada 21.0 17.0 20.2 7.4 10.4 18.7 4.8 100
France 27.3 22.8 7.1 12.0 3.1 23.1 4.6 100
Germany 41.9 25.3 15.0 10.5 2.1 4.9 3.2 100
Netherlands 22.4 19.3 16.7 14.5 7.4 14.8 4.8 100
Norway 44.0 21.2 16.4 3.1 9.6 5.7 * 100
Sweden 39.4 20.5 28.1 4.3 4.0 3.8 * 100
Switzerland 41.6 19.5 28.7 3.4 3.6 3.1 * 100
UK 33.9 25.6 11.3 4.7 7.6 11.4 5.5 100
USA 23.7 17.7 18.5 6.2 15.4 13.0 5.6 100
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Table B7. Composition of poverty population by family type after social security transfers at 
40,50 and 60% poverty intervals adjusted using Whiteford equivalence scale, circa 1980.
[a] 40% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 3.8 5.1 41.2 9.5 15.7 22.6 2.0 100
Canada 7.2 3.3 39.6 8.9 17.3 19.2 4.5 100
France 1.5 3.9 23.5 26.6 6.5 29.9 8.0 100
Germany 32.7 13.6 33.0 5.1 3.2 4.2 8.2 100
Netherlands 9.7 3.0 34.7 18.4 1.0 29.2 4.2 100
Norway 31.6 2.8 38.6 6.4 8.8 10.5 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.0 85.6 4.2 5.1 5.1 * 100
Switzerland 24.9 2.6 62.4 2.1 5.8 2.1 * 100
UK 34.3 9.0 28.9 4.8 5.4 14.5 3.0 100
USA 21.5 7.5 27.3 5.3 21.2 11.9 5.2 100
[b]M % ^o^^^nterval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lewie
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 7.4 5.9 33.2 7.9 17.5 25.8 1.9 100
Canada 16.1 6.0 30.8 8.0 15.2 19.5 4.4 100
France 20.6 4.4 15.2 18.5 5.6 28.0 7.3 100
Germany 38.5 15.8 27.0 5.5 2.7 3.3 7.2 100
Netherlands 8.4 3.3 30.3 19.8 1.5 31.5 5.1 100
Norway 26.6 6.3 34.2 6.4 12.7 13.9 * 100
Sweden 0.0 0.0 863 3.8 5.0 5.0 * 100
Switzerland 33.0 6.5 50.5 2.3 4.9 2.9 * 100
UK 39.1 23.9 15.6 5.0 5.9 8.1 2.5 100
USA 22.0 9.1 23.9 5.9 20.5 13.7 4.9 100
[c] 60% poverty interval
Aged
(S)
Aged
(C)
Single
(NC)
Couple
(NC)
Lone
Parent
Couple
(CH) Other Total
Australia 21.9 13.9 24.6 8.1 12.6 17.2 1.5 100
Canada 20.7 9.7 25.1 7.5 12.4 20.3 4.2 100
France 21.9 10.7 12.1 15.5 4.8 29.8 5.3 100
Germany 38.8 19.0 24.6 4.1 2.2 5.0 5.3 100
Netherlands 7.4 5.5 27.7 20.4 1.8 29.8 7.4 100
Norway 463 9.1 25.0 3.0 8.8 7.9 * 100
Sweden 24.1 0.8 60.5 4.1 5.3 5.3 * 100
Switzerland 36.7 11.5 40.7 2 3 4.2 4.6 * 100
UK 40.9 25.4 12.2 4.0 6.3 7.4 3.8 100
USA 22.2 10.0 22.7 5.9 18.8 15.8 4.7 100
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Table B.8. Cumulative poverty rate9 and head-count reduction Australia, OECD scale.
Pre-transfer poverty rates as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 79.6 68 24.7 10.7 55.6 8.9 22.9
50 82.1 70.2 26.6 12.1 59.3 11.6 25.5
60 83.6 73.1 28.5 13.3 63.5 15.3 28.9
Post-transfer poverty rates as a
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 1.6 3.6 9.1 2.6 20.5 5.4 2.9
50 3.8 6.9 13.9 3.8 39.5 10.2 5.1
60 33.4 28.9 20 7.6 54.3 16 7.1
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 98 95 63 76 63 39 87
50 95 90 48 69 33 12 80
60 60 60 30 43 14 -5 75
Table B.9. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction Canada, OECD scale.
Pre-transfer poverty rates as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 68.1 48.2 20.5 6.3 45.1 9.4 22.2
50 71.5 55.2 23.5 8 50.4 13.5 26.3
60 75 6 1 3 26.3 10.2 53.5 18.4 31.7
Post-transfer poverty rates as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 5.0 2.9 11.6 3.2 28.6 5.9 7.6
50 11.3 8.7 17.3 5.2 38.7 10.6 13.3
60 36.1 20.4 21.4 7.4 46.3 16.7 20.5
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 93 94 43 49 37 37 66
50 84 84 26 35 23 21 49
60 52 67 19 27 13 9 35
BIO
Table B.10. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction France, OECD scale.
Pre-transfer povei
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 85.9 73.8 20.7 15.2 31.2 13.7 27.9
50 87.5 77.7 23.2 17.9 39.4 21.5 34.1
60 88.7 81.3 24.7 22 45.1 29 39.8
'ost-transfer ]poverty rates as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 0.6 1.7 8.5 5.7 12.9 4.9 7.9
50 1.4 3.4 10.8 7.5 19.4 9.3 12.6
60 18.8 9.2 13.4 11.5 26.4 17.3 18.3
Reduction in  poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 99 98 59 63 59 64 72
50 98 96 53 58 51 57 63
60 79 89 46 48 41 40 54
Table B .ll. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction Germany, OECD scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 84.6 68.3 24.2 10.3 20.8 2.5 25.1
50 85.8 70.6 24.8 11.5 22.8 4.5 25.1
60 87.8 74.1 26.7 13.4 29 7.3 31
Post-transfer poverty rates as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
O therin terval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH)
40 4.3 4.1 4.9 2.0 3.5 1.7 7.8
50 10.4 8.8 8.2 3.4 9.4 4.7 12.9
60 18.4 17.9 11.6 4.3 15.5 12.8 17.0
Reduction in  poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 95 94 80 81 83 32 69
50 88 88 67 70 59 -4 49
60 79 76 57 68 47 -75 45
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Table B.12. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction Netherlands, OECD scale.
Pre-transfer poverty rates as a
Poverty Aged Aged Single
interval (S) (C) (N C )
40 68.9 60.7 44.5
50 72.9 64.0 45.2
60 74.0 67.0 45.7
Couple Lone Couple
(N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
18.0 72.4 12.5 38.8
18.6 73.0 13.5 41.5
19.6 74.8 14.6 43.5
Poverty Aged Aged Single
interval (S) (C) (N C )
40 4.9 1.7 13.9
50 4.9 3.0 14.6
60 4.9 5.4 15.3
Couple Lone Couple
(N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
4.4 2.4 5.0 7.7
5.5 6.0 6.8 11.2
7.6 18.0 12.3 21.0
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single
interval (S) (C) (N C )
40 93 97 69
50 93 95 68
60 93 92 67
Couple Lone Couple
(N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
76 97 60 80
70 92 50 73
61 76 16 52
Table B.13. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction Norway, OECD scale.
rate^sapercentag^offam i^^ges^
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 80.4 56.8 25.1 7.9 32.4 3.2 *
50 82.7 61.8 26.7 8.1 35.7 4.4 ♦
60 85.0 66.1 28.5 9.1 39.5 6.4 *
>overty rates as a percentage of family
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 5.6 1.4 6.7 2.1 4.1 1.7 *
50 7.0 2.6 9.1 2.8 9.5 3.2 *
60 8.5 8.8 11.3 3.8 19.5 6.6 *
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 93 98 73 73 87 47 *
50 92 96 66 65 73 27 *
60 90 87 60 58 51 -3 *
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Table B.14. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction Sweden, OECD scale.
_P re-te^ sfer^ £ove^ ^ ate^ s^ gercenta^ ^ £fam ib
Poverty Aged Aged Single
interval (S) (C) (NC)
40 89.1 78.2 25.3
50 92.0 81.1 28.2
60 93.6 85.2 31.2
Couple Lone Couple
(NC) Parent (CH) O ther
7.4 26.3 4.6 *
9.3 33.0 6.4 *
10.9 39.8 10.1 *
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.8 3.4 0.8 *
50 0.0 0.0 8.5 1.0 5.4 1.6 *
60 5.5 0.5 9.8 1.8 7.9 2.4 *
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 100 100 74 89 87 83 *
50 100 100 70 89 84 75 *
60 94 99 69 83 80 76 *
Table B.15. C um ulative poverty rates and head-count reduction Switzerland, OECD scale.
Pre-transfer poverty rates as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 67.2 49.7 16.1 4.3 19.1 1.6 *
50 72.8 59.9 18.7 5.2 23.8 3.1 *
60 78.7 67.7 21.4 6.2 26.0 7.8 *
Post-transfer poverty rates as a percentage of family
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 7.6 3.2 10.6 1.3 11.4 1.7 *
50 18.6 11.9 14.2 2.3 17.1 5.8 *
60 33.4 27.8 17.0 3.3 21.8 14.9 *
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 89 94 34 70 40 -6 *
50 74 80 24 56 28 -87 *
60 58 59 21 47 16 -91 *
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Table B.16. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction UK, OECD scale.
»ercentegeo^am i^t^ges^
Poverty Aged Aged Single
in te rv al (S) (C) (NC)
40 83.8 64.9 26.4
50 86.2 70.1 27.9
60 88.8 75.0 31.0
Couple Lone Couple
(NC) Parent (CH) O ther
5.1 49.3 5.2 26.6
6.1 54.3 8.5 29.8
7.2 60.0 13.8 33.3
Poverty Aged Aged Single
in te rv al (S) (C) (NC)
40 0.9 0.1 4.1
50 15.6 17.8 9.4
60 42.4 41.7 17.0
Couple Lone Couple
(NC) Parent (CH) O ther
0.6 5.0 2.0 1.3
2.4 18.8 4.8 3.4
4.2 30.9 9.6 13.0
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 99 100 84 88 90 62 95
50 82 75 66 61 65 44 89
60 52 44 45 42 49 30 61
Table B.17. Cumulative poverty rates and head-count reduction US, OECD scale.
Pre-transfer poverty rates as a percentage of family types.
E S 5 5 5 2 5 5 3 0 B I9 3 E E 5 S B B S S 3 E B B 5 3 mE S 9 9 H IH B H B H H E R E S B E B H H 9 B 9 E S m 3 3 S 9 E 9 9 H H H H B B E B H !S B H S B H I
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC) (N C) Parent (CH) O ther
40 68.9 49.9 18.8 6.2 48.0 7.6 30.0
50 72.6 57.4 21.6 7.9 53.3 11.5 35.0
60 76.4 61.8 25.2 9.7 59.2 15.8 37.8
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC) (N C) Parent (CH) O ther
40 16.4 9.4 12.6 3.3 34.0 6.7 14.1
50 31.9 16.4 17.3 5.3 45.7 11.7 18.4
60 43.4 24.2 22.0 7.3 56.1 18.3 24.2
Reduction in poverty count as a percentage of family types.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rval (S) (C) (NC) (N C) Parent (CH) O ther
40 76 81 33 47 29 12 53
50 56 71 20 33 14 -2 47
60 43 61 13 25 5 -16 36
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Table B.18. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Australia 
OECD equivalence scale.
Pre-t
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 87 80 79 76 87 67 70
50 87 81 78 73 85 58 69
60 87 81 76 71 82 51 66
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 42 32 61 47 36 43 26
50 27 28 48 42 32 34 26
60 8 13 41 29 33 35 30
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 42 32 61 46 36 41 23
50 27 28 48 41 30 32 26
60 8 13 41 29 33 30 30
Table B.19. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Australia 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Pre-te^Mfe^gwert^^ags^s^gercentag^o^govert^ine
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 86 80 78 75 87 69 69
50 87 82 78 73 85 61 69
60 88 82 76 70 82 55 67
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 28 33 50 46 37 49 24
50 17 28 46 42 30 34 29
60 14 14 40 29 31 35 27
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
O therin terval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH)
40 28 33 50 46 37 48 22
50 17 28 46 41 28 33 28
60 14 14 39 29 31 31 28
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Table B.20. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Canada 
OECD equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 79 67 74 59 76 46 68
50 79 65 70 55 73 42 64
60 79 65 68 50 74 40 59
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 23 25 48 39 34 31 31
50 21 20 43 36 37 31 31
60 16 18 44 36 42 31 31
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 23 25 48 39 33 30 30
50 21 20 43 36 37 29 29
60 16 18 44 34 41 28 29
Table B.21. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Canada 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Pre-transfer poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 80 67 71 57 77 48 67
50 79 65 68 53 74 44 62
60 80 65 67 50 74 42 59
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 23 23 42 37 35 32 29
50 16 19 44 36 36 31 29
60 20 17 45 36 40 30 32
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 23 22 42 37 35 31 29
50 16 19 44 35 36 29 29
60 20 17 43 33 39 28 31
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Table B.22. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, France 
OECD equivalence scale.
Pre-transfer pove
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 90 83 78 71 61 39 70
50 91 82 75 66 56 36 64
60 91 82 75 60 57 36 61
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 75 33 48 38 40 31 38
50 33 27 48 41 39 27 35
60 9 19 47 36 38 25 35
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 70 37 48 38 40 31 38
50 33 29 48 41 38 27 35
60 10 19 47 36 38 25 35
Table B.23. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, France 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Pre-transfer poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 90 83 75 70 69 40 70
50 91 83 75 66 56 36 63
60 91 82 72 59 55 35 60
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 73 33 48 40 47 35 38
50 6 25 47 39 39 30 32
60 15 12 41 37 34 26 35
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 70 37 47 40 45 35 39
50 6 27 47 39 39 30 32
60 15 12 41 36 34 25 35
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Table B.24. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Germany 
OECD equivalence scale.
^^^ ans^ ^ ^ ove^ y^ ag^ sji^ ercentag^ of^ overt^ T ine
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 95 91 89 82 69 53 82
50 94 90 89 77 69 39 85
60 93 87 85 71 60 33 72
Poverty
interval
40
50
60
Aged
(S)
36
26
25
Aged
(C)
25
23
21
Single
(NC)
47
35
35
poverty line
Couple Lone Couple
(NC) Parent (CH) O ther
47 46 53 26
32 35 26 31
35 35 18 35
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 36 23 43 43 46 27 27
50 26 23 36 34 25 19 30
60 25 21 35 38 24 16 34
Table B.25. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Germany 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 95 90 90 82 66 65 82
50 94 90 84 77 67 46 86
60 93 88 85 72 67 36 70
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 30 25 39 48 44 49 27
50 24 24 36 33 35 41 29
60 25 22 33 30 36 26 34
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
O therinterval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH)
40 30 24 38 47 44 29 28
50 24 23 35 37 30 27 28
60 25 21 31 34 30 17 34
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Table B.26. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Netherlands 
OECD equivalence scale.
>overty gaps as a percentage ot povei 
Poverty Aged Aged Single
interval (S) (C) (NC)
40 77 78 98
50 78 78 97
60 80 78 96
Couple Lone Couple
(NC) Parent (CH) O ther
91 93 86 89
90 93 83 86
87 92 80 84
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 36 34 93 80 55 79 75
50 46 40 92 70 54 71 56
60 55 29 91 66 40 67 44
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 49 36 94 73 46 73 65
50 59 • 31 91 65 28 59 51
60 66 26 89 53 17 39 34
Table B.27. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Netherlands 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 77 78 97 92 95 88 89
50 79 78 97 91 94 84 87
60 79 78 96 88 93 82 83
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 39 35 92 83 72 85 75
50 51 40 93 71 51 71 60
60 59 29 91 66 41 71 43
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 54 36 94 75 55 76 64
50 63 31 88 64 30 66 51
60 63 27 84 52 24 52 35
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Table B.28. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Norway 
OECD equivalence scale.
Pre-transfer poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 81 72 82 70 71 45 *
50 83 72 81 74 71 43 *
60 84 72 79 70 69 39 *
aps as a percentage of povei
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 48 26 53 43 45 38 *
50 49 24 51 42 31 33 *
60 51 18 51 38 25 31 *
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 49 33 52 41 44 33 *
50 49 28 49 42 28 29 *
60 48 16 48 40 24 24 *
Table B.29. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Norway 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 82 73 81 70 71 50 *
50 83 72 79 73 70 45 *
60 84 73 78 71 71 41 *
Poverty Aged Aged Single
interval (S) (C) (N C )
40 48 32 51
50 51 19 52
60 16 11 33
Couple Lone Couple
(N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
41 45 39 *
41 33 33 *
42 26 31 *
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (N C ) (N C ) Parent (CH ) Other
40 48 30 48 40 44 41 *
50 49 21 47 39 32 31 *
60 16 12 33 37 24 24 *
B20
Table B30. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Sweden 
OECD equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rva l (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 78 73 65 62 66 44 *
50 80 76 66 57 59 42 *
60 82 76 65 56 56 35 *
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 0 0 44 44 48 43 *
50 0 15 44 45 39 32 *
60 4 11 48 34 37 31 *
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 0 0 42 40 45 26 *
50 0 15 42 33 35 27 *
60 5 10 43 31 30 24 *
Table B.31. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Sweden 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 79 76 64 62 68 45 *
50 80 75 64 57 65 44 *
60 83 77 66 56 58 39 *
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC) (N C) Parent (CH ) O ther
40 0 0 48 45 52 41 *
50 0 0 45 47 49 42 *
60 8 9 47 34 35 33 *
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single
in te rv a l (S) (C) (NC)
40 0 0 40
50 3 34 44
60 8 9 43
Couple Lone Couple
(N C) Parent (CH ) O th er
39 45 29 *
33 44 26 *
31 31 27 *
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Table B.32. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Switzerland 
OECD equivalence scale.
Pre-transfer jpoverty ga|>s as a percenta ge of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC)
40 67 56 67 70
50 68 56 65 65
60 69 56 63 61
Lone
Parent
62
58
60
Couple
(CH)
34
29
20
Other
*
*
*
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 18 21 59 43 40 25 *
50 20 15 53 35 40 20 *
60 22 16 51 32 42 16 *
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 18 24 56 35 38 23 *
50 20 16 50 30 37 16 *
60 22 18 50 31 39 16 *
Table B.33. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, Switzerland 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Pre-transfer poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 68 56 67 70 64 43 *
50 69 55 63 65 58 32 *
60 69 57 63 60 59 27 *
^os^w d^^ecuri^^over^^ags^s^^erceiU ag^o^cw e^^in^
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 17 22 56 42 39 30 *
50 20 16 51 35 40 22 ♦
60 22 16 49 32 41 19 *
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 18 25 54 40 37 45 *
50 21 17 51 31 36 20 *
60 22 17 49 31 37 16 *
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Table B.34. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, UK 
OECD equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 83 72 84 69 81 54 76
50 84 73 83 65 78 42 73
60 84 73 78 61 74 34 70
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 25 7 38 21 15 22 16
50 9 8 27 15 15 23 14
60 13 15 24 21 21 23 14
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 31 7 40 36 15 22 13
50 . 9 8 27 20 15 20 17
60 14 15 25 22 21 20 14
Table B.35. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, UK 
' Whiteford equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 83 72 83 69 82 58 77
50 84 72 79 65 78 46 74
60 85 73 78 61 75 37 71
^Pos^sodal^e^m^£0^^^ga£9^a^gercentege^f^ovei
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 6 2 30 16 18 24 15
50 12 10 24 16 13 22 12
60 18 17 28 22 18 24 16
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 8 21 33 30 18 24 13
50 13 10 25 20 13 20 13
60 18 17 28 23 18 20 16
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Table B.36. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, USA 
OECD equivalence scale.
Pre-transfer poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 80 64 74 60 75 48 66
50 80 63 70 55 73 42 64
60 80 65 65 53 70 39 65
P o s^ o d a ^ e c u r it^ jg o v e r t^ a g ^ ^ jg te rc e n ta g ^ o ^ o v e r t^ in ^
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 28 27 57 41 40 36 43
50 27 28 52 36 41 33 42
60 31 30 49 37 45 33 43
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 28 27 • 57 42 40 33 41
50 27 28 50 37 41 30 43
60 31 30 48 37 43 29 42
Table B37. Poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line, by family type, USA 
Whiteford equivalence scale.
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 80 64 71 60 76 49 65
50 80 63 68 54 73 44 64
60 80 65 65 52 71 40 64
Post social security poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) O ther
40 24 28 53 40 40 38 42
50 30 28 51 36 40 33 42
60 33 30 49 37 43 32 43
Post tax poverty gaps as a percentage of poverty line
Poverty Aged Aged Single Couple Lone Couple
interval (S) (C) (NC) (NC) Parent (CH) Other
40 24 28 52 39 40 37 39
50 30 28 49 37 39 31 43
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Table B38. Aggregate poverty gaps as percentage of GDP and poverty reduction 
OECD equivalence scales
pre­
transfer
gap
post­
social
security
gap
post-tax
gaP
post­
social
security
reduction
post-tax
reduction
40% poverty line
Australia 3.4 0.5 0.5 85.2 84.9
Canada 2.9 0.6 0.6 78.9 78.5
France 4.7 0.5 0.5 89.6 89.4
Germany 4.9 0.2 0.3 96.1 94.7
Netherlands 5.0 0.9 1.0 81.2 80.0
Norway 3.4 0.2 0.3 92.7 92.1
Sweden 3.0 0.1 0.2 95.2 93.6
Switzerland 3.4 0.6 0.7 82.7 80.8
UK 2.4 0.1 0.1 97.7 97.0
USA 4.0 1.2 1.2 70.7 69.0
50% poverty line
Australia 4.5 0.9 0.9 80.2 79.4
Canada 4.2 1.2 1.3 71.1 70.0
France 6.7 1.0 1.0 85.7 85.5
Germany 6.4 0.4 0.6 93.9 91.3
Netherlands 6.5 1.3 1.4 80.4 78.7
Norway 4.6 0.4 0.5 90.7 89.7
Sweden 4.1 0.2 0.4 94.2- 91.4
Switzerland 4.9 1.1 1.2 78.5 74.8
UK 3.3 0.2 0.2 93.9 92.6
USA 5.6 2.1 2.3 62.5 59.7
60% poverty line
Australia 5.8 1.5 1.6 73.7 71.7
Canada 5.7 2.1 2.2 63.1 60.7
France 9.0 1.8 1.8 803 79.9
Germany 8.0 0.8 1.2 90.6 85.4
Netherlands 8.1 1.7 1.9 79.4 76.0
Norway 5.9 0.7 0.8 88.0 85.6
Sweden 5.3 0.4 0.6 93.0 88.5
Switzerland 6.7 1.9 2.4 72.1 64.9
UK 4.3 0.6 0.7 86.3 83.6
USA 7.6 3.4 3.7 54.8 50.6
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Table B.39. Aggregate poverty gaps as percentage of GDP and poverty reduction 
__________Whiteford equivalence scales____________________________________
pre­
transfer
gap
post­
social
security
gap
post-tax
gap
post­
social
security
reduction
post-tax
reduction
40% poverty line
Australia 3.5 0.5 0.5 86.1 86.0
Canada 3.0 0.6 0.6 80.0 79.8
France 4.8 0.5 0.5 90.5 90.3
Germany 5.2 0.2 0.3 95.8 94.7
Netherlands 5.1 0.9 1.0 81.9 80.9
Norway 3.7 0.3 0.3 92.7 92.1
Sweden 3.1 0.2 0.2 95.1 93.7
Switzerland 3.6 0.7 0.7 82.1 80.4
UK 2.6 0.1 0.1 97.9 97.4
USA 4.0 1.1 1.2 72.3 71.0
50% poverty line
Australia 4.7 0.9 0.9 81.6 81.1
Canada 4.2 1.2 1.2 72.4 71.7
France 6.6 0.9 0.9 87.1 86.9
Germany 6.7 0.4 0.6 93.4 91.6
Netherlands 6.6 1.2 1.3 81.3 79.8
Norway 5.0 0.5 0.5 90.9 90.1
Sweden 4.2 0.2 0.3 94.1 91.8
Switzerland 5.2 1.1 1.3 77.9 75.1
UK 3.5 0.2 0.3 93.0 92.0
USA 5.6 2.0 2.1 64.4 62.2
60% poverty line
Australia 6.0 1.6 1.7 73.2 71.9
Canada 5.7 2.1 2.2 63.8 62.1
France 8.8 1.6 1.6 82.0 81.7
Germany 8.3 0.8 1.1 89.9 86.6
Netherlands 8.1 1.6 1.8 80.4 78.0
Norway 6.4 0.8 0.9 87.5 85.8
Sweden 5.4 0.4 0.6 92.8 89.2
Switzerland 7.0 2.0 2.3 71.8 67.2
UK 4.5 0.7 0.8 83.9 82.0
USA 7.5 3.3 3.5 56.6 53.2
A p p e n d ix  C  
I n e q u a l it y  m e a s u r e s :
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C2
Table C.l. Income inequality measures after social security OECD e<
G G* P R H V E C CD
Australia 0.4143 0.3359 0.9456 0.1892 -0.0155 0.2047 0.0985 -0.5313 03295
Canada 0.3865 0.3245 0.7717 0.1605 -0.0157 0.1762 0.0968 -0.3852 03184
France 0.4707 0.3435 0.9190 0.2703 -0.1180 03883 0.2483 -0.4482 0.2879
Germany 0.4066 0.2796 0.9188 0.3125 -0.0643 03767 0.2001 -0.5122 0.2534
Netherlands 0.4672 0.3291 0.8963 0.2957 -0.0739 03696 0.2387 -0.4291 0.2945
Norway 0.3848 0.2854 0.9059 0.2583 -0.0454 03037 0.1481 -0.5211 0.2679
Sweden 0.4168 0.2407 0.8127 0.4225 -0.1185 05409 0.3840 -0.3959 0.1913
Switzerland 0.4142 0.3574 0.9374 0.1373 -0.0211 0.1584 0.0753 -0.5232 03486
UK 0.3928 0.2933 0.6541 0.2532 -0.0276 0.2809 0.2029 -0.2613 0.2825
US 0.4252 0.3690 0.8596 0.1322 -0.0248 0.1570 0.0842 -0.4344 03585
Table C.2. Income inequality measures after social security Whiteford equivalence
G G* P R H V E C CD
Australia 0.4024 0.3264 0.9238 0.1888 -0.0120 0.2009 0.0959 -0.5214 03216
Canada 0.3758 0.3146 0.7612 0.1627 -0.0131 0.1758 0.0950 -0.3855 03097
France 0.4628 0.3350 0.8936 0.2761 -0.0974 03735 0.2398 -0.4308 0.2900
Germany 0.3958 0.2733 0.8853 0.3096 -0.0488 03583 0.1908 -0.4895 0.2540
Netherlands 0.4575 0.3204 0.8572 0.2998 -0.0520 03517 0.2311 -0.3997 0.2966
Norway 0.3733 0.2776 0.8894 0.2562 -0.0357 0.2919 0.1396 -0.5162 0.2643
Sweden 0.4103 0.2362 0.7971 0.4242 -0.1007 03249 0.3702 -0.3868 0.1949
Switzerland 0.4056 0.3500 0.9505 0.1371 -0.0168 0.1539 0.0703 -0.5449 03432
UK 0.3826 0.2866 0.6386 0.2509 -0.0268 0.2777 0.1996 -0.2560 0.2763
US 0.4152 0.3591 0.8634 0.1352 -0.0215 0.1566 0.0815 -0.4482 03502
Notes to tables: G = pre-transfer Gini coefficient
G*= post-transfer Gini coefficient 
P = progressivity index of the benefit or tax 
R = net redistribution achieved by the social security or tax system 
H = re-ranking or "leap-frogging" index 
V = vertical (or gross) redistribution
E = average incidence of benefits and taxes for the income unit 
C = concentration index of benefit/tax received/paid by the unit ranked by 
pre-transfer position
CD= concentration index of post-transfer income
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Table C3. Income inequality measures after taxes OECD equivalence
G G* P R H V E C CD
Australia 0.3349 0.2872 0.1802 0.1426 -0.0053 0.1479 0.2156 0.5151 0.2854
Canada 0.3220 0.2931 0.1747 0.0899 -0.0075 0.0974 0.1522 0.4967 0.2906
France 0.3438 03065 0.3984 0.1085 -0.0023 0.1108 0.0873 0.7422 0.3057
Germany 0.2780 0.2517 0.1480 0.0946 -0.0719 0.1665 0.2383 0.4259 0.2317
Netherlands 0.3284 0.2932 0.0843 0.1074 -0.0233 0.1307 0.3373 0.4128 0.2855
Norway 0.2816 0.2342 0.1595 0.1682 -0.0248 0.1930 0.2541 0.4411 0.2273
Sweden 0.2408 0.1967 0.1388 0.1829 -0.0598 0.2427 0.2963 0.3795 0.1823
Switzerland 0.3533 03355 0.1089 0.0504 -0.0165 0.0668 0.1781 0.4622 0.3297
UK 0.2880 0.2638 0.1417 0.0841 -0.0158 0.0999 0.1687 0.4297 0.2592
US 0.3645 03168 0.1981 0.1307 -0.0133 0.1440 0.2095 0.5625 0.3120
G G* P R H V E C CD
Australia 0.3255 0.2760 0.1845 0.1519 -0.0043 0.1562 0.2161 0.5100 0.2746
Canada 0.3120 0.2820 0.1801 0.0963 -0.0075 0.1038 0.1524 0.4921 0.2797
France 0.3354 02980 0.4034 0.1114 -0.0023 0.1137 0.0864 0.7388 0.2973
Germany 0.2718 0.2425 0.1550 0.1078 -0.0727 0.1806 0.2405 0.4269 0.2227
Netherlands 0.3197 0.2814 0.0890 0.1199 -0.0224 0.1423 0.3382 0.4088 0.2742
Norway 0.2736 02251 0.1609 0.1773 -0.0236 0.2009 0.2547 0.4345 0.2187
Sweden 0.2363 0.1929 0.1374 0.1835 -0.0615 0.2450 0.2964 03737 0.1784
Switzerland 0.3457 03274 0.1108 0.0531 -0.0165 0.0697 0.1785 0.4565 0.3217
UK 0.2813 0.2578 0.1381 0.0833 -0.0164 0.0997 0.1687 0.4194 0.2532
US 0.3545 03051 0.2041 0.1394 -0.0131 0.1525 0.2095 0.5586 0.3005
Notes to tables: G = pre-transfer Gini coefficient
G*= post-transfer Gini coefficient 
P = progressivity index of the benefit or tax
R = net redistribution achieved by the social security or tax system 
H = re-ranking or "leap-frogging" index 
V = vertical (or gross) redistribution
E = average incidence of benefits and taxes for the income unit 
C = concentration index of benefit/tax received/paid by the unit ranked by 
pre-transfer position
CD= concentration index of post-transfer income
Appendix D
Welfare effort calculations.
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Table D.l. Social Security and related tax expenditures,1980.
Social security 
expenditure
Tax expenditure 
non-super
Tax expenditure 
super
Compound
transfer
expenditure
Australia 9478 926 1226 11630
Canada 22727 3626 3140 29493
France 470580 7198 1240 479018
Germany 242210 2720 3996 248926
Netherlands 64050 3914 9717 77681
Norway 31334 * * 31334
Sweden 85090 11037 11832 107959
Switzerland 15260 * * 15260
UK 21361 2623 1644 25628
USA 218796 19869 36745 275410
Social
Security /GDP 
%
Social Security 
per capita
$US#
Compound 
transfer 
expend/GDP 
%
Compound 
transfer expend 
per capita 
$US#
Australia 6.9 624 8.5 765
Canada 7.4 838 9.6 1087
France 16.8 1597 17.1 1625
Germany 16.4 1638 16.8 1684
Netherlands 19.0 1836 23.1 2226
Norway 11.0 1136 * *
Sweden 16.2 1926 20.6 2443
Switzerland 9.0 984 * *
UK 9.3 771 10.3 897
USA 8.1 906 10.2 1140
Notes to table: * Data not available 
# Converted to $US using purchasing power parities 
Social security transfers: millions of currency unit 
Tax expenditures non-super: millions of currency unit 
Tax expenditures super: millions of currency unit 
Net transfer expenditure: millions of currency unit 
Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP 
Social security transfers per capita in $US 
Net transfer expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
Net transfer expenditure per capita in $US
Sources: Social security transfers- Varley, R (1986)
Tax expenditures- OECD (1984); McDaniel,P and Surrey^ (1985) 
GDP- OECD National Accounts (1986)
Purchasing Power Parities- OECD National Accounts (1986)
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Table D.2. Accounting for taxes in social security effort measures.
Australia
Clawback
26.5
CTE/GDP
8.5
CTE/per
capita#
765
NE/GDP
5.1
NE/per
capita#
458
Canada 33.3 9.6 1087 4.9 559
France 11.7 17.1 1625 14.8 1410
Germany 19.3 16.8 1684 13.2 1322
Netherlands 43.3 23.1 2226 10.8 1041
Norway 28.5 * * 7.9 812
Sweden 42.9 20.6 2443 9.3 1100
Switzerland 24.6 * * 6.8 742
UK 36.9 10.3 897 5.9 486
USA 22.4 10.2 1140 6.3 703
Notes to table as above.
TableDj3^ccountog^^^nddenceof^odaJ^ecuii^^xg«iditures^^TO^ogulationj^M .
Vertical
expenditure
efficiency
%
VEE
Post-tax
%
Effective
SS/GDP
%
Effective 
SS/per cap 
1980 $US
Effective
NE/GDP
%
Effective 
NE/pc 
1980 $US
Australia 68.4 90.3 4.7 427 4.6 414
Canada 51.7 74.6 3.8 433 3.7 417
France 69.4 75.6 11.6 1108 11.2 1066
Germany 65.1 78.9 10.7 1067 10.4 1043
Netherlands 64 86.4 12.2 1175 9.3 899
Norway 67 86.6 7.4 761 6.8 703
Sweden 61.5 84.2 10.0 1184 7.8 926
Switzerland 63.2 76.6 5.7 622 5.2 568
UK 44.3 67.6 4.1 341 4.0 329
USA 59.8 75.1 4.9 542 4.7 528
Table D.4. Efficiency measures._________________________________________
Poverty Efficient Efficient
reduction
efficiency
%
Efficient
SS/GDP
%
SS/per 
capita 
1980 $US
Efficient
CTE/GDP
%
CTE/per 
capita 
1980 $US
Australia 51.8 3.6 323 5.9 534
Canada 38.7 2.9 324 5.5 620
France 34.3 5.7 548 6.6 629
Germany 36.2 5.9 593 7.5 749
Netherlands 27.3 5.2 501 10.9 1055
Norway 37.0 4.1 420 * *
Sweden 23.9 3.9 460 8.5 1011
Switzerland 40.9 3.7 402 * *
UK 32.1 3.0 247 5.6 452
USA 41.4 3.4 375 5.4 600
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Comparative measures of welfare effort.
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Welfare effort: an introduction.
In a recent article in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Gilbert 
and Moon (1988) challenge the conventional definition of welfare effort 
which is published by the ILO and widely used by researchers to compare 
and explain differences in welfare expenditures in OECD countries.1
The conventional measure of welfare effort expresses direct government 
outlays for social programs as a percentage of a country's gross domestic 
product:
DE-
GDP ...[1]
Direct welfare expenditures for each country are compiled by the OECD and 
comprise expenditures on: health, education, income transfers and social 
services.2
On the basis of this measure, countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands 
are said to be 'leaders' in social welfare effort while the US, Australia and 
Japan are considered as 'laggards.'3
Gilbert and Moon challenge the conventional welfare effort measure on 
three grounds:
(i) they argue that the definition of social welfare effort should be extended to include 
indirect expenditures through the taxation system and private/voluntary transfers;
(ii) that welfare effort comparisons should be adjusted to reflect the degree of need in each 
country; and
(iii) that these comparisons should be similarly adjusted to reflect the tax burden in each 
country.
This paper critically examines Gilbert and Moon’s arguments, suggests some 
alternative measures, and discusses the implications of this approach for the 
welfare effort literature.
1. Gilbert and Moon’s critique of the conventional approach.
1.1 Extending the definition of social welfare effort.
As noted above, the conventional index of welfare effort currently includes 
only those direct expenditures by government on social programs. Gilbert 
and Moon argue that this measure should (in theory) be extended to include
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indirect or taxation expenditures (eg: deductions for dependents) and 
private/voluntary financing.4
In considering tax expenditures, Gilbert and Moon cite Titmuss' argument 
that whether income is provided through direct expenditures or as a savings 
on taxes the net effect is identical. Gilbert and Moon underline this 
argument by pointing out that in a comparative context
Excluding tax benefits from an appraisal of social welfare 
expenditures would result in underestimating the welfare efforts of 
countries that rely most heavily on "indirect" provisions of social 
support through the tax system.5
In relation to private and voluntary financing, Gilbert and Moon argue that:
... an ideal measure of the expenditure component would also include 
the value of cash and in-kind benefits that are transferred outside 
market channels through charitable agencies and informal 
arrangements with family and friends.6
However, they immediately concede the difficulty of operationalising this 
measure. They note that the lack of systematic and comparable data on this 
element makes it 'unfeasible [sic] to incorporate these costs into the 
expenditure component of welfare effort.'7
Thus, they extend the conventional measure [1] by the addition of tax 
expenditures to give an alternative measure of social welfare expenditure: 
DF+TF
GDP ... [2]
1.2 Adjusting for need.
The major challenge to the conventional welfare effort index which Gilbert 
and Moon present is that of attempting to take need into account when 
ranking the welfare effort of various countries. They reject the underlying 
assumption of the conventional index that 'more is better.' They illustrate 
their point by the following argument:
Should a country with a relatively small elderly population be 
regarded as making an inferior welfare effort if they spend a lower 
proportion of their GDP on social security pensions than a country 
with substantially more elderly persons? What if the first country 
spent less as an overall percent of their GDP, but more per capita on 
the elderly?8
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In considering how need might be expressed on a comparable basis for their 
index Gilbert and Moon discuss a number of variables: pre tax and transfer 
poverty rates; constructing an index which focuses on those groups which 
traditionally form the core of social welfare beneficiaries eg: families with 
children, the elderly, single parent families and the unemployed. Given 
operational constraints (data availability and comparability) they settle for a 
need index which incorporates: the dependency ratio, single parent families 
as a proportion of all families and the unemployment rate (equally 
weighted) .9 Thus:
NEED= dependency ratio + sole parent families + unemployment rate
DE-t-TE___
(GDP)(NEED) ...[3]
1.3 Adjusting for tax revenues.
In addition to adjusting the welfare effort index for need, Gilbert and Moon 
advance several arguments for further adjusting the index to reflect the tax 
burden.
The first concerns the amount of tax revenue which is expended on social 
welfare programs:
... if two countries spend the same percent of their GDP's on social 
welfare, and one collects proportionately twice as much in taxes as 
the other, «ire their welfare effort’s equal? Surely the country with 
proportionately smaller tax revenues would be making a greater 
commitment to social welfare at the expense of other governmental 
expenditures. It is making less effort to collect taxes, but more effort 
to spend what it collects on social welfare.10
Related to this is the effect of the tax burden on the individual:
Because a significant part of a person's economic well-being may be 
measured by his or her disposable income after taxes and transfers, 
rather than by pretax income, the overall welfare level of people is 
affected not only by social welfare expenditures but also by taxes.11
Gilbert and Moon reflect the tax burden by expressing tax revenues (TR) as a 
percentage of GDP, thus:
IB _
GDP ...[4]
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This modifies their welfare effort equation to:
_DE+TE__________
(GDP)(NEED)(TR/GDP) ...[5]
2. Comments on Gilbert and Moon's work.
2.1 The extended definition of welfare expenditure.
Table El summarises the main results of Gilbert and Moon's analysis. It is 
clear from comparing Columns 1 and 2 that the inclusion of tax 
expenditures for this limited sample of countries significantly changes the 
rankings of welfare effort for countries such as France and the UK. In 
aggregate, however, the changes in the rankings between columns 1 and 2 
are slight the rank correlation coefficient is 0.93. 12
Table E.1. Rank on welfare effort using Gilbert and Moon indices.
Country
(year)
(1)
Conventional 
index (score)
(2)
DE+TE/
GDP
(3)
NEED
Index
(SNI-1)
(4)
Gilbert/Moon 
NET index (I)
Netherlands (1980) 1 2 9 1
(35.5) (41.7) (0.847) (40.0)
Sweden (1980) 2 1 1 6
(32.5) (45.7) (1.154) (29.8)
France (1980) 3 5 6 9
(28.3) (29.0) (1.036) (24.5)
Ireland (1981) 4 3 2 3
(27.8) (36.5) (1.112) (33.8)
Austria (1981) 5 6 4 10
(27.1) (27.2) (1.068) (23.0)
U K (1981) 6 4 3 2
(23.5) (35.9) (1.075) (34.1)
Canada (1980) 7 7 8 4
(21.0) (26.7) (0.922) (33.7)
U S (1981) 8 8 5 7
(20.7) (24.8) (1.056) (28.4)
Australia (1981) 9 9 7 8
(18.9) (20.6) (0.973) (25.4)
Japan (1981) 10 10 10 5
(17.3) (17.3*) (0.756) (31.8)
Source: Gilbert and Moon (1988327-337)
Given the widely accepted validity of Titmuss' argument, the extension of 
welfare expenditure to include tax expenditures suggested by Gilbert and 
Moon should be considered as non-controversial and incorporation of these 
into future estimates of welfare effort should be limited only by the 
availability of data.
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Although Gilbert and Moon do not use private/voluntary financing 
estimates for lack of consistent data, it is not clear theoretically that these 
transfers have as equally a valid standing as tax expenditures in an ’ideal' 
index such as they propose. While their approach is to encompass all non- 
market transfers, it could be argued that the conventional welfare effort 
index is attempting to capture only government action to improve collective 
welfare. As such, even if these private transfers could be operationalised it is 
doubtful whether these are an appropriate addition to the extended welfare 
effort measure.
2.2 Adjusting for need.
There is strong intuitive appeal for Gilbert and Moon's arguments in this 
respect and as the results of their analysis show there are considerable 
empirical differences in defining which countries are welfare leaders or 
laggards when account is taken of differing levels of need in each country.
As Table El shows, Gilbert and Moon's adjustments for need have a 
considerable impact on welfare effort ranking, pushing leaders such as 
France well down the scale and promoting laggards such as the US and 
Japan up the ranks. The rank correlation coefficients between Column 4 and 
Columns 1 and 2 are 0.21 and 0.41 respectively. In other words, the Gilbert 
and Moon adjustment for need produces a highly significant re-ranking 
such that the adjusted rankings bear almost no relationship with the 
original rankings.
The critical issue for adjusting the welfare effort measure in this way is the 
choice of variables to reflect 'need' and their relative weighting in a 
composite index. As other studies of cross national comparisons have 
shown (Buhmann et al 1988) comparative analyses are quite sensitive to 
choice of measures of need, adjustments for equivalences, etc.
Gilbert and Moon's preferred variable is the rate of pre tax and transfer 
poverty for each country, comparable data for which was not then available. 
In the following section, this paper uses a measure of pre tax and transfer 
poverty developed for comparative use in the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) and the results for LIS countries are compared with the Gilbert and 
Moon index.
In the absence of a poverty measure, the index which Gilbert and Moon 
develop has strong appeal and in some respects may be a better measure
than pre-tax and transfer poverty rates. Theoretically poverty rates may be an 
appropriate measure when looking solely at income transfers. Social welfare 
effort, on the other hand, is a concept which is intended to have wider 
application. For example, the demands on health and education programs 
come not just from the 'poor' but also reflect the demographic composition 
of the population. Countries with relatively larger numbers of children or 
the elderly will have a greater need for these types of expenditures. Thus, 
while the Gilbert and Moon index may not seem as clear cut a measure of 
need as poverty estimates it is a measure which is appropriate to the broader 
picture of social welfare expenditure that the welfare effort index is 
attempting to capture.
There are two ways in which need can be taken into account when looking 
at welfare effort. Gilbert and Moon opt to divide the expenditure index by 
the need index [2/3]. An alternative way of looking at the problem, and one 
which I think better expresses the argument which Gilbert and Moon are 
making, is one which plots welfare expenditure rank against need rank.
In Diagram 1 the diagonal represents expenditures which are commensurate 
with need, those on or above the diagonal could be considered as welfare 
effort leaders while those below could be considered as laggards.
Another way of expressing welfare effort to reflect parity between welfare 
expenditures and degree of need would be to subtract welfare expenditure 
ranks from need ranks and then rank countries by this difference.
Diagram 1: comparing welfare expenditure 
ranks with need ranks.
Welfare expenditure 
rank greater than or
N'lands equal to need rank: ’leaders'
Canada
Australia
France •
•  Austria
Welfare expenditure rank 
less than need rank: 'laggards'Sweden Ireland
Welfare
-I---- expenditure
10 (rank)
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Using the ranks shown in Table E2 (Column 3-Column 2), welfare 
expenditure commensurate with need would be expressed in the following 
ranking:
1 Netherlands (+7)
2 France (+1)
=3 Sweden, US, Japan (0)
=6 UK, Ireland (-1)
=8 Austria, Canada, Australia (-2)
2.3 Adjusting for taxes.
In principle, Gilbert and Moon's arguments concerning the need to control 
for tax revenue raisings seems persuasive especially in terms of the 
examples quoted earlier. However, there are several problems with their 
approach here. The first is a technical error in the construction of their 
index.
(1)
DE/GDP
(2)
(DE+TE)/
GDP
(3)
NEED
(4)
(DE+TE)/
GDP.NEED
(5)
(DE+TE)/
TR
(6)
(DE+TE)/
TR.NEED
N'lands (1980) 1 2 9 1 4 1
Sweden (1980) 2 1 1 2 3 6
France (1980) 3 5 6 6 7 9
Ireland (1981) 4 3 2 4 1 3
Austria (1981) 5 6 4 7 9 10
U K (1981) 6 4 3 3 5 2
Canada (1980) 7 7 8 5 5 4
U S (1981) 8 8 5 8 6 7
Australia (1981) 9 9 7 10 8 8
Japan (1981) 10 10 10 9 10 5
Source: Gilbert and Moon (1988: 237)
OECD Social Expenditure 1960-1990 (1985)
OECD Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-84 (1985) 
OECD Labour Force Statistics 1963-1983 (1985)
Recalling equation [5] it can be seen that the effect of introducing tax 
revenues (TR) as a proportion of GDP is to cancel out GDP from the relative 
reckoning:
DE+TE / TR / N E E D  = DF+TE /NEED 
GDP GDP TR
In effect the welfare effort measure which Gilbert and Moon have 
constructed is welfare expenditure as a percentage of tax revenue, adjusted
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for need. (This is the measure shown in Column 5 of Table El.) It appears 
that Gilbert and Moon believe their measure still controls for GDP but as 
equation [6] shows this is not the case:
■DE±IE__
(TR)(NEED) ...[6]
Apart from this technical error, there are theoretical objections to including 
tax revenue in the welfare effort measure. Principally, it is not at all clear 
that differences in funding arrangements for non-welfare activities - eg 
whether road and transport developments are financed privately or through 
taxation - should affect the index of social welfare effort. It makes sense to 
adjust welfare expenditures for the society’s capacity to pay, so the natural 
deflator is the level of GDP. Implicitly Gilbert and Moon, assuming that total 
tax revenues are the relevant deflator, are attempting to measure 
government's 'ability to pay’; but they are ignoring the multitude of 
environmental, institutional and political factors which influence the 
decision to finance non-welfare activities through taxation.
A second objection follows from Gilbert and Moon's argument concerning 
the effect of the tax burden on individuals' disposable incomes. While their 
observation is correct - that taxation can influence welfare levels and 
rankings - they are implicitly arguing for the degree of progressivity in the 
tax system to be taken into account. In which case, it is more appropriate for 
such an adjustment to occur in the numerator rather than the denominator 
of the equation since progressive taxation is part of the welfare effort rather 
than part of society's resources or needs against which such effort is to be 
measured. We might, for instance, wish to use a measure of tax 
progressivity, P, to construct an alternative welfare effort index:
fDF+TR + (t r*p )
(GDP) (NEED) ... [7]
Table E3 uses a measure of tax progressivity based on actual incidence of 
taxes for families in the LIS data set.13 Countries with highly progressive tax 
systems such as the US and Canada are promoted one rank using this
measure.
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Table E3. Welfare effort rank adjusting for progressivity of the tax system.
Country (DE+TE)+(TR*P)/
(year) (GDP) (NEED)
Australia (1981) 6
(0.67)
Canada (1981) 5
(0.88)
Germany (1979) 3
(1.06)
Netherlands (1981) 2
(1.26)
Sweden (1981) 1
(1.56)
U K (1979) 4
(0.92)
U S (1979) 7
(0.65)
In summary, both technically and theoretically there appears little 
justification for adjusting for tax revenue in the way suggested by Gilbert 
and Moon. Although their argument in respect of the impact of the tax 
burden has some validity, alternative ways of incorporating this adjustment 
into welfare effort measures needs to be considered. The approach used in 
Table E3 may be one way of doing so.
2.4 Reconstructing the Gilbert and Moon index
After considering each of the modifications suggested by Gilbert and Moon, I 
believe the most defensible measure is:
DF+TF
(GDP) (NEED) ...[8]
Table E2 follows through the changes in rankings attributable to each of the 
steps suggested by Gilbert and Moon. Column 1 shows the ranking based on 
the conventional measure. The addition of tax expenditures (Column 2) 
significantly alters the rankings for the top six countries. The need index 
rankings are shown in Column 3, with highest = 1 and lowest = 10. 
Adjusting Column 2 by Column 3 (Column 4) gives the preferred measure 
described by equation [8]. Columns 5 and 6 are the Gilbert and Moon indices 
which measure the ratios of welfare expenditure to tax revenue (5) and 
adjusted for need (6).
Whereas the Gilbert and Moon method of adjustment for need alters the 
rankings substantially, with Sweden moving from first to sixth position, the 
preferred adjustment method implies more minor re-rankings of one or
Ell
two places. The rank correlation coefficient between columns 2 and 4 is high, 
0.93.
In summary, the marked changes in welfare effort rank which Gilbert and 
Moon present are invalid on closer inspection. The technical error described 
in Section 2.3 substitutes tax revenue raisings for GDP as the deflator so that 
countries with low tax revenues relative to GDP appear to make a greater 
welfare effort than is the case. Conversely, countries such as Sweden which 
rely heavily on the tax system as a means of redistribution, fall considerably 
in welfare effort rank on this measure.
3. Alternative measures of welfare effort
3.1 Welfare effort using alternative need indices.
It was noted earlier that welfare effort rankings are likely to be highly 
sensitive to the need index employed. This section of the paper investigates 
several alternatives to the need index employed by Gilbert and Moon:
Nl= pre tax and transfer poverty rates for families
N2= degree of income inequality as expressed by the Gini co-efficient
N3= Gilbert and Moon’s need index (SNI-1)
Table E4 shows the need indices described above. The N1 index has been 
calculated from LIS data using a relative poverty line of 50% of median 
disposable income, adjusted for family size using the OECD equivalence 
scale.14 This index is presented cautiously since it does not include poverty 
rates for single non-elderly persons and families without children. The N2 
index has also been calculated using the LIS data set and is the Gini 
coefficient for pre tax and transfer income (adjusted for family size.)15
The N3 measure is based on the Gilbert and Moon SNI-1 need index, 
calculated for the year which corresponds with the LIS data.
Table E4. Alternative indices of need.
Country:
Nl: Pre-transfer poverty 
rates % families
Rank
N2: Degree of inequality 
Gini coefficient
Rank
N3: Gilbert/Moon 
SNI-1 Index
Rank
Australia (1981) 28.0 5 0.414 4 1.05 2
Canada (1981) 24.9 7 0.387 7 1.01 4
Germany (1979) 31.0 3 0.407 5 0.91 6
Netherlands (1981) 32.5 2 0.467 1 0.97 5
Sweden (1981) 36.5 1 0.417 3 0.89 7
U K (1979) 30.0 4 0.393 6 1.04 3
U S (1979) 27.1 6 0.425 2 1.13 1
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The rationale behind the choice of each of these measures is that they are 
various ways of representing 'need' using comparable cross-national data. 
Thus, N1 describes those defined as poor on an international standard 
poverty line; N2 gives a summary measure of societal income inequality 
which social expenditures (particularly income transfers) might seek to 
address; N3 is an indicator of demographically generated demands, as 
discussed in Section 1.2.
Each of these measures are used to calculate alternative versions of the 
welfare effort index shown in Table E5. Two trends are discernible: Sweden 
and the Netherlands are leaders on all versions of the index, while Australia 
and the US are laggards. The remaining countries have variable rankings.
The correlation between each of these measures is high. Columns 1 and 4 
have identical rankings; the lowest rank correlation coefficient is between 
columns 2 and 3, but it is still fairly high at 0.79.
Table E5. Welfare effort index using alternative indices of need.
Country (DE+TE)/
GDP
(DE+TE)/
GDP.N1
(DE+TE)/
GDP.N2
(DE+TE)/
GDP.N3
Australia (1981) 7 7 7 7
(0.65) (0.70) (0.65) (0.62)
Canada (1981) 5 3 5 5
(0.85) (1.02) (0.88) (0.84)
Germany (1979) 3 5 3 3
(0.97) (0.94) (0.98) (1.07)
N etherlands (1981) 2 1 2 2
(1.35) (1.28) (1.24) (1.39)
Sw eden (1981) 1 2 1 1
(1.50) (1.22) (1.62) (1.68)
U K (1979) 4 4 4 4
(0.98) (0.96) (0.97) (0.93)
US (1979) 6 6 6 6
(0.70) (0.78) (0.70) (0.62)
Using the method described above in Section 2.2 welfare expenditure rank 
has been plotted against need rank to produce an alternative view of welfare 
leaders and laggards. Diagram 2 shows that for the majority of the measures, 
Sweden, West Germany and the Netherlands are welfare effort leaders; 
Canada and the UK have mixed rankings; while Australia and the US 
appear laggards when comparing welfare expenditure and need.
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Diagram 2: Comparing welfare expenditure
with alternative need ranks.
'Leaders’
O AusN'lands
' Laggards'
N'lands
+  Aus
N'lands
Welfare
- j —  expenditure 
7 (rank)
O N1: Poverty index +  N2: Gini index • N3: Gilbert & Moon
If the differences between rankings on need and welfare expenditure are 
examined, the .average of measures N1-N3 produces the following ranking:
1 Sweden (+5.5)
2 Netherlands (+4)
3 West Germany (+1)
4 Canada (-0.5)
5 UK (-2)
6 US (-35)
7 Australia (-4.5)
3.2 Income transfer effort
It was noted earlier that it may be more appropriate to use need indices such 
as pre tax and transfer poverty rates to examine only the income transfer 
efforts of various countries.
Table E6 shows total income transfers (defined here as total social security 
transfers plus tax expenditures) as a percentage of GDP. Thus:
IT+TE  
GDP ...[9]
This measure has been adjusted for need measures N1-N3:
IT+TE
(GDP)(NEED) ...[10]
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Table E6. Income transfer effort
IT+TE/
G DP
IT+TE/
(G D P )(N 1 )
IT+TE/
(G D P )(N 2 )
IT +T E /
(G D P )(N 3 )
A u stra lia  (1981) 7 7 7 7
(0 .5 1 ) (0 .54 ) (0 .5 0 ) (0 .4 8 )
C an ad a  (1981) 5 5 5 5
(0 .7 7 ) (0 .93 ) (0 .80 ) (0 .7 7 )
G erm an y  (1979) 4 4 4 3
(0 .9 8 ) (0 .95 ) (0 .9 9 ) (1 .0 8 )
N e th e r la n d s  (1981) 2 1 2 2
(1 .4 6 ) (1 .3 8 ) (1 .3 3 ) (1 .5 0 )
S w e d e n  (1981) 1 2 1 1
(1 .6 1 ) (1 .31 ) (1 .7 4 ) (1 .8 1 )
U  K (1979) 3 3 3 4
(1 .0 3 ) (1 .03 ) (1 .0 4 ) (0 .9 9 )
U  S (1979) 6 6 6 6
(0 .6 4 ) (0 .7 1 ) (0 .6 4 ) (0 .5 7 )
As Table E6 shows, the separate analysis of income transfers results in little 
variance in rankings from those of aggregate welfare expenditures. This 
suggests that leaders/laggards in overall welfare effort tend to be 
leaders/laggards in income transfer effort.
We find again that the correlations between these rankings are high - the 
lowest rank correlation coefficient is 0.86 between Columns 1 and 2, the 
rankings in 1 and 3 are identical and the correlation coefficient for 1 and 4 is 
0.96. In other words, adjustment for N2 makes no difference to the welfare 
effort rankings, adjustment for N3 makes only a very slight difference, while 
adjustment for N1 produces significant but still relatively minor re­
rankings.
4. Conclusion: implications for welfare effort studies.
The welfare effort literature has largely accepted the index first developed by 
Wilensky in 1975 which has been adopted (with minor modifications) by the 
ILO. Studies using this welfare effort index largely attempt to identify the 
determinants of the size of welfare effort through multiple regression 
analysis using such explanatory variables as the electoral cycle, 
parliamentary composition, degree of unionisation, economic growth (see 
for example, Castles,1982; Swank and Hicks,1985). Other writers have used 
the index to examine hypotheses concerning the convergence or divergence 
of welfare effort in OECD countries (O'Connor, 1988).
Gilbert and Moon's work re-opens the issue of whether the ILO measure is 
sufficiently inclusive of all the elements which should be called into account 
in measuring welfare effort. Their work presents the case that as a
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minimum the conventional index should be extended to include tax 
expenditures and additionally, that there is a strong case to be made for 
adjusting for need. A third modification which I suggest earlier is to 
incorporate some measure of the progressivity of the tax system into the 
welfare effort equation, although the case here is not as strong as that 
suggested for tax expenditures and need. I have argued strongly against 
Gilbert and Moon's method of adjustment for tax revenues, since it seems 
theoretically dubious and their actual method appears to negate their stated 
intentions.
Although the empirical examples discussed in this paper used only a limited 
sample of countries, Section 2 (10) and Section 3 (7), the alternative 
measures suggested resulted in some significant re-ranking. The 
implications of these findings may: affect which countries should be 
regarded as leaders and laggards; reduce the apparent divergence in effort (as 
noted by O’Connor,1988:275) through the use of more comprehensive 
definitions of welfare expenditure; and may affect the regression results of 
various explanatory variables.
1 International Labour Office: The Cost of Social Security, vol 11 (1983).
2 OECD: Social Expenditure 1960-1990 (1985) ,
3 The terms 'leaders' and 'laggards' were first coined by Harold Wilensky in The Welfare State and 
Equality (1975) and continues to be used by writers in comparative studies of welfare states.
4 Gilbert,N and Moon,A: Analyzing Welfare Effort: An Appraisal of Comparative Methods. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 7(2) 328-332.
5 ibid, 329.
 ^ibid.
^ibid.
8 ibid, 327.
9 ibid, 331.
10 ibid, 327.
11 ibid, 330.
11 2 345*Rank correlations for Tables 1-6 are reported in Appendix A.
Kakwani’s measure of progressivity, calculated from LIS data for taxes on gross income.
14 The OECD equivalence scale weights the first adult as 1; second and subsequent adults as 0.7; and 
each child as 0.5.
I8 910*4Calculated using LIS data, using pre tax and transfer income. Unit of analysis is the family. Income 
equivalence scales based on OECD equivalences.
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Appendix F
Comparable results from other LIS studies.
F2
Table F.l. Proportion of population in poverty (based on 50% median adjusted income).
Estimates by Smeeding et al. (1989,Table 5.2) and Buhmann et al. (1988, Table 10).
Percentage of persons in families with adjusted income below 50% of median income.
a b c d e f
Australia 12.2 18.0 16.0 14.8 12.3 13.7
Canada 12.6 17.1 15.0 14.4 13.2 12.3
Germany 5.6 10.5 7.6 6.6 5.2 5.4
Netherlands * 9.7 7.3 7.2 8.0 8.8
Norway 5.2 14.3 10.3 8.9 5.1 5.2
Sweden 5.3 13.9 7.9 6.5 5.4 5.3
Sw itzerland' 8.5 13.6 10.5 9.8 8.5 8.3
UK 9.7 17.0 15.2 14.0 11.4 8.1
USA 17.1 19.7 17.9 17.8 17.2 17.2
a Smeeding et a l : using US poverty line equivalence scale
b-f Buhmann et al: using disposable income unadjusted, and adjusted by SUBJ, CONS, PROG 
and ST AT equivalences respectively.
Table F.2. Proportion of population in poverty, by family type. 
Estimates by Smeeding et al. (1985b,Table 5)
Percentage of persons who are poor in selected family types.
total elderly
families
single
parent
families
two parent 
families
other
families
Canada 12.1 11.5 37.5 11.0 8.5
Germany 5.0 9.3 18.1 3.9 5.4
Norway 4.8 4.6 12.6 3.4 5.7
Sweden 5.0 0.1 9.2 5.0 7.0
UK 8.8 18.1 29.1 6.5 4.1
USA 17.1 19.7 17.9 17.8 17.2
Table F3. Proportion of population in poverty, by poverty line.
Estimates by Buhmann et al. (1988, Table 10) using PROG equivalence scale.
Percentage of persons in families with adjusted income below x% of median income.
40% 50% 60%
Australia 6.4 12.3 19.5
Canada 8.1 13.2 19.0
Germany 2.6 5.2 11.3
Netherlands 5.1 8.0 12.8
Norway 2.8 5.1 11.9
Sweden 3.3 5.4 8.9
Switzerland 4.8 8.5 14.2
UK 4.2 11.4 18.7
USA 11.4 17.2 22.6
Table F.4. Post-transfer poverty gaps, by type of household. 
Estimates by Smeeding et al (1989, Table 5.13).
Post-transfer poverty gaps as a percentage of 50% poverty line.
Families
w ith Elderly 
children families
Australia 31.6 12.6
Canada 31.4 22.7
Germany 24.1 26.5
Norway 25.4 18.8
Sweden 28.4 3.0
Switzerland 28.8 19.8
UK 21.4 16.4
USA 37.7 29.3
Table F.5. Post-transfer poverty gaps,
Estimates by Buhmann et al. (1988, Table l l ) -
Post-transfer poverty gaps as a percentage of median equivalent income,
%
Australia 16.4
Canada 16.7
Germany 14.1
Netherlands 24.5
Norway 16.9
Sweden 17.5
Switzerland 17.3
UK 10.7
USA 19.0
Using 50% poverty line and PROG equivalence scale.
Table F.6. Post-transfer Gini coefficients.
Buhmann et al (1988, Appendix Table 1) and Bishop et al (1989, Tables 2 and 3).
Gini coefficients for disposable income.
Australia
a
0.312
b
0.344
c
0.316
Canada 0.305 0.330 0.319
Germany 0.324 0.357 0.334
Netherlands * 0.308 0331
Norway * 0.306 0.269
Sweden 0.267 0.287 0.229
Switzerland 0.306 0.332 0335
UK 0.299 0.338 0.281
USA 0.329 0.362 0.346
a Buhmann et al: weighted by persons 
b Bishop et al: family incomes 
c Bishop et al: per capita incomes
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Table F.7. Proportional reduction in poverty head-count. 
Smeeding et al (1985b, Table 6).
Percentage reduction in poverty rates for persons.
reduction 
Canada 52.7 
Germany 78.8 
Norway 80.1 
Sweden 87.8 
UK 68.5 
USA 38.1
Poverty line defined as half median equivalent income.
Table F.8. Proportional reduction in poverty gap. 
Smeeding et al (1985b, Table 8).
Percentage reduction in poverty gap for persons.
reduction 
Canada 51.4
Germany 68.2
Norway 48.8
Sweden 50.4
UK 78.0
________ USA 43.8
Poverty line defined as half median equivalent income.
Appendix G
Sampling error and statistical significance.
G2
This appendix discusses the reliability of the statistics quoted in this study 
and the inferences which are drawn from them. The discussion relates only 
to random sampling error, that is to say the probability that the value of a 
sample statistic will differ to some extent from the true population value 
because a random sample will never be truly representative. Other sorts of 
possible error, such as non-random sampling and problems in defining and 
measuring variables, are discussed in the text where appropriate.
There are three levels at which data are analysed and compared in this 
study: aggregate country statistics; disaggregated country statistics; and inter­
country comparisons of statistics. Each of these is discussed in turn.
G.l. Aggregate country statistics.
Typical statistics which are reported in this study are the percentage of a 
country's LIS sample which is in poverty, or the Gini coefficient measuring 
the inequality of the income distribution. These reported statistics are based 
on samples of at least several thousand observations. The sample sizes 
reported in Appendix A are listed again here.
Table G.l. Size of LIS samples.
Country Sample size
A ustra lia 15985
C anada 15136
France 11044
Germany 2727
N etherlands 4833
N orw ay 10414
Sweden 9625
Sw itzerland 7036
UK 6888
USA 15225
Because the samples are fairly large, the sample statistics should provide 
reliable estimates of the population statistics, but there is likely to be at least 
some small element of random sampling error.
For example, if the sample size for a country is n=10,000 and the proportion 
of the sample in poverty is p=0.250, the sample standard error s is Vp(l-p)/n 
s = V0.25X0.75/10000 = 0.0043.
The 95% confidence interval for the estimate of the proportion of the 
population in poverty is p +/- 2s = [0.2414, 0.2586]. More simply, we can be 
reasonably sure that the true poverty rate lies between 24.5% and 25.5%, and 
very sure that it lies between 24% and 26%.
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The standard errors of the sample estimates for the countries with larger 
samples are, of course, even lower. For the smallest sample, Germany, 
however, the standard error of the estimate would be, in this example, 
s = V 0.25X0.75/2727 = 0.0083.
When countries are ranked in terms of the sample poverty rates we are 
interested in the confidence interval for the difference between two 
estimated population proportions. The standard error of the estimated 
difference is given by s = V pi(l-pl)/ni + P2(l-p2) /n 2 •
Take, for example, the post-transfer poverty rates reported in Table 4.3 for 
France (0.152) and Germany (0.127). With what degree of confidence can we 
assert that poverty in Germany is lower than poverty in France? The sample 
difference is 0.025. The sampling standard error is:
s = V 0.152x0.848/11044+0.127x0.873/2727 = 0.0072.
The 95 percent confidence interval for the difference between the German 
and French poverty rates is [0.011, 0.039]. In other words the ranking which 
places France with a higher poverty rate than Germany is very robust.
The standard errors of the estimated Gini coefficients are more complex to 
determine. Bishop et al (1989b, Table 3) report standard errors for their LIS 
sample Gini coefficients which are generally less than one percentage point. 
Their estimate of the German Gini coefficient, however, has a standard error 
of five percentage points.
G.2. Disaggregated country statistics.
Some of the aggregate statistics are broken down by family type. The 
disaggregated sample statistics are necessarily based on smaller samples and 
will have correspondingly greater standard errors.
For example, Table 4.24 reports that the average post-transfer gap for lone 
parents in Australia was 0.333 of the poverty line. In this case, there were 163 
observations of lone parent families in poverty and the sample standard 
deviation was 0.233. The standard error of the sample mean is s /Vn = 
0.233/Vl63 = 0.018. The 95% confidence interval for the sole parent poverty 
gap is therefore [29.7%, 36.9%].
This example indicates that the disaggregated sample statistics must be 
treated with caution when cell sizes become small.
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G.3. Inter-country comparisons.
The study compares sets of aggregate statistics across the sample of ten LIS 
countries. Diagram 4.6, for example, compares poverty reduction with post­
transfer poverty rates. The illustrated linear regression line (based on 
Ordinary Least Squares regression) indicates the nature of the relationship 
between these variables; in this case a downward-sloping line indicates that, 
on average, higher levels of poverty reduction are associated with lower 
levels of post-transfer poverty.
The extent of the scatter of observations away from this regression line 
indicates the strength of this linear relationship. The diagram displays the 
summary R2 statistic which measures (inversely) the extent of the scatter. 
Values close to zero indicate that there is no linear relationship, whereas 
values close to unity indicate a strong linear relationship.
With ten observations and one explanatory variable there are eight degrees 
of freedom. The F-test for statistical significance is F^s = 8R2/(1-R2). The 
critical values at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are, respectively, 
3.46, 5.32 and 11.26. The corresponding "critical values" of R2 are 0.302, 0.399 
and 0.585.
Put simply, if the reported R2 is greater than 0.3, we can infer that there is 
less than a ten percent probability that the estimated linear relationship is 
spurious. If the R2 is greater than 0.4 (0.6), the probability of a spurious 
relationship is less than five percent (one percent).
In the case of multiple regressions, where there are two or more explanatory 
variables in the regression equation, the degrees of freedom are lower and
the critical values of R2 are higher. With n observations and (k-1)
n-k R2
explanatory variables, the F statistic is Fk-i,n-k = x '^ r 2 • (See f°r example, 
Koutsoyiannis, 1977).
The corresponding critical values of R2, for significance at the five percent 
level, are 0.575 with two explanatory variables, 0.704 with three explanatory 
variables and 0.806 with four explanatory variables.
In the text, I generally refer to relationships which are significant at the 5% 
level as "moderately strong" or "significant" and to those which are 
significant at the 1% level as "strong" or "very significant". Relationships
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which are not significant at the 5% level are generally referred to as "weak" 
or "insignificant".
Reference
Koutsoyiannis, A. 1977. Theory of Econometrics. 2nd edition. London: 
Macmillan.
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Appendix A
Luxembourg Income Study
Database description.
/  A2
A.l. The Luxembourg Income Study Database.
Table A .l. Data sets in the first wave of LIS.
Country Year Survey source Sample size
"A ustralia 1981-82 Income and Housing Survey 15985
"Canada 1981 Survey of Consumer Finances 15136
"France 1979 Survey  of In d iv id u a l Incom e Tax 
Returns
11044
France 1981 INED-CERC Survey of W om en w ith 
Children
3639
* Germ any 1981 1981 German Transfer Survey 2727
Israel 1979 Family Expenditure Survey 2271
"N etherlands 1983 Survey of Income and Program Users 4833
*Norway 1979 Survey of Norwegian Tax Files 10414
"Sweden 1981 Swedish Income Distribution Survey 9625
"Switzerland 1982 Swiss Income and W ealth Survey 7036
"United
Kingdom
1979 Family Expenditure Survey 6888
"United States 1979 March Current Population Survey 15225
* Indicates the data sets used in this study.
Table A.2. Data sets in  the second wave of LIS.
Country Year Survey source
Australia
Belgium
1985-86
1985
Income and Housing Survey
Canada 1987 Survey of Consumer Finances
Germ any
Hungarv
1984
1987
German Panel Survey
Israel 1986-87 Family Expenditure Survey
Italy 1986 Bank of Italy Income Survey
Luxembourg 1985 Luxembourg Household Panel Study
N etherlands 1987 Survey of Income and Program Users
Poland 1986 Polish Household Budget Survey
Sweden 1987 Swedish Income Distribution Survey
United 
Kingdom  
United States
1986 Family Expenditure Survey
1985 March Current Population Survey
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A.2. Income Variables
VI Wage and Salary Income (Gross)
V2 Mandatory Employer Contributions
V3 Nonmandatory Employer 
Contributions
V4 Farm Self-Employment Income 
V5 Nonfarm Self-Employment Income 
V 6 In-Kind Earnings 
V7 Mandatory Contrib'ns: Self-Employed 
V8 Income from Property 
V9 Noncash Property Income 
V10 Market Value of Residence
VII Income Tax
V12 Property or Wealth Taxes
V13 Mandatory Employee Contributions
V14 Other Direct Taxes
V15 Indirect Taxes
V16 Sick Pay
VI7 Accident Pay
V18 Disability Pay
V19 Social Retirement Benefits
V20 Child or Family Allowance
V22 Maternity Allowances
V23 Military/Veterans' Benefits
V24 Other Social Insurance
V25 Means-Tested Cash Benefits
V26 Near Cash Benefits
V27 Food Benefits
V28 Housing Benefits
V29 Medical Benefits
V30 Heating Allowances
V31 Education Benefits
V32 Private Pensions
V33 Public Sector Pensions
V34 Alimony/Child Support
V35 Other Regular Private Income
V36 Other Cash Income
V37 Realized Lump Sum Payments
V38 Total (or Net) Income
V39 Head — Net Wage/Salary
V40 Head — Hourly Wage Rate
V41 Spouse — Net Wage/Salary
V42 Spouse — Hourly Wage Rate
V21 Unemployment Pay
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A.2.1. Derived Variables (Available for all Countries)
SELFI= Income from Self Employment = V4 + V5
EARNING= Earnings = VI + V4 + V5
PENSIOI= Pension Income = V32 + V33
MEANSI= Meanstested Income = V25 + V26
OTHSOCI= Other Social Security = V16 + V17 + V18 + V22 +V23 + V24
SOCI= Total Social Security = V19 + V20 + V21 + OTHSOCI
SOCTRANS= Social Transfers Total = MEANSI + SOCI
PRIVATI= Private Income = V34 + V35
PAYROLL= Payroll Taxes = V7 + V13
H= Factor Income = EARNINGS + V8
TRANSI= Transfer Income = SOCI + MEANSI + PRIVAT1
MI= M arket Income = FI + PENSIOI
GI= Gross Income = MI + TRANSI + V36
DPI= Disposable Income = GI-V11-PAYROLL
PI= Per Capita Income = DPI/D4
A5
A.2.3. Demographic Variables
D1 Age-Head
D2 Age-Spouse
D3 Sex-Head
D4 Number of Person in Family (Unit)
D5 Family Structure
D6 Number Earners
D7 Location Indicator farm, non farm
D8 Ethnicity/Nationality/Race-Head
D9 Head — Race
DIO Head — Level of Education
Dll Spouse — Level of Education
D12 Head — Occupational Training Group
D13 Spouse — Occupational Training 
Group
D14 Head — Occupational Classification 
D15 Spouse — Occupational Classification 
D16 Head — Industry Classification 
D17 Spouse — Industry Classification 
D18 Head — Type of Worker Group 
D19 Spouse — Type of Worker Group 
D20 Location Indicator — Rural/Urban 
D21 Marital Status of Head
D23 Head — Full-Time, Part-Time
D24 Spouse — Full-Time, Part-Time
D25 Head — Disability Status
D26 Spouse — Disability Status
D27 Number of Children Under 18
D28 Age Youngest Child
LFSHD Head — Labour Force Status
LFSSP Spouse — Labour Force Status
HRSHD Head — Hours Worked Per Week
HRSSP Spouse — Hours Worked Per Week
D22 Housing Tenure
A.3. The unit of analysis variable.
The following discussion is drawn from notes prepared by the LIS Technical 
Director, John Coder. The LIS variable D5 "Family Structure" assists 
researchers to identify the type of unit for which the data was originally 
collected. In Chapter 1 I set out the problems associated with comparing data 
from different types of units. In this section I describe the types of units for 
which data was collected in each country.
Australia, Germany, UK, US: These countries' databases allow the choice 
between household and family units. The variable D5 has the following 
values:
1= Single family household 
2= Multi-family household
3= Separate family from a multi-family household 
Selecting cases where D5= 1 or 2, yields household units for analysis; 
selecting 1 or 3 yields family units.
Switzerland: only family records are available. D5=l.
Canada: the unit of observation in Canada is the "economic unit". Coder 
notes that the definition is based on household relationships and is virtually 
identical to the family definition used in the US. D5=4.
Netherlands: the data from The Netherlands is for households only, D5=5.
Norway and Sweden: these units are coded D5=6 to indicate that they are 
based on taxation or administrative units. Coder notes that in the past these 
have been loosely termed as families. As noted in Chapter 1 however, in 
Sweden unmarried persons over the age of 18 years are considered as 
separate units and not as "family" members if they reside with their parents.
France: The only unit of analysis available in the French taxation data is that 
of the household. The household is constituted by combining the tax returns 
of all members. D5=8.
